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CIlAPI'm I

JAPAl>l ENVISIONS A

W01~W

Pl1PIRE IIi THE FAR E!\ST

Respondbillty tor t..':le war between Japan and the United St..'\tes has
been a topic much discussed since the dq that Pearl Harbor

tering blows of the Jap:mese.

receim t.he shat-

The a.ttack was one of the most hum1l..i.'lting a.nd

devastating catc.strophios ever end,;.lred by our proud and t'dghty ootion. 1
making an an.a].ys1a

o~

In

the responsibility for this wcl-r, one finds a great di..

vergence of opinion among writers.

Some claim t1:18:1;, Japan, ambitious for

blam.e on President t.'rr.tnY..lin Delano lloosevelt ar..d tlle statesmen who
'J

wore di-

! "-

rooting our nation.:" The defeat at HO.l!ro.ii was, at the outset, bl. 'lln.ed. uoon
Japan, beea'tWe she hud l,";tU'·lChed the attack at the moment th..'lt our Amorlc.;m

Governrtl.ent
~

,laS

!2::!! Tim¥,

trying

to find. a road to peaoe. 3 In a specilll mGssago to the

Bertr£all

D. Hulsn said that 5ecret.'tl"y' of St::!t,6, Cordell Hull,

accused Ja.pcm of making n lttreacberous a:1d utterl.v unprovoked attack" 4 upon

."'
1 UI~:ted St.e.tes D<:r~a.rtment of state, Inve~;;tiqn 9.f the Pe.u:1
ilarbor Attackl Report of the Joint Conm.ttee OIl the !iivestlgation""Ol the
}'earl Hur~ A:t.tack, Seventy-ninth Congress, 2nd. Sess., Document no. 21.~4,
¥lash1ngton, 1946. 65. ( Ui.ter references will be listed U.S. Deplt. P«U'l

Harb<>r. )

,.

I"

Iiew

"

2 George Norgon.stern, Pearl H::~rbor, The St2!Z of the Socret liar.
York, 1947, 310.
.
....- .. -~

J ~ York 'rimae" December 8, 191tl, pt. 1, p. 1.

-

4 Ibid.

1

2
~

the United States am of ha:rins been "infamously £alse and fraudulent"

5

by

getting ready for the invasion, While her diplcmats were conducting negotta...
tionl to maintalo peace. 6

'\\

\'

Tha.t the Japaneee attack on Pearl Harbor was a. treacherou.G surprise,

wa.s the story given CN.t tar Geveral

1'JAll'S

by Was!:d.naton.

~cana had

not

yet learned that members ot our Armed rOTCM had cracked the secret code,
months before Pearl. Harbor) and th.!lt the Congreumen Who read the oode knew
nearl;y as muoh about Japanese plans as the Tokyo

war councll. 7 But

the Pres-

ident, and the Wash1ngton o.tf1cials wished to give the publli the :t.4ea that a
Japan.ellJe attack was not expected.

8

il'

", Writing 10 ~bt, Charles Cal.lan tansUl expressed. the opi.n1on

that we could not make a comprCl'ld.ao lldtb dictators, who
rulu o£ civU1aed nations.
peace with

u.s, it we

disreg~ed

It _s futile to hope that Japan would maintain

eonsid8l"eci bct'r' conduct since 1931.

The attack on Pearl

fLlU>bor had been dramatized by the Japaneee many timu in hs"
Ch1na.

a.ll tho

'Wl'J.r

a.p.i:nst

Japan bad puraued a pol.107 of eruel and heartless destruction, and

the banbing of Pearl Harbor was only one item in a lor...g llit

ot useless

i

sla.Ulhter and erime.. 9 ,,"

$ !l?,g,

-

6 Ibid.

7 Margenstern, 310-312.
8

-

Ibid.

9 Charles Callan Tanalll, "The United States and Ja.pan,

New York, XVII,

rlo~

64, March, 1942,'lO4.

Th~t-,

J
'On the other hand, Walter MUlis thinks that the question, w~ilo

responsible for the Pearl Ho.l'bor disaster'i", can. never have a tinal
ml'lY ft?ctoTS, both good and bad, enter into tho question,

$0

vlllS

So

anSlleI'.

m..;;.ny motives are

IIIcxtricably'mi.''lgled, th..'1t the moral issue of responsibility must depend on
t,h,e

standard \'111.ioh a purticul.::,r person applies to it,. lUllis :finds it dU:f'i-

cult not to bJ..1JIle Admiral Kimmel and.. General Short because, baing the cor.rmand..

1ng officers at Ha\iaii, they shoald have been prepared for

though their equipment

wUS

<it

militi..:1rY surprise.

not complete and their charts undependable, yet

they were responsible fer brint'ing the ship into port ililespi t,c the dungers they
encountered. lD .

In wi t1:!1.. this thesis, no attempt l>rill be !Iltlde to determine
responsible for the gren.t tragedy of Poe.rl Harbor,

r01'

'~ho

was

writm.'s in general hold

so man;y divergent Ol,Wons that the question may never have n cott$Ct answer.
~ievertheless,

ri!30

an af£ort will be put forth to present the

to power" Americt.l.n

senrch for tl1e rO:1d to

toreig~: ~)oliey

p~ce,

vie~is

0f the more ra ...

in thr: Far ~st, President Roosevelt's

and finally, the revi.sionist theories concerning

?o:lrl Ha:i.bor, which developed attar the Pearl Harbor Investigation, cwill be
discussed in the various cl:<:.q;:l'ters.i ,...
\ I' For more thOl'l a century, J.::p:], ~1 hn.d boen roald.nr:; e11croo.chinnnts on the

mninh:.nd of Ch1na., a::ld on the isli::i.nds near her shores" until at length, she

4
'"

;lold a gX'Olt IDLtr:itiml? empire with reprosontatives sitting at tho council
tables of the nations. 11 As £<~ "back as 1815, the Ju~~nese took control
the Ryu Kyu Islands south of Kyushu.

or

'I'hc Kings of th,ese iah'lds hadt £ or se-

veral hundred years, paid tribute, at one time to China, at another to Japan.

However J -che Japunese su.mmaril:r put an end

/

"':'0

this custom by Mold.ng tho king...

At this t.ime, by a trthlty of amity vith Korea, J"lpan gained contr'='Jl of three
important ports. 12

Dut it was not long be£rJre trouble

arOSG

~iar

reans and the Ja"tx2.nese, culminating in the Sino-Ja.:;anese
lowing yeo.:r, Japan took j'ormosa, ard declared her purpose

between the Ko-

of 189::., 'l'he fo1...

ot control.l1ng

parta

of China. l )

\\' The issues involving the United Str.ltcs and Ja;,>atl vill be better understocd, i f sane m.ention of .tun.er1ca.' s early dealings with Je.pan is made.

the begintlin(t o,f tho twentieth century, tho United.

St~1tes

in1tiated its 'Open

Door' policy, and two years later the .4.nglo-Japaneae alliance
long after this, Japan st.:'rt,oo on her c<'J,.reer of

ion f'avored JalJiln in those days.
Chirla frora B:ussia's

gr,:.~sp,

~:d.re

~las fOI'!:'le<i.

building.

It vus fitting that she should free ::;orth

so when Jap.an made a u;.t.rp:r:5.se

at·l~n.ck

em Port Arthur

11 Ian. Horrisan, ~ Jupa:oaelge ~, Ne"\1l' lork,1943, 24.. 213.

-

12 Ibid., 2h.
~e:,rl

Not

P"ablic opin....

the jl.m.erica::J. press praised the Japaneae.14 ! f\

1.3 U.S. Dep't.,

At

Harbor, 1.

'"

Ihargi."1g victorious at Port Arthur, Japan secured, by the Treaty of
portsmouth, the Liaotil..D.g :;>eninaula, and tr.e southern balf' of Sakhalin, an

111

as a loo.r;e of Kwantung, and possession of the South Vuanchurian Railway, wh1eh
1r:a.8

shortly linlted to Korea by

il

Japanese brll."1Ch lintJ, vi.:t Antung.15

ncse Eastern RaUway rema,ineci lIDder Russian oootro1. 16

'»:lw:1:n

o.

Detschauer bel1evea that no one could question Japan t s

seizure of Sakhalin and the Kwant'U.'Ylg Leased T$ttltory'.

Justice seemed to be

on her side, tor she h£ld 1<ron thi.s territory !rem China :in 1895, only to have
to surrender it a :few months IlJ.ter 'to Gftrmany, Fr;mce, a."1.d Russia who unscru-

puloua.ly divided it among thenwelns, thl'oo years later, Russia taking the
Kwantung Te:rritorjl" tor hcrsolf.l"( i ~i}

America. had brlef.'ll' pursued a policy of empire building when she
took the l:1b11ippines in 1898, but a few y(';;.'...rs luter, she returned to her be-

lie£ in the right of ann. tion to detendne its own st;atu:a, and began to oppose
imperia.l.1mit in Asia, pI'ofessing her bellef in the territorial intogrit,y o:f

China a..'1d the "Open Doorn pollcy,

d~nding

If)

eqwll economic oppor'tuni;';;r Jor all

foreign b-Ilsiness concerns <T::'GTa'l;..1ngthere. 0

:!

,j"

15 lilt was a.t Yalta tlll.lt ROOSevEllt and Cburchill conceded Stalin's
demands in the l"ar East, including the recovery of Southern Sakh.'llin and the
Kurile Islands and tho acquisition of' tl position in J.ia..'1.Churia, that ~ms ta.",tamol.mt. to full cntral of tba.t ancient Chinese prcvince. u Sumner \velles,
~ Decisio~1 £!l! Dobi~, ~ €!r..editJ 191.

16 T. A. Bisson, America. t s
17

!!!: ~stern

I"'c1icl, Ne'(~ York, 1945 J 17.

FJiwin O. H.eiaehalJ.er, The United st,.tos and

21-;~2.

18 Biasoo, 17.

J:lD:~n,

Cambridge,

p

-~-----------------------------------------------------------,

6
Pre;:ldtmt Theodol'e Roosevelt, 'Who acted as mediator in the peace

settlement at PortalOUth (190$) bad made prior arrangements with Japan eon...

cern1ns ManchUria..

Japan and. Russia were obltgated by the trea.ty "not to

obStruct artS' general

~

eOOlmOO to all countries, which Cbba mq take

for the deVelopment of the canmerce and :5.nd.ustr.r of l~. II 19· . r'
IYen thrugh Japan 'became the doldn.mt power in the Far &at

/

treaty, still .be was not satistied, becaWJe she bad reoe1VQ1
Since Roosevelt had helped to &l'TtIl'lgs

l'.,

br th1a

WfIl1'd.t7.

the tenas, the Ja.panese bla:l.ud the Am__•

1Can people, and as a result riots broke out in Ja.panese c1t1ee. Which ~

gered American lite and pt'operty_

It vas not until Russia and Japo.n, on

30, 1907, eonoluded public and secret tr_t1es, wbich marked
tive spb.ere$

or 1.ntl..uenee in 'Manchuria

ized. hie· scheme

tor

1t\:a1anced

01£ their

and Mongolia, that \he

an~"

~

respec-

~t

real-

had failed. 20 'l'he follCAdrJ.a '1fJIiIZ.

on Nov_her )0, Roosevelt concluded the Boot..tlakah1ra Agreement J 1Ib1ch "P"f'e
Japan a tree band. in l1anchuria.,"

.

the Philipp:t:n...

21

to.

return fO'l' a promis. of non-aggre.si.on in

The President va., no doUbt,

Clad to make

tbl..J

pact, .s it

was a means of COJlcU1atinB the .1-'1'4n8.8, who were causiDe him. ser10u coneern
22
over the htmigra.tion quw.J.on, at that time.
He vas part1cular1;r disturbed
over the d1spu.te with Japa.n, in regard to immigration into Cal1fo.t"niD..
Taft had

~ President~

19 Tana1ll"

ao !!!14., h.
21

ll>1d..,

-

22 Ibid

5..

After

B.oosevelt wrote to hhl. stat1ng "that the Admin.i.a-

£!.c3 Door, 5.

,-----------------------------------------------,
7
tration shoul4 take no step$ that would. malee Japan teel that we are 'a. men-

ace to their interests I
'f

in Korth China.

2.3

Looldng At the Japanese side of the question, B.eischauer expresses

the idea that there seems to be no eXC'WS0

tor the

EI:'cl1ah-spea.ld.ng peoplea

claiming as the:f:r> r1ght most of the parts of the world which bave a desirable

cl1mate, and at the same ti."ne ezc1udina the Japanese hm the un:1nbab1ted or
sparsel;r
ting

settled l.a.nds of

tho tropica,

tdm;pq becawJe the latter 'begc1 migra-

at a later period. The Japanese, becauae of wu.ft1e1ent ten1.tOl7 on

the Island, dream of a

new haue in th$ great tmClD:Plored regions south ot them,

particularlTI in New Guinta. and Borneo. 2h
Colonel Bo'uIsa believed that 'the Unit_States ohould not thwart

Japan'se:rpans101'l into ASiatic ten:i.tory near her h<:deland,
might

bave to

f~ with b.ar at .. later date. 2S I :) ,}<'

othe~

we

• B,y 1910, Japan had annexecl 101"ea. regardlua of the fact that she

had

pr~ll'

guaranteed

Bu1des this, during

26
to the Koreans, frMdcm, aM the right to propert1'.

~1orld

\/ar

I~ tald.ng ad"tantage

of the w:i.deaprea.d disorder

in the world, .he presented her wen-known Twenty-one Ilemands to Chins.. 27
When America entered the cQl'1fiict in 1917, Japan bee&nlG our alq.

-

23 Ibid.

24 Rei.eMuer,
25 Tanaill,

6$...66.

~ ~,

S.3.

26 U.S. Dep't., Pearl Harbor, 1.
27

-

Ibid.

P~----------------------------------------l
~

8

the toJJ.owinl yee;rI She· was aaked to participate in an

1nt~'lX"...Allied

pl4n to

aid in the evacuation of Ozechoslovakian torees .from Siberia., and to
the m1l1tary supplies there.

iU<~rd

Fifty thousand Czech soldiers, who had desert-

ed the AUs-trie.n arm1ea to fight for the Allies I were caught by tho revolution
28
wbUe be.1ng. tran~ across Siberia to Vlad1vostok.
The Un1ted statea

Bent 7,000 troopa, and Japan, which was more than happy to be recognized as
an ally

of the

Great Powers, sent on equal num.ber. Moreover. seizing tho

opportunity to tak:$ Ea$tern Siberia, at this time, she sent 70,000 troops
into the area, but her attenpt at conquest

tfaS

untJUCCuai.'\1l.., The.American

force underGe.neral \If:!] J 1a S. Graves atayed in Siberia ne"wly two years.. Its
sole aceompli8biuent was the prevant10n of the rutbl$sS rule of Red Russia in
tho maritime prov.1ncas of Sibe:>ia. 29
.1'

At the Peace ConterenCfJ at Versa.l.ll.e$, (1919), Japan paid little at-

tention to European a.ffa1rs.f devoting herself to thotJe of the Far East. 30
President Woodrow lV1J.soD, neverthelus, strongly opposed. Japan's position in

Shantuns..

&Cl.;.UJrJ,ng t:J.rr3" la1ow'l.edge of

the Ie.naing-Ishii Agl'eement .. · Tansill

sev-ere17 cnticizG8 the President.s action in these words:

therefore, and bis
~ust

$ubs~t

den1al

or arrt lal.olIledge

"W1l8on's a.ction

of the seeret treaties

have convinced Japanese statesmen that he vas 1mplcenting the maxims of

~b1a.vell1•."31
28 :tl:lW.
29 TaJlS1ll,. Back ~J' S;3..
~

Ibid.,. $2.

-

Bctct.

-

,---------------------------------------------,
9
i

Ths"lansing...Ish1i Af,reement $pec1£1call.y stated that "territorial

propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently,
t..be ()oVer'l:lmant of the

untted

states recognizes that Japan has special inter-

ests in China. part1culArl,y in the part to which her possessions are conti...
32
guous ...
These tfepec1a.l 1ntereatatl are explained b3' A:lihitney <h":1swold in
the tollowingworasJ

Established dipl.allatic usage has endowed. the phrase uspeeio.l int.....
ests" with political as well as eeoncmic OOMOtat1ons • • • • The situation in world politics at the .t1:ae the ~t vas be1ng negoti.
ated was aucb as to suggest that IAmsing realised the political char...
acter of his concession and concealed it. The tact is, Lunsine knew
ot the existence o,t the secret treELti.,w.1th which his phrase was
pale in oanpsrison and ~ch l"endered fantastic the expectations
:1mpl1eit in the l'eat of the agreement• • • • Qivt:m Lansing's knowledge
of the Allied c<:!ll'tllitments to Japan., even the phrase "spiilcUil interests"
implied at least tentative recognition o£ them. 33,/ r) "I'
\

,r During the decade £ollow1ng the Treaty ot Versailles, the American
people generously contributed to, the econanic restoration

or

F..Urope.

Publio

opinion was enthusiaStic over the conclusion o£ the Kellogg-Briand Pact which
condemned :recourse to war tor the Iflttl1ng

too gladly that thil would end

or world rI%'oblem.s,

bel1ev.L"lg

o~

It praised the work of the government in

val".

the plans tor disarm.ament inBt1tuted at the Wllshinaton Conference

turth~

of 1921-1922.34

-

32 Ibid.
"

A. Whitney Qrizwold, The Far ~t«m PoliS£ of the United States ..

New York, 1938,

34

219.

-

-

...

.- - -

t~'Uliam L. langer and S. Everett Gleason,

lation.. ti.. York, 1952..

1.5.

...

!2! Challge !2 !!!-

,

10
'"

To set.tle t,he l'''ar F..:astcT{: Questton.. the United states, the Ik'itish
COl1r,:omiealth of Ha tions, Jap..1.u and FrG.l1ce prr)mised to respect the richts of.'

one nnot:ter in the isl.,.'lnd possesstcns of the Pacific .. and. to consult one an...
other in case a:t:r3' other nation attempted aggression there. 35 The Nine-Power

'treaty signed by all the major nations who had interests in Chine,. was also a.
result of -ehe Conference. The sig:t'U:l.tories pl'a1lised to mtd.ntai..'1J the ()pen Door

policy in China, to re.frain from inter!ering with her administration of governnent and to recoanize her territori,';,l integrity.36

Sta.tes Govern.-nent to protect Chins. from. being forcibl;y deprived

tox'Y and to ensure peace in that country.

They

01'

her tnrri-

were also designed to take care

of the special interests of the United States under the system 01' unequa.l
trEUlties. As they were applied, the second design cancelled the £1rst. J?
In a letter to Senator Borah, February 2), 1932, Henry L. Sti.'II'!son,

!Secretary of state, discusses the Nina Power Trea.ty, expi a1n1ng its connection
"lith the Open Door policy• .38 He wrote;
This troaty, as you of course knO¥-l, torf)s the legal basis upon
llIhich now rusts th,,,: 'open door' poliC"J' tOh'Urd Chinn. That policy•

.35 'I'unslll, Da.,c}£ l?R0r., h59.

f:!:

37

Helen Heart}, H~..:::.2!:

11Jl...el':i:c::~:

~~,

38

St:l..mson, The l"ar Eastern Cris:i.D, 1(,6-167.

Boston, 1948, 217.

~--------------------------~
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enunc1:.lted ~J John Hay :in 1899, brought to an e..'1d the struggle among
various powers for s~ spheros of i."ltereat in China w:h1ch was
threaton:ing the dismemb«rmtmt of that empire. To accomplish thi.s
Hr. llay invoked two principles (1) equality of c('JI}%J1el"c1a.l opportunity
among all mtiOl1$ in dealinc: ",nth Clrl.rl.;J., a..'ld (2) as necessary to that
equality the preservatil)n of China fa temt{)rial a..1'ld admin1strat1w
intogrity. These pri:noiples were not new in the foreign poliey of
Ji."llorica. They had been the principles upon which it restod in its
dea.1i1.1gs with other nations for ma..V yerJ."S. In the case of China the;r
'tvore invoked to save a situation, which not only' throotened the future
developme'lt and sovereignty of that great Asi.:'lt1c pilloplo, but also
tl1l"eD.tened toc:reate d.a.ngerous and incre.,"UJing rivalries b&tweoo other
nations of th(!' world. "'Jar bad o.lready taken place bGtwe.en Japan and
Chim.. At the close of that W'l:4.r three other nt::ttions intervened to
prevent Japan tran obtai.'I1ing some of the results of toot wnr claimed
uJ her.39

In another part of the ].etta", Stimao;"). suya:
This treaty represented Q curelully developed and nmtwod. inter.
ootiono.l policy intended." on the one hand. to asO'W:'e aU the contracting parties their rights e.nd tn'tarests in and with ~<l:rd to Ch.ina
anrl on the other hand, to assure to the poople of Chi."1a the tullest
opportu..l'l1ty to develop without molest;:(tioo." their tiovereignty and independence acctU"ding to the tI1Ot\tU:":l "Ina ~htened sta.ndards believed
to obta.in among the peoples of the ~h. 40 ! . "
1,

t!

I The

"Open Door" po11.cy was not £Ol'1nc~ st&.t€d untU 1922, when the

"ep:resentat.ivea of tho natioI1ti who n,1,d interests in tho Pacifio held a confer...
~ce

at which theuOpen Door n poller.,. wns

i'reaty wbich defined the principles

UpOl'l.

cry:!rta.lli~ed.

illto tho Nine f'owCtr

whIch the treaty ~stt,>d. ttl

Uotwi thst..~nlding the fact that JapctO had 5igned the Nine PO"#'er Treaty
~nd

~e

hud accept.ed the agreements made at the j,{1.shingtozl Contereneo of 1921...1922,

find her meddling in Chinese affairs 500.'1 aft.cr Go,,:eral Ta.nLlka ts cnbL'1ct

-

39 Ibid., 168.

40
41

Ibid., 167.
-Ibid.
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came iIltc, POW::' in 1927. },l.2 In O"pen violatiou of }l4lr premises at thCl
ton Conference,

chukUo.

J~Jpan

took tJV(!Jr V.u.mchuria a.."'ld

::;c;,t

t~aehing

u;p the pUp"i)et reg:1.me of Han...

This action was also a disregard of the Kellogg...Driand Pact of 1928,

which renounced

wnr

as an inat.ru.l::len t o£

Il:1 t,ional

policy. 43

A clash between Jap;11lM0 and ChinesE) soldiers in the South Manchur:k'1
F.aUway zone,

WllS

the occasion of' the Hanehurian Incident.

The Chinese Hank

Govcrn.'fl1ont called the incident naggress1on. 1I The Jnp:mese soldiers, on the

a,rrtJ

other mtianals 1rTOu.1d do 1.'11

si.-nil..~

cirC'UL.1St.:lnces, terming it police actio

to prevent disorder, and eJCplaining that the action 'Wr.s pul"Cly loca.l, a.nd that

thought to be those

ot

young Nanhal Chang l~h, gOVL.""'IlOr of' l-Ja.'1.chu.r:.t.a., bad

attempted to destroy part of the ndlroo.d, which belonged to Jap::n. h4
The intervention of

J.~pan

in H.,,'1!"..churia on Septen.ber IB, 1931, was

the begin.'ling or the destruction of world security.45 The agreeIllenta of tho 1ft

wont deeper a::d deeper int.o Ch:tna, subjecting that country to political and

42

u.s.

Deptt .. , Poorl H&rbor, 2.

-

43 Ibid.

44 UHer @h:1na'iJ richest province, Hanchuria, which contains seven
ty per cent of her industrial strength lrr,JS controlled b'y J;'l.panese trO!~: 1932 to
19L~5" ;:'L'1d is nOli in largo part controlled. by the Soviet Union and t.~'le Chinese
Soviet ,~ff!I. Her might lies Ll1 the intelligence, endurance IiUXl ll1Jmbers of her
people. She may recover Na::lchuria and. she :may become a great industrinl na ti
She is not noW'." Bul.l1tt, 110.

45 Hears, 21:;0

pi
13
econonic

con~lS

which gave Japan the advantage in every instance. 46 In the

opinion of Hears, the Western Powers

l1lU.St

IvIanchurian incident, which resulted £rom
Clrl..M.

l'leatarn penetration

time elr.tpaed the situation

accept part of the blame for the

0.

very

tw.S the cau.~e of

beca.ll~ti)

c~lex:

set of conditions in

many revolutions in Ch:i..nc'l, and as

more chaotic, thus furnisbing the Japanese

with a pretext to protect their property. 47

: Under-8ecretnry liellee not_ the long' range viaion of his su.?erior
officeX' in· the St.:1.t.e Department 1n regard to Japan' s 1n:vasion of China.

Those

Secretary of st."lte stim.son was the one figure in the Hoover Cabinet who saW clear~ Wi.'. t effect the J:;'1,Xlneft inws1Cin would inevitably mVEl upon the pe..."lce of the rtlst of the ~forld. In Febru.ar;y,
1932, he urged the British sovernment to join with tho United'. Statu
in view of the ,failure of the League to cope with tho 81 tuat.ion in
invoking the Uina.-Power Tre;J.tyof 1922. He felt tmt concerted
pressure upon Jap,an by It,U the signt:ttories of that tret'tty was the
one poas1ble means of p.ch1evi..1:lg .any practical results. P.s is well
known, the British goV'crnment through Sir Jolm Sim.;:m, th311 SeeretaI"'J
of SU:.te tor Foreign At.t'a.1rs, taCitly maW. it clear that it tias not
disposed to tc1.ke the acti<.ln suggested. The British government permitted it to be u-'1dC'"stood.. that in 308 much as she wne I). member ot
the Council of the League, and the t.e.aeue was already' attempting to
deal ,lith the situaticln, she would weakG'fl the effectiveness and prestige of t.he Loague 1£ she wore to join with this government by invoking either the !ii.."le-Powel" Treaty or tbe Kellogg-BruUld Pact. This attitude did much to croo.'t$ in this OOU:ltry hostility tOW:2.rd British
poliey, and IWlIlY oth0l"Wise objootive pm:-aons p1rlCoo the hla1'l'.a for tho
almost u' ;l~.mi ted evils arising out of J{lpo.n J S suocessful aggrcSSiOflo '
in !'Umchuria s!?.warely upon the doorstep of the 13.'t:-itish Governmont. Ie)

46

U.5. Dep ft., PC:l.rl
Harbor.t
2.
• ..... .....
.,111

h7

HOtll'S, 207.

h8 Sumner

-208.

~felles, fj_':iJne for Decision,

Neu York, 1944, 280.

Ch1na., uho was not able to resist the 1-1anohu:ria.t'1 attack,appealed
to the LSt.").gue of Uations on September 21,

19)1.49 The Chinese claimed that the

Japanese" anxious to conquer a..."l<i annex Manchuria, hr.d tl:ler',.selws blown up t.he
Irailroad • The Ur.J.ted Stat&s preas aided. with the Chinese:.

The European gev-

eJ,"'.llritoota, however, were reluctant to decide the issue until all the faots eon-

cerning 'che incident ';Iere thQ'r'01lghly 'i:nVestig:.:;, tad .. 50 The LeJ.gue discussed th0
questio.'1., and in l)eeeraber.. 19)1, appoint«! a

en mm1ssioo

to stud;r the matter.

Sir Ha.nl'jT IqI:.tonj a British Earl" headed the investigation. 51 The United Sta-

states opposed the l·1a.nehurian InCident, condemning it as

An

on tho part. of the J<''l.pD.nese, and on Jall'W1l"'1 7 J 1932, the

Sacret,~;,ry

act of aggresnion
of St.1.te is...

sued the Stimson Doctrine, stating Americata official position concerning Jap.-

anese aggression. 52 It C!)l'ltainod, no nel>l principle in foreicrn policy, but simpl.;:r

rep~t·,'<i

the stataments made to both Ch.i."'Ml and Japan after the In.tte.r i'k'ld.

pl"'esentoo. hsr Twa..1'lty-one D«(k'lnds, in 1915. >3
Lord Iqtton d.ecL'u·oo the Japanese Govrommant in Hanehukuo to be a
pu;p~)et l~eg1me"

govorl'll'OOnt.

and thought it ought to be repl':lceeJ

b'.r

til.

Chinese auto....'10111OtfS

When the lr,.rttoo Camis;Gionts report of: the Hanch.urian situation

$0 Hoora, 213 - 215.

51 Bs.1n, 14'1.

52

l'ie<:trS, 215

53 Sumner Welles, Tille :f'~ ~i,si0n... He'd" York, 1944, 280.

was

adopted It.; the laague of Nations, the Japanes& delego.te walked out of the

MSGnbly on. Feb::uary

24, 19.3.3,

and the !ollow1~ month 1l<.lt1f1ed the ~
'"

the.t she

wilO

It 'iias a.t this time that Sadao

wi:thdrawing f'ro.-n. l1leIllbership.S4

Ara.ki, who believed in excludil1Z

f~ere

.trom the haaeland, and in an 1:,m...

perial policy abroad, announced oval' the radio.
Mvolou.s thinking is du.e .to foreign tho'Ug'ht . . . . . Jap<:'n l'l'lust
no longer let the impudence of the wb1te peoples go unpunished. It
is the duty oJ: Japan .. • '" to cause China to respect t.he Japi1nese"
to expel Chinese 1nflUEJnC$, .from fWlchuria, and to follow the way of
imperial. destiny. 55 1 , \\t
"" iThe
1
\\'

Le~e

of !'iat.icfI..s achieved one

practi~

result through the

Iqtton Coninisslon, namely, it made clear to all the world the true oircumstances concerning the !';.al'1chur;tan. Incident.
Secretary ot sta:t.e, stiruJon, in

r~i.."lC

Likew.i.se.t Pre$ident Hoover and

to recognize Japan's .PUp'.[let state

served a usafr.Jl purpose" at a time lihen public morale was e:x:tre:m.e11 low. 56
. Conce:rnil"ag the w1t·hdmwal of Japa.'1 .fror:. the League of l1ati{')nG, I!%'.

Kok1 Hirota, 'Ria

1~'\je~118

l1inister of

S'k~tt\':

fctr Foreisn ,Affairs said in a

speech delivered in the Uq'.l$(l o! Peer-e" and also in the nou.SIl

ot Repl"$sen'l;&..

tives of the lm!J'0I'i/U Diet" on January 2J.; 19.34:

The Japtlnetl1e OOyer.t'lMellt. were obliged to sorve notice ot withdrawal from the ~;:).gue of Nations en the 27tb or March" 193.3, because the
Manchurian !ncidmt and the questions regarding the State of 11anchukt!o

r:'l,
;H+

S 1'\-"'t ., ~
.. $ll"1

~D • • ~p

55 bank P.

lq, Th1a ~

~,

.2! Conflict"

;;6 \ieUe$, 260 ..

u_ ....1
~-oor,

2•

Olristina. Pb.elpa Harr1s and

RMsed, N_ York, ItSo,

4J0-.43h.

Ohara, c.

Ba71

16
showed tbQ.t there was no agreement between Jap.:>,n and the Leagu.$ on
the ~"ldame.ntal prlneiplea of preserving peace in the Far East. $7
In 'the same adt1rea., Hirota reminded. t.be members

ot the

Imper1al

Diet O! the word. which the ]bperor used in his rescript which Was issued to
the Japanese people.

Theae are

Hirota'. verde f

Now that Hanchukuo hae been to'W1d.ed, 0U:r lhp1re deed it essent1al
to respect the independence of the new Stute a."'ld to encourage its healthy developaen.t in ard.- that the aou.ree. of evil in the Jar . .t 'tffIJ.Y
be eradicated and an enduring pea.:::e the:reby' established. • • • However,
the aavancement of tnt«rl'lS;t1onal peace i8what,. as ev. .ore, We detlire,
and OUr attitude 'toward enterprises of peace aball auste1n no cbarl£e.

By ¢tting the League and embarking on a· 0011rH of its own, Our 1iapire.
does not,mean that it will stand aloof in the ktorene Orient, nor that

it will ue1ate ltselt thereh.Y ~ the fraternit7 of nations. It:La
our desire to pranote Mutual confidence between OUr 1h.p1re a1Xl all the
other IX'W'-' and t.o make known t.be justice ot ita ca.use t~tthe
world. 58 ,
'

', ..
, The rtllSignation of their nation trom the League, causGd wmn:y and
disturbance to the common people of Japan, who had gloried in the taot that,
their country' was

~

a.s a Western Power.

that the League would impose a. blockade,
out of }lanchuria.
fee~g

t:1!' a.

The business community' feared

boycott to torce JapaMse and.

By propaganda, the lhperor bad tried to give h1$ people ..

that a state of crisis exi8ted.

In 1933, he had wam«l them that

there would be trouble because they bad w1,thcb.'a.-wn t'rcm the League, and they w
were made

to

bel1eve that a cOl"dm

was being drawn

around Ja.pan by the

west-

ern nations in order to prevent the Japanese from treeing Asians tran explo:Ltation b)"the W'estem Powers. $9

-

L

17
There were two schools o£ political thought in Japan in reg:'xd to
the

manner

in which Vanchuria waS to be ruled. ,One group wanted. c(,J.'l,Stltution-

al and popu.lar government, the other believed. in mlitl..U"'y' C?ontrol.

The former

method was known as the ".friendship" policy, the latter as the "positive" pol....
icy toward ChiM.

Baron SlUdehara., Japan's great jI"ore1gIl l'1in1ster, advocated

vhe n.tr1endsh1p polieTt which wus founded on gooo. "Will and neighborliness to-

-ward China.. General Baron Ta.ua..ka, on the other h.and,. belleved :in a upositive

polleytt. one Vhi.ch USeS lulita:r;y force to attain its ends.

He was of the 0"
pinion that Japan should defend its hold:inp against all who menace them. 60/ 'S'
\,

\\' The fact· that the great powers 'Were unw1l1ing to act wh.en Japan ruth
lessl",f took over
Leag1le of

~ianchuria,

Nations.

demonstrated to all tho world the impotence ok the

J&p.an's attempts at aggression bad been so eo.S!:/, so $Wif't,

and so successful that she did not know enough to stop 'before the whole world

ed. its ineffectiveness to pruerve peace.

'1'he United St.:i.'tes declared her dis.

approval of Japanese aggression in }1anChuria, but did nothing mol'f.t.

Its fail...

ure to aot, gave Japan the opportunity to rush forward to catustrophe. 61 The
It.::'l.11.."I.Xl Gcwernmcnt. seeing thc.t Jap&J.n was not hindered itl her
dertook the conquest of Ethiopia.
leI' t.o enter on a course
r,.... "'v

"'-..~ ...J .

60 stimson.. 27.
61 Reiscbauer, 2.h 62 Welles. 280.

25.

un-

The Leaguets impotence also embolden8d Hit-

ot violence

,,62

~0.ss1cn,

in tho hope of craat,ing

Q

Ugreeter Qer...
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The decision to acquire a s(')lid footing in Asia. 'was rode b'lJ the Hi63
ota. cabinet, at a Five H1r.dsters Conf8l"eooe, August 11, 19)6.
They pl.."UlfttIId
o move sout'!1.wurd slowly and quietly, so as not to arouse suspicion concerng their aims.

ioncd

~J

A complete of£e;-:sive on China began on July 7J 1937, oeea...

an ineident at Pe1ping, wideh had been str.::rtcd by the Jnpooese anny.

he C6rlgressional Camdttee describes' it thwu

Seiz11lg upon the negligible I'larco Polo Bridge incident between
Japt.Ulese Ilnd Chinese forces ne<1T Paiping, Japan, in July of 1937 J

began wholesale inv'dSion of Ch:l.na. The lawloss acts o£ the Ja2~an
ese mill kll'Y' in carrying forward the L"'l.V'asionw.,l.s a disgusting and
d.egrading episode of rape" theft, and murder. In the outrages a.ttending the occupation of Nankin~h on December 13, 1937, the Ja.
panese military wrote a particularly ignoble page in history. Yet,
on July 21, 19.37, the Japanese PrIJmd.er, Prince Konoye, s'kted, uIn
sending troops to North China, of course, the Government has no
otru:..r purpose, as was explained in its recent statement, thun to
prfWerve the peace of Fast Asia." Aga.in, on October 28, 1937, the
Japanese Foreign Office said. "Japrll1 never 1001,s lll~on the Chinese
people as an enemy." As obse~ by Secl'e~ Hullr nJa.pan showed its friendl.v £eeJ.itlg tor China by bombing Chinese civilian p0pulations, by burning Chinese Cities, by mald."lg mill10ns of Chinese
homeless and destitate, by m1stre:~t.ing and killing civlliuns, and
by acts of' horror und eru~ty:."

64

ion bYiVes us an idea of' W!ult the Japanese wre

ini~ending

to do.

He says:

1fe will not annex ChiIla, oh no, we will not do that. i'1e will
only arrange China so we can do business \'d th Chi.'1.'1. .. •• The
world is three parts, Euro::ie j,'or the Europeans, Araerica £;,,1' -~he
United Stato~, Ash for Japc!.D,. 65
---.~

....

-

64 Ibid.
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i

The rise of ultrano,tionalism in Jap~).n, as a result of their vietor"J

in Hanchurj:'1, caused a feeling of insecurity in HoscoW'.

si.fied its efforts to prevent war.

The comintem inten-

NOZilKa, Japanese mq:>ert in foreign affai.rs

waS called UpOn to report on conditions in ChUla. He said that the liar in Man-

churia marl<ed the commencement of a new

1m~stic

campaign against the

Chinose revolution and the U.S.S.R. and tl\.;'1t the United St.a.tes wished to subject all China to the 1\merican DolJ..ar, and therefore wanted to prwent the
seizure of t4'mlchuria by' Ja.pan, a.nd that the doJ.1ar diplomats
to have Japan get into war wit:!. the U. S. S. R.

11lere

emeavol'1ng

HO$'lka ended hU report to

his superiors in Hoseow in a tone of' warlike oonfidenoe:
Should the :imperialists of the whole world hurl their ch9.l1enge
at our fatherland.. the USSR, we will ah~tlthem toot the irTorld proletaria t will arise in arr...s aga1nst them. We will show them, tb..'iLt
nothir.g n:waita them but the grave.
Down with Japru,lcse ~ml
Dow11 with the international counterrevolutionary conspirators~
Long live the Red ~ of the Soviet Union :m.d the 1~ lrJ!1Jr;I 0,
Soviet China:J
Strengt,httn the revolutionary struggle of the world proletariat
against l-lti.%' and wa,r mach.inat1onal
Long live the Cominteml 66

fensive

~ainst !~ussin.The

conclusion of the Anti...Canintern Pact und tbo a-

greem.ent reaohed at Osaka, in the wi:nter 'Ji: 1937, seemed to confirm this

66 Hedger SW'earingon and P;!.l.D. lilnger, Red Flag in Jarxm:
tion,::,l ComtTruniam in Action, Cnmbridgo, 1952, 49.
67 ~., 69.

id('m.~~

Interru:r!r-

p
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Shortly after the fight at Peiping, July 7, 1937,. Prince KooO"lJel the
Ja.panese Prime Hin1Bter1 made knotm to the Diet the Government t s plim .for es-

tablishing a new ol'der in East Asia. 68 An attempt to form. a military alliance
!

with GerI:l:my proved unsuccessful b$cause the Navy and so:::;.e

o£l the politioians
l

opposed giving IlGermany military aid in a waX' against the Western Powere. u69
Jap21Jl l1anted an a.11i.:mce with Germany

ehi~ly

as a protection against the

Soviet Union, but Germany wo.nted better trude rel.:1l.tions than Japan wished to
give, and abe also wanted a promise of.' military assistance in ca.se she was
attacked by another country)O Hir~, who had recently been appointed

Prime

~linister,

1n Konoyets place. made another attempt in ttaYJ 1939, to

strengthen the Anti-Comint.ern Pact" but he was u.."lS\lCcesstul, because Ja;xm
wa.s 'Wlable to promise Ocrm::Ln;y' m:U.it.:l-:t7 aid in cruse ~ Should break out. 71

Hiranumtl continued negotiations i.."'l an effort
at oe;rJ..:Ln and Rome ferm an

a.greement.\;,,~en

Soviet Non-Aggression Pa.ot, was signed,
~Jhile ~ i1a.3

still at

haw the J;,lpanese

a.mba~wadors

on August 23, 1939, the German-

Jaj,J<J.n

Will"

t~

received a severo blov;.J2

with !:!llrope, Japan s.<:.w hor opportu'!'"

nity to begin an o£fensive in the Far East.

Stal.mar j the

~

er.tt.&aa.ry,

68 Joseph 11. Ballantl.n.O, ltifukd011 to Pf).;'1r1 lfurbcr, Tho Foreign Pol...
icy of Japan," Foret..iB Allaire, XXVII" July 1949, 651-658.

69

~.,

-Ibid.
-

70 Ibid.

7l Ibid.

12

651-664.

~-----------,
21

ca:ne

to Tol::yo to cOfl.i'er with Foreign Birdstel' Matsuoka in ordor to perSUD.de

Japan olio rOfJtrain til\') United StD.:Les tram enterlr.g the European war.

waS assUl"ed th..1.t Gel."r.lal\Y would not interfere w1th Jupants pJ.<:ll'lS for a
EaSt Asia., .o.nd that Germany

W'..l,S

V'iatsuoka
Gre~lte!"

interested only in the economic field in that

S1:.a.lt:'u:l.l" said that a struggle between the whole Al:lglo-Sax-

Frt of t})O world.

on world and Asia tics

VOlS

bour.d to dwelop.

He

eonaid~lred

·t.he German-Japanese

AJ,li.D.nce to be a. long term pact for co-operation during tho carting struggle,

71

and therei'orG, he ms Ll'lxious to Il'l.ake a treaty before the Europeall war ended. '"
R1bbentrop

ani Fl'a.."'lce.

\faS

likewise a.nxi.ous to lila.l:e nn alliance witil J.:lpa.n against D:ri tain

He tried to have General O$llima, the Japunese Ambassador, ally

Tokyo lath the

I~a.s1-Soviet

it was ir;1portant

£01'

bloc.

In a. telegrr:m to Tokyo, Ribbentrop said that

Japan to quickly extend. her power in Fast

ASic. 1'.01113.1'<1

South before t:1e conflict between Bhgltmd a,1"ld Ger.ma.ny ccmes to n close. 74
As is well

Tripartite Pact.

i

knmm., Stalmar succeeded in inducing Japan to sign the

Joseph

~v.

Ballantine telJ.;s us that

Sts.lmer and l'latsuokQ. drew up a d.~t of a trea.tYI which was laid
b(!ltore the Privy Council on September 16, 1940. The Navy held h.l,ck
its approval t4'1tiJ. some days later,., The cabinet still had to obtain
the sanction or the I"mperor, wbo strongly reliOO upon tho advice of
PriIlce Saionji, t1-'j!) last oor':"ivi~1g cldE4.'" aUtt.eSl1,nn. ;:cnd a bitter opponent of the al1io.l"lce. Kido, who, as Icrd Privy Seal, was cherged
\dth keeping the £I.goo and ailing Saionji informed, failed to do so ..
a:ld the old st1ltesroa::1 ii£i.S lef~ C~;lFl(';te1.y in the dn,rk on what lias
goi.'1g on. In this 'iJlay the 1i.blp$ror' S [j"U1Ction \'laS obta,ined and tho
Tripartite ID.lianca was signed on September 27, 1940. Sa:tollji, upon

-

73 Ibid.

74

Langer ..md Gleason.. 29.3.

the
i'

~~-------------------------.
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lea:rni.ng what had been dona W",J,S sorely aggrieved. becausQ he felt that th
... the Itnperor had 'batm betl'IlYed.. '74
,\ 'IJhen the European

\'tar

broke out in September 1939J Japan sa.w an oppol'..

t.u,Jit.y to settle h&1'" dif.ferer..ces with Gl1.ina., witllOUt fear of interference from

the

~{e:::tern.

~i:mg

world, but Clrl.ang Kui-shelc" would not come to an agreement.

Clli.l1g-Wei, who il.'1d turned traitor to the Chinese Nationalist Govermn«lt in 193e
waS made Presida..."lt of u "}L:1.tional Go~ent of

Clnn,,:'

He

in 1940 by Jap,')Xl.

promised su.pport of the Co-prosperity Sphere in Bast Jl.sia, and the Japanese
Government

o.f'.ficiall~r

recogniz.editG £reaJd,sh croo.tion. 16/,r

estubli.!Ji1mcut of the Co...Prosperlty Spll.ere.

1

Early in October, the Cabinet ap..

1, the ~17 success£u1 settlement of the China affair; 2, tM
negot1a ti n of a non-aggression p.r.!.ct nth the Soviet Union; 3, the
incorporation of tho countries of Southeaat Asia and tho islD.nds of the
the J:lalay Arcidpelago .in the s~lled uCo-Prosperity Sphere" (i.e.
~he establishment of domination or control there)" At D. I"our 11in.tsters t
aonference held on Septabel" 4, even India, AUstralia. and tiew Zealal"lt.i
ll<ld beoo mArked for :t.nelua1on in Japa..'1.. s sphere of Wluence. '1'1 }C i
i,

.J

I.,..

tI'_,

cha.nce tor a sattlanent with Ch:iung •...ai..ahek was lost because a

, !.the

t,reaty wit'] tho puppet :regime of Wang Ching-wei was concluded. in DeoanOel' and.

a neutrality pact with t.he Soviet Union v,;.;,s entered in:to, in P.pril of the 10110lr.i.ng ;rear. 78

7,

~ntine, "l'lukden to Pearl Harbor, The Foreign Pollc:r oJ: Jap,.:m,t
Foreign ¥£ai:rs, Xl'VII, July, 1949, 658.

76 Chambers, 677.
77 Ballant1ne, Itl'lukclen' to pe:.l.rl Harbor, The Foreign PoliC"",f of Japc.n, f
Fyre!iID .U'.tairs, mn, July. 1949, 658.
'/8

Ibid.

23
Even before tho Pact 'With Germriny- and Russia bad been COl'lCluded, . •

baSsador Grew had informed. the authorl:tie$ at -Washington of the trend of a!-

£airs. He was later to call this message hiD ItgrGOO ligl'lt" telegram. The
/I1IlOOSsador' reaJ.ized that Jar~e e.,ggrossicm. could not be stopped by mere

words of disapproval. .Americnns

Q$

a whole knew little of the real strength

of the Japa.noae war ma,chine, or of the stubborn determ:i.nation

lOrds to conquer the Far &.st.

ot its war

Grew felt that an embargo on essential war

materials weulci precipitate ratilw thrr.n stop her ruce 1'or milit..al."y and. economiC

indep~e. 79

He roo.110OO that the mint.:rlning of th.e s;t:),tus c1uoin the

western Pa.citic ..8 necessary tor the survival of the llr'1tish aopir0, and for
ourselves as welJ., since Am,erican economic securi:cy lias dependent on Britain.
Japan needed something strl'ltlg6r tlum a polit. expressioo of American

al to turn her from her pa.th.
gan

dis~,tpprQV\

AJ.'ter sarious tbought, the State Depa.rt.:ment be-

to take vigorous action. In September, iron and steel DCrap were put undo

---.

'~1

~"1\

to

pre~t."

embi.l.rg~.\ ~ October 8t Am~or Hori.nouchi called. at the State Depar'bnent
Secretary of

S~lt&,

Hull, a.fter cla:iml.ns 'wt the

Unit~

States

Government had been vary patient witb the Japanese, continuoos

It is clear now, hoWG'V'&l", tha:t; those 'Who are dol'ldmting the e1X't.er...
nal policies of Ja.p.'1n aX'. " •• bent on the conquest by force o£ all
worthwhile territor.! in the Pacific Ocean area without limit as to .extent. 1."1 the South" •• and that W"l.'! and all other nations are e:x:paeted,
as st;:l.ted, to sit perfectly quiet an.d b& cheerful .and agreeable" btlt.
static, while most of Asia is l:krnchuria-ized. • • • " I added thu.t, of
course, if any one oountry is suffiCiently desirous of tro'blo, it can j
always find an,y 0;16 of innUl.'neruble occasions to ot::rt such trouble. Co (,

-----r(9

vk'llter 11111i3,

80 ~'"

20.

!!E:! !! P~'tX'l"

Now York, 191("

19.

~------------------~
;,

, The Un1ted States GoV'erment continued to exert. eeonauie pressure.

American aircratt sales to Japan amc:runt.ed to

very little a:c

the end

or 1938,

beCause :m.anuractt.t.rer1ll bad been advised by the State Depal"'tment to stop sales.
The American-Japan... eQlll'l.8l'C1al treat,' of 1911 ..8 not renewed in 1939, but

trade with Japan vas placed on a daJl'-to-t:bq 'basio. The acport Control Act
wh1ch p4ss$d C~UB in

1940 gave ·hanl1:l~.n

to

Delano Roosevel.t authority

control the cport of aooda essent1aJ. tor detenae~ Qradua.J.ly.. machine ~*
cbeldoals, and strategic metallir could not be sb1pped withoat a lie. . .;.

av.LatJ..on psol:i.ne .abtu1ned.
tUX'e trade

such

~

Japan reaented th1s measure alXl sa1d. that fu.

the United states an:l Japan would. be verJ'

~1fU.l"e$ con1;1nue. 8J.

Next

~l

1:

In the con:n:rsatlona Wh1chSecretal.y BUJ.l held

with .Adm1ra11ion'tll'a anil MJ.-. KUl'USU, Japan tbreaten«t to

Aid

~, if."

w

d:Ld not r_ogrJiz. her pol1tiaal" ltd.l1tar;r anti econanic interests in Cb1rta and
:in

~ter

&t.st AlU, 62

It Japan could get what ahe wanted by diplomacYf

it, without go1ng to -""U"J ehe could gam her ambitions in the Far lastJ
she would interpret her obligation

to

Germany and ItalT d.tenaive~~

other vOl"d$" 1£ the United Stat., entend the

war against

~.

Atlantic, Japan would not feel bound by the Tripm1te Pact,
by atteckina the Un:1ted Stat. in the Pac1t1c~

83 It

to

in

~cm

In
~

aid Ge~

Japants attaupta at dj...

Plana;cy.faUed.. she W'OUld make a surprise attaok on u.s in the Pae1f10,

us:S.na

toree to achieve her ambitious .ohemes for oonquest. Dur:l.ng the early part
,.

j

81 U.S. Deptt., Pearl ~, 1.

82 Sam.u.el J"l.aig BaWl, D1~~tic lH.a1.;~ of the United. States.
....._:;.;.;;:.a,. - ...
.." ..

New York, 19$0, 668.

8

of

19h1,

~

Ja.pa..'1 was :making ready tor the attack.

84

Shol't17 alt. these .co-

nonic restrictions bad. been l.ml)06ed, Japan signed t11e Tripartite
aermanY and Italy.

i)1l(1.,

with

Tbs Pact

provided that GC'mailv, Italy and Ja.pm would au1st one another with
all political, economio am l'dl1te.ry means, when one of the powers
was attacked by a pow. not then :1nvolved 1n the European war. ctIt :1n
the Chinese-Ja.r:anesa conflict. 8$
The three Powers declared tha. t the Pact

was not made

aga.1nst the

Sari.et, t.ra;&

vbich it follows that the Power referred to must be the United States, town.rd
wan it was a veiled threat. The follow1ni April" Japan entered into an
.ant with Russia.

Roosevelt retal.1a.ted. b:r

United states, and Br1ta1n did

m«t:be.

:t.r~ing

~t...

J&pa.n$8e asaete in the

Pr.anCG had agreed aft.. h* faU ia

June, 1940, to close the pons and :ra1.lrcads of Indo.China to war materials·
being ~ to f.ree Ch1na. and Br:1ta1n closed the !tt.a'ma Road. for three

months, in an effort to appeaM Japan.
China was powC"lMa

~

the

~

to prevent Japan bam establiAlhing

General of Indo-

au 'bas_ there;

pre-

sumabJ.y to be used \0 banb CMa:oa Xai....bek t • detlllM$, newl;r _taWehed at
Chungking.

Ilu.Ji.ng 19U, Japan lnt.r:riedly prepared for: l'4U'.

The National

Mobilization Law was put into etract. The Premier, Prince Kano,ye. was try...
ing to make a 8ettJ.ement with the United Sta:l;.es, but the militarisw did net

want a settltmWtt.

ll.l.ready.t the Japanese were atU<ly.i.ng the maps of I>earl Har..

bor, and ascert.a.in1ng the number and strength of our battleships and

drp'--.

Tojo, Minister of ~h:r, warned Konoye that Uto carry on negoti:lt1ons~ tor
which there is no possibilitY' of t.rl,d.t1on, and in the end to let slip the t1mE

tor fighting would be a matte of the s;reatest consequence." Konoye t:Lnal.l\r
"'*

,

•1

-

84 Ibid..
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:resigned in botoherfJ and Touo, 8the Razor ~ succeeded him as hood of the

_

cabinet.

86

Japan

continued to extend her mll1tary position in the southwest Pa

c1f1c until the PhiJJ.;pines were almost entirely encircled# and its armed for
_

were near enough to strike impo1:'tan.t tw..de routes.

tbat Japan

was

oce~

live. In ()%'der to a:t'Oid
\j

RooatWelt realised.

theBe positions .. a ~tion for a. ~t often..

'fIftU:,

strang

$COlladO

pr~ was

'\m:l7 neeassar;r.87! ,t

J

A Ja~ off1eer, who took part in the attaCk on Pearlliarbor re-

ported to the Joint Cor.tm1ttM, the 1"oJ.l.ow;1.ng intormation:
On October " 1941, a meetJ.ng 'WaS called of all office pilots
ot the carrier. aboard the .Ak.aai in Sh1buabi BaT, by the chief of statf
of tbe ~, Rea:r Admlral ltJ,noauke Koulm.~ Abcut 100 attended.
They ~ told verr uec.retlT that on December 1, 1941, (Japan T:1me)

a Ja.panese naval a1r toree Vt,Nld ~irt:.r1k. the American nGet .:\t i;f,ft!~"
Grand Admiral of the Japanese Nav,v, Isoriku. Yamamoto, a:l$O address.
the P-C7UP saying that -Although Japan never wanted to ftght 436 the
United stc.tea.. they were .foroed. to, because the)" would be defeated
reaardl.ess, it the t1n1ted states continued its a1d to China. • • •
The United States fleet," he said, ttwu Japan's atrOl'lSe6Jt enany, so
i t the,:r could strike it ~ at IiawaU, it would be 2 Ot' :3
months before it could manCAlVV. By that time occupation of Borneo,
the J?h1l;ippi:r.!es, Singapol"e, Java a.1'ld s-atra. would be complete. - 88

Even the Marqu;Ls Koicbi lido, th$ Lord Privy Soal, advised the lhperor tha:!; i
was necesSSl"y to ttght the UDited stiltes.)!J!

\' 1'ojo wu appohlted lT~ in Octobet:' of 19h1. He WAS given plen:l....
potentia.ry' powere

to

oanT on Wa1'.

On November

lS,

be sent K'urwro.

to

.Wash-

ington to help Nanura. e.nci to bring the Ja,panese dGIwlds to Washington.

The

........

86

U. S.

Dep ft. J Pearl !~,

14...17.

87 U.. S. Qov't., Pe~.!!!! ~t' Washington, 194.3. Doe. 220,. 699~70:3.
68 !bid., 126-127.

27
Jll,Cssage dem.:md'«l that ftthe United states a.."ld Great Britail;l a'lxmdon China to

Japan, and provide Japan with th.• materials for a Japnnese advance into

Alllerl.can, British and Du.teh territoriel in the ra.r Fast. tl 89
At the Atlantic Conference in August, 1941, Britain and the United
states w,:.rned. Japan not to encroach s:trJ farther in the South Western Pacific,
for 1£ she did, the United Sta tee a..."1d Britain would take counter :measures,
which might lead to

lItJl'

with Ja.pan, and 1£ she attacked a thlrd power, the

United Stutes would seek to aid that Power.
tUl'll.

This was reaJ.lya war ult1ma-

90

Preparations for the attack: on Pearl Harbor, Singapore, and other
American, British

November 1st.

am Dutch possessions

1..'1 the Fnr East were completed

b7

If the United. sta tesdid not aCcept. the Ja.rnnese terms by

November 29, 1941, diplomacy would be aba.r.tdoned and J~n lrould notU'y its

allies that it intended to open hostilities with Great Brttain and the Un,i...
ted Stutes. 91 Japan'" generals. with their $Ullply of. oU dildnishing rapid...
ly, and with the chance to acquire a vast empire .lowly ;fading, would not

waste any ~ore time arbitrat1.ng.92 Iii·
,/1
(y. IThe following quotation reveal.a san.e of the dU't1cultiee with which
the high au·thori.t1ea in Wuhington were faced, at this t1me.

09 D:1$son, U.
90 Bem1s, 868.
91 BalJantine,
For~

~1ukden

to POi)rlAlrbor, The Foreign Policy of Japan

WUrs, XXVII, Julj"t 1949, 664.

~~------------28
The J::Lpanose were not o£fcl'ing -to negotiate u reasonable settlement
by processes of a~entJ they were presenting cl.ema.nd.s, to be nc....
ceptedor rejected.. The United states h:.;,d only two choicest either
to yield to the Japanese d~s and sacrifice pl'inciples and security, or to dec1.ine to yield, a.nd to take the consequ.ences .. 93
Secreta.ry of State Hull repl:1Gd on £~ovember 26, 19~1 to the Japaneso
with the follo"W'ini; counter d$}~.

Jact between Cb.i.na a.nd Ja.:,:Ja.u

W;:Ul

to be made;

U' forces £ran China and Indo-China;

territorial integrity;

'1'lrose we:re~

1) a ~aggreasion

:(.) the Japanese ,,;ere to w1:thdraw

,3) CJ:l.1n,a was to be

gi"ll"ell

a gtl.'arantoo

4) Japun was to recognize the Nn.tionnliSt goverp.-

ant of Chiang Ka.1...shek.

On December 1,. 1941, the!!!

Jor,k T:Uri.es carried tho account ot the

apaneso rejection of iimerican propos.a.ls.
U. S. l'Tinciples Rejected by Japanese as nFantastic ll
Foreign 111!dster Tojo Hakes First Ofticial COMl."1tmt on
Hash1n(.-ton Note. General Thre'lto"lS Fresh Aggression.
B.1 otto D. Tel.1schWil.

Tokyo, Monday" December 1. In the first o£ticic"\l stt'ltAment on
the :\merlcan proposals for a sett1emo!1t o.t the issuea in the l'acif'ic
au1:D1tted t.o Ja.pan, Foreign Hiniater Shiganori Tojo ~ rejected
the principles u.nder~ thetl as nf'zmtast1clf and chantcterized the
Anlerican attitude as u.'1l:"eallstie und reg::r."ettable. He reiterllted
JapCtll's det,ermiru:Ltion to proceed m.th tho construction of a ltHew
Order in East ASia.. If 94

l'ojo, 'I:,he re..1.d.i.ng of which

Wf:l.S

too highlight of yesterdr;.y's

1'!l.'1SS

Foreign l1in1cter decl.-"lred:

(93 ~.
9l~

New York Times, December 1, 19h1, pt. 1, sec. 1.

meetil'lgs, the

29
The world i8 crynfronted with l.U'lp%'ecedented c11sturbances. In
Greater East As:L1., however, close relations of Japan, lianchukuo,
and China. must go forward tov;ard the construction of a. new order
in East Asia on the basis of their co-ex1stence and co-prosperity. 9$

In our negoti:,ltions with the United. states, we have consistently
upheld this principle. However, the United states does not understand
the real situation in East Asia. It is tryir.g forcibly to apply to
East Asiatic Countries fantastic principles and rules not ado.pted to
the actual situation in the world and thereby tending to obstruct the
Construction of the New Ord.er•. This is extr«aeJ.y regrettable.
Opposing the slogan of "Asia for the .Asiatics under Japan' it leadto the .American principle of' the IlOpen Door, U Japan, l'hnchukuo
and the 1:lanking puppet regime, yosterd.ily celebrated the fust anniversary of their joint deelara.tion of eo-operation with. mass meetiJ:1.trs in
their principal cities organized by their governtttents. Sem.i-otf'ic1e.l
org-dJlS re:\.terated the f'il"Ill. determination of these countries to "l1beratefl the one thous.;mQ. million people of East Asia from the tJexplo1ta..
t10ntt of Europe and .1\rIler1ca by the construe"cion of the "Greater East
ABia Co-prosperity Spher.,» as a. gujdi.';::! torch tar manldnd to crush
all outside powers t obstruction of tbis "holy and historic mission. U 95

ership"

~~","":

,

'l,ri.. j,"

-,: .L

1,'

A week after this nGWlJJ art.icle appeaTed, ob December 7, 1941, the
Japanese flad rn.nde their surprise attack

OIl

PGP...rl Harbor, followine which 'they

made att,.'.1.cks on the Philippines, Hongl\ong, Ellalay.;" 13u:rma, the l'ietherl.ands East
Indies and the British islands northflast of Australia.
8) Japr-:;.n declared 'Wa.r on

too

The next day (December

United St.;ltes a:ld GreD.t Br:l.ta1n. 96

The ease with

which the attack on Ha;'la1i was mod., enabled Japan to contulUe har work of de-

struction.

American :i.'orces, greatly depleted, ",-:tthdrew to tho &.ta.rul peninSu.-

la for a l,:;l.st stand. 96

-

9$ Ibid.

. l i·'"'

'I_.--------------------------~
The report

ot the Congressional Committee investigating Pearl Harbor

tolls, in a brief semtc.."lCf.!, of the ret-c'lliuti0n visited on the Jap::.nese for

their

bra~en

and dastarCly attack.

T!le Pyrrhic victoI7 of

havinG executed the at tn.ek

.;.dth

silI"prise,

cu.nnil1./3) and deceit belongs to tho "4l';,>;;r lords of Japan whose dreams
of conquest were buried in the ashes or HirOB!Wna. and ~~ History will properly place responsibility tor Pearl Harbor upon the
military clique dot'linat:i..."'1g the people of Japan a.t the time. 91 ' i j

------.-.........

CHAPl'm II

()n$

of the quostions which arose to trouble American st..1.tesmen, in

tho early years of the tl/ootieth century was immigration.
only about 2000 Jap,).nese oorl.gr:n;,ts in the United. states.

inCreased to 24,000 and by 1910 to 72,000.

In 1890, there wr
By

190Q, they had

Although this "'las a very small

per cent of the total popu.l.&tion of our countr:r" nevertheless, the Japanese
Ctll'lle into seri·'JUs competition with white l..':lbor, because oJ: his .superior indu
~ueat1on

The San Frllnciseo Board of

try and his low stQndard of living.

brought about a crist between Japan and the United St.ates

wen

they

decidE~

that Chinese, Japanese and Korean ehildre.n would not be permitted. to attend
the public schools, but woald have to

eo

to the Oriental school in Chinatown••

The Japanese govC'l11'lleat immediatCllly issued a. protest.

Russ 1:;; at Port Arthur" Japan had .felt
to maintain hel' national honor.
21,

1906,

Iii.

S1nce har victory over

new selt-confidence, and was anxious

Olle of the 'l:'oky'o pa.pers, !1ainiehi, on Octo

decl.ared angrily that tIle Ja.panese should sa'ld their navy to punish

the It"nericans for their d.iscr1minati'~n.l The European pross l:1.ke"nse criti-

cized the Unit.ed States tr.::rr willfully provoking a proud and. sensitive nation.

Germany we.t1t so fur

-_._---1

V.{i

to ew. :r t..lmt

G,

war between America and Jnp;:>.n

Cldtosn1 Ya.naga, Japan Since Porry, llew Yorl-c, 1949,

-

2Ib1d.

31

'W::tS

immine

434..4:;.5.

~

r.:----------------------~
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The United

states, a..mous

to avoid tro1.lble, l.100.ght to have !'rl.~ rG~'tiOll8

wit.h Ji.1.pan by S<llitl1ng th$ immigratio...'1 question to the !at,tel" t e satisfaction.
'l'::H~

Ii

gent,lemen •$ agreeM.ent" of 1907. 1..'1. which the J;:tpanooe ~~ent pranis«i

the Uni:ted St.a.tes, eased t.he situation, SU:tIlswh;,'l;t.

The

foll~

ye..'U', on

5eptSllber 29, diplomatic negotiQ.tio= wel'e be~.c1. by Foreig:l:J. !l'J...."l1ster Kanura

and

Ar1ba~v;r 'rak.:.~

in washingto..."l, cU!lnLrw.ting in the

!!o~t-T~.hix'a. ~_

ment by ·W'hich both th~ 'Un1ted States fU1d Ja;?an prowisai to rai"rain.

taring with oac11 other's possessions in tlle J:lacitic, to
fi·wadom.. and. i-z,

si.lpp~

the uOp«J. DoOI'u policy.

wilo had bl;:sn sorioualy concerned over

tiallchuria, in :t'sturn tor
ippines.· 3

to hin,

~

mtt'

disavowal oJ:

g'J.~"t..ee

tram

inter-

Chinese

Pr-esident Theodore F:.ooowelt..

dispute with Japan in rsgard to ....

~resslve

intentions to"W{rd ttkO Ph!.'-

Aftar' ;Jillia..lU Eow<u'd T;::;.!'t h,.''ld becom.e President J HOl'}!'levelt wrote.

st.~,t1ng

uthat thE: Adl:d..."1iatl'ation should t.aka nQ steps t11at would make

JalJ'3.1' .feel th.",t we are fa monaca to tlH~ir interest.D' in North Chinr,\. ,,4
Attar j.\iOrld Uinr I had closed, t.he U"n,!:ted flt.Z'·cos,.fearful that the

or ii"lt'l1igration

't/J.l,-impoverishad countries o£ Europe wO'uld send Vs,ifeE

hanes and mlployMent in our

OOUfltryJ

began

to tighten

A.t first, only tr.ree percent of t.he number of people

) 'l'ansUl, Baek Door,

4

-Ibid.

5.

to :N,nd

her :iztm11gl"at:tcn laWS. S

ot eaoh mtiomlity,

33
1IhO resided"'1n the United States in 191O.. were permitted to immigrate to
AlIlerica.

Later, the number was reduced to two per cent, am still lu tor in

1923, Congress introduced a bill excluding aliens ineligible tor citizenship
The Japanese Alubassador Haniha.ra protested this bUl strengly.
la1CtI uwhather Japan as a. nation is

(1r

and ooneideratien of other nations?U

He wanted to

1s not entitled to the proper respect

6

Secretary HuShes wrote a letter to Representative Albert Jolmaon,
Cha.irm.an of the House Committee on Immigration, stating that he considered
the proposed lee1s1ation at variance with the treaty of 19l1, and that it

would
large3¥ undo the work of the W'ash1ngton Conterence on the Limitation
of Arma.ment .. which so gre-'3.tl)" improved our relations nth Ja];.'lSll.

He

was certain that it was not ttvorth while thus to aftront a friendly
nation with who.'I'Il ute have esta.blished the l'4Ost cordial relations •. 7
La.ter~

Secretary Rughes and

oot..-l:, ir.!m:!.zra.tiQl'l.~

H.~a

tilTIlk"lSSador

sa.id. that Jtil.p;m

";JO_~

Hanihal'&'
not

m:cha.~cd

rt~estioni..""l8

notes a-

the sove.;r""

but l1e te.Ued t<:'l see the logic of a IT'.t:'.o.sure 'w'ldeh would "not only seriously

offend the just pri..:.w o£ a f:rien.dly nntion • " '"' but would. also irr,tolvc the
q'..letJtion

of the good faith and therefore of the honor of their govarnment,,"

....... ,

o

riolid
--

~-----------,
(2f:IJ U.8. 178) h:mded down a. deeision on November 13, 1922, to the e£,teet

that the Japanese vet'e inelicible for citizenship by naturaliae.tion. "

bill

W'<:lS

adopted on April 12, by an :L'!lll1enoe majority of 373 to 71.

The

On l>1ay

31,

1924,

a .formal protest was lodged by the Japanese against the oxclusion law.

TokYO

psl:t)el"S

I

In

were~oud in their dtmuneiation of it. 9
1931~

the Immigration Comrdttee of the United States Chamber of

C()llJ1lcrce favored the restoration of a. quoi':.a.

system. The Cal.ifomia Council on

oriental Rel...t:l.tions organized in 1931, was active in aiding the Immig.r.rrtion

Com1ttee.
the

Business men and educational 10adars ware confident. of restor1:ng

quota system.

lht when the destruction of the :railroad track at .Hukd«l on

Septer.1ber 18, brought about the l;Ia.nehurian Incident, all bope of repeallng the
,

exclusion lay was lost. a.'1d the faint rum.bliragS of war becllI!le audible. lO
Reiscbauer seems to ~"\ke the part

or

the Jcq:w.nese when he S:::~YSI

view, there is no l"e&son ;Jby the
qJ.ish-9peak1ng peoples, who hoWe actually multiplied during the
1.'UJt eentur,v and a b<11£ at a far lcss rapid rate thtla the Japanese,
should have the right to appropriate for thet'!Sel~s most of the
lightly popul."ted parts of the world which enjoyed a. desirable cl1,...
mate, while the J:lr;,.1llCSe are excluded not only £ran these areas, but
wo £I"O!il the .less desirable and still mI'll:Jty l.:l.llds of the tropics,
simply because they became candidates for emigration u century or
two later th:.4'1 the !i1.gl1$l1 speaking peoples. They 1l.:iturally look
toward t.h0 great u.'1e:xpJ.orv:i i;:.1u!lds sou.th or them, such as Nml
Guinea and Borneo, and dream of a new Jap;l.n which ld.ll redress the
unhappy bal£!l1ce ot the old.. 11
As Htm. fran the Japo.nesfI point of

9

Yar'lD.g3.,

h42.

10 Ibid., W~.
11 ne!Schauer, 65..66.

~-------------,
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Korea in 1910.

Then because she had been one o£ the Allies in t'iorld War I ..

she waS pexmitted to truce over the German interests in the Far East.
_ident Tart had chaJ.1enged Japan's poaition in China. by dollar

Pree-

d.ip~cy.

i;J:i.lson had applied diplanat1c pressure, whon Japan bad. presented her TwentY'one DEmands to Chim. refusing to recognise Japa.nts action. 12 ~ 1919, Japan

md risen to the status of a great pOwer in tho Fl:ll" East; and China was 1n
danger ot being dismembered, while very little notice was given to the tlOpen

Door'·

poliey..
One method which the Un1ted States used to give fina.nci.1.1 aid

~

Ch.in.a. was 'the establishment of a oonsOl"tium in which Br1tishl French, Ch:!.nese
and 1\merica.ns held interests.
1C[J.ll

During Taftts adm1ni:rtrat1on, cert.,.-dnAmer-

banks had been bigh-prossu.red into joining a foUl" power

ban...~1ng

tium to aid China in building the Cbinese Hukua.l'l.g RaUways;

1C3.':l

bankers,

reali~ing

consor-

later it became

that ther.r were deriving very little profit from their

mcmberailip, applied to Pr.sidont It.'Uson to give tl"l.em security b"r.r asking them

to stay in the COruJortium at the request'

or

the Unit,cu States

GOV'~t.

The President, however. favored abstention from :memo&rship for the r5n.so..'l
tha:t the consort.ium might exert undue pressure, whioh would interfere

~dth

the i'i.'1.!mC1,'l.1 and political affairs o! China. 1) Ge:t'!l'lD.1ll' and FlUlSU:.. were

Ijmi...'''mted trcm the consortium by the outbre..1.k of

13

Ibid., ,51~

1forld~~r

I;

Britain and

r;-------vrance could ~ot pay their loans to China, but Japan came forward with an of-

ter

of )20,000,00 ,J yen.

Tue other members of the consortium could not but

realize the l.."li>lications 'Which might follow because of Japan's contribution,

and suggested that it would be wise tor the United States to re-enter the
consortium. 14 .A.tter eonsidering the srmtter and discussing it with the President, Secretary Lansing advised that instead of the old one, a new fOilr-pov-

er consortium should be formed. Britain, France and Japan were given a de-

taUed proposal conoerning it.

The Japanese press opposed this re-arrange-

ment, stating that this would cause Japan to lose nthe fruits she had _saed
in the last few years."l$ The Jep.anose government h:ld their financial re-

presentative, Mr. Od.!.agiri confer with the .American i'ina.'1eial representative

Hr. Lamont, and intorm him tdlat "all rights and options held by Jap.'ln in the
region o:t Manchuria o.nd Hongolia, where
be excluded :fran the ar:ra..'lgaent. 16

r.lr.

J~l")an

held special intere5ts should

Thomas

~i.

lamont said that Japanta

exclusion of Manchuria. and Mongol.ia woultl be 1nadmissible.

The Jap4').MSe re-

presentative took pains to explain that the safet3' of J4').pall was at stake because of the R\v.t8ia.n meDllce.

J.llattera in Siberia might change aver night.

Tho JalJal1eSe lmlted Hanchuria and Mongolia to serve as bufter eta tea against
Rwssian encroachments.

Since Japan seemed unwilling to agJ;'ee to the plan pro

posed, the United. States 8uggeelted another plan for a. Three Paver
but Britain and France would not hear to it.

-

14 Ibid., 55-56.
15 Ib1d., 55.
16 TS!:'J.,

-

O~ium,

They foored such a. course might

rr-----------,
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].e&d Japan to fonn an alliance with~.

_8

Finally, the Chinese government

notif1ed that a new Foal" PQrer Consortium had been .tat't'tled, but China Jade

no a,nsver to the notU1catian, then or later, probably because of the coneea,tons demanded by Japan.

Hence, the consortium accomplished nothing.

!'lation-

&liSt China scorned. it, not v1shing to 11ft up an;r of ber power to international banker•• 17
Japan . . left tn a pa.1"U\ouut. position of milita'f'T and naval power in
tMt Far !hat a!ter

.th.$ ~fl1.ngton

treaties

ot

1922 1II'el"e signed, but she

was

ex...

pec1ted to abstain freD f\Ir""'¥her conquests in China, to recognise the territorial
~t7

of China, to _1n'tain the IfOpen Door" pol1oy, and to leave 'IlllnOlested

the ielanda of tbe Pacit.lc.

18

M she did not keep her

pr~ses.

In SeptEim-

bel", 19.31, the Japanese occupied the principal cities of Southern Manchus-1l..

This was a. violation of the Paot of Par1s, so the Uni:t.ed States sent a wa.:rning
note

to

Japan ~ th.."t, she would

not

reeogl'd.z.e IJl'l¥ treaty ar ~ent._de

in violation of the Paot. 19 The Kellog..Mand Peace Feet (Pact of Faris) ini-

tiated by the Men after 'Wllanlt was named,

liaS

a solem agreement by fUt.een

nations of the world to solve their difticu.lties by pacific means.
nations signed. thA pact on Auguet

'Z1, 1928.

At the 1nv1ta:t1on of the Un:ited

states, the other nations of the 1I03:'ld 1IJ'erfJ aeted to 30m.
K

Fifteen

Sixtty...thre'. nations

.1

17 Sasmel lIlag BemitJ, A pjpl~!!~ lA!tSD; 2l 'Y\e 'flmt§d Ifdrt&lb

14ew yot'k, 1950) a63.

18 !'!?if!., 121. A footnote on page 721 ~. llHunter !-lil1er interIJ,ret$ jurid:tca.llYthis unique treaty in The Peace P'::lct ot Paris. A St'Udy of
the Kellogg-Bl"iard. Tl"eaty, liew York, 1926.
19 :f3taia, 6l.O-814.

bad beCome tWmbers by 1949. 1ea,v:tng eight not holding lOOl1'I.bership. 20
lanbasador Grew tells us that. he

W"..1S

sent to 'Toqo

in the East" at'ld to guard A'llerican interests in i1sia.

to keep poace

He h:td betm. chcsen

'1.'1*.1

f';residont Hoover. who lacked the ability or the power to prevent the Japanese from t..'Utl.ng lia.nc.buria in 1931...193), an aggression which could have been

1'1revented by the use of economic and f1naneial sanctions.
J;;

When Franklin

Delano Roosevelt succeeded lioo'vw',. in 1933.. Grew was retained in Tol-,:yo.
Roosevelt foJ..lowed:.a pollcy of appeasem-ent toward Jar>an.t wl1Ue America. was
b(d.~

hl.ltT13dly prep&red. fat: 'li'a.r.

Grew realleed the power which the militar-

ists we1lded.. and knew that .4r1ta a.od Konoye were dominated b,y them. 21
Tho r.dli t..ar~~.t clique 11'1 Ja.pan, who lII'ere res,?onsible for 1nstipt1ng arl<1

ex-

,

seuting the Nanchurian incident of September, 1931.. will; no doubt, live in

history aa the persona who were responsible for World War II. That gigantic world struggle, which
que.."lce. of a chain

~rt.ruck

at event.

the road over Which the

us a.t Pearl Harbor, was s1mpq the cohee...

which began in Maneh'u.r:ta.

JllpanU&

We

can now

see olearl;,y

travelled :£rom Hulden to Hiroshima and Nap..

saki. 22
The policy Which the United States adopted in 1934, had a d1reet

effect on World War II.
pan and the ei'i'ects

In government recol'ds one can find evid.ence about Ja

oJ: Ja.,");3.l'lese policies upon our dealings with Cb1na..

The

main idea in the whole Far .Eastern situat.ion is stressed by Ambaosador Grew.
U;J

20

••

-

IbM.•

21 Joseph C, Grew .ll.mhassador tn Jap,c;!l writes to the Secretary
Jan.ll, 1934, No.
893.01 Manchuria / 992, Forei§! ~tions,
t

22 Ib14.

640,

39
ia that Japan considers herself responsible for the peace and Ol.g,er of tlreattJr

East As1a.

She thinks that she should. be consulted on UJY question of im.-

portance affecting China. 2.3

When Secrete.ry o! State, St1mson., learned o£ JaImlIS military conquests in Manolluria .. he restated the principle which the united. Stat08 bas

foll()jTed, throughout. th;e

~. lJirlCe

the days of Per%7J

this was that Cfd.na t S

integrity must be preserved, and equal opportunity must be granted to all :nationa t.xoadi.ng with China. This tlSt:1l:uon Doctrineu as it is now k:noWn, was
not a new p:d.nc1p1e.

:&ten the stataaent th<.lt the United States would not r

cognize territo,ry taken 1.."1. violation of trE)£,ty promises

liaS

not new.

It sim-

PlY rea£f1rmed the decla.r1:J.tiro presented to both China and Jar,an in 19l5, a£
tar Japa."l had made her

Twenty-one~.

The Un1ted stat., has cons1ster!

1y followed th1s policy t~ the past hun.dred~.

Std.mson sct notes to Japan and China on
their respective

g(W~ts

24
J~ry

1, 19)2, telling

that the United States reftw4l$ to recognize the

legal1ty of any treaty forcad upon China, contrary to the Pact

or

1928.

He

waged a disheartening oampaip, &8 dUJclosed b:y the documents tollow1ng the

note of Janu.ar.v 1, 1932.

Pa.rticular~

1Illportant .".. tba trans.AtJJant1c

C()l}-

ver_t1ons which Secret.ary St1nwon held wit.h the Brituh Pr:1me lUnistorI

23 Joseph C. Grew, a. letter trom Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to th
Secretary of sta.te, No lll6, tokyo, Deceaber 29, 1934, ForeMI Rel.atio:r..sof
.!:h! United stat,eII' Di{>lanatic f,afJ,eJ:a, 19341 !h! !!£ ~, I , 1955, ~. -

2h Henry 1. Stimson, eited by ~e Endowment, American AUoe
ation for International Conciliation, lliework;l§3~J >4=~. (Doc. 306-.314.)

~1 l~c

'"
Donald.,
and the Brit.ish Foreign Minister, Sir John Simon, in reb-.

tar it

~,

1932,

~

toward Sb.angh1.

wa.s in that month that the Ja.panese array and navrJ were

111

At the same time, the m.1lita:r;r clique in Tokyo,

lIhicn had seized control of the Japanese government, was misleading both
the An'mican and Drit1sh goVe1"'l)ttenta by dual diplmac;r. 25
liefthC" t'!.lG Unit.ed States·

sanctions on

J.~n,

~Qr

Britain i."rIpoaed military or econal'l.1c

because of thi.8 deceit,

bQ.~

both St:1.mson and S:1mon urged

a. strong dl.ploml1t:1.c. front aga1nat the 'Obstreperous st.:lte.

Sthlson was stUl

under the illwl10n that peaoe could be obtained thr'ough the Kellogg-Briand

Peace Pact; although 'tho tltl1tGd states still held herseU aloof fran the
La'1gue

or

.

NatiON,.

26

.A.Aer the appointment of Joseph C. C1.'rew to Japan, Juno, 1932, reZl
porta from that sUxee were more adfJQ.uate and complet,~ Intomation regard...
:Lng tbe collapse of parlia.mentary government and the pranotion of a popular

war psychology by means of

pr~reaohed

the state Department regu.larl:y.

But regardless of Grew's t:trele8s. efforts J Ja,.,'OaMse rels. tions

gl"EM lTOl"Se.

The Japanese considered the United states policy of conciliation to be a
sign

ot ~.

28

..

The United States tilled to approve

25 Kenneth Colg:rave,

A.ij.~. ;LV, 1949...1950,

Q.

government loan

11.1...148 J citing ....
For
.....·~....

~elations ..2£ ~ U~t~ £!tat.: -.f&l~;t.1;c P9z~9J ~, .!!!, ~ ~ ~:st,
Department of State Publication, 3152, 3162, 'Washington, 1948.

26 Ibid., 146.

tI

~.

-

28 Ibid.

r;=------to China, bec;:ruse Jal::6.n ~;posed it.

B:US13ia, on the (rt:.her hard, ineror..lsed her

aggressions toward Japan. During 1934,

felt t.lul.t war would

The United states failed. to influ.ence

break out. between Jar:o.n and Russia.

Japanese policy but Russia d1.d, for

ma.rv pers()l'l8

litU

find her (Japan) in 193;>, chs;ng:ir.lg her

policy bacaUSfl Il:uasia had built up a military POt:l~ in .,\Sla .. and had expI'es.eed
ncr readiness to use it if necessary.

gre;ltest

l'lleans

for preventing

W<lZ

A Japanese state.sma.."1 remarl1:ed that the

between F..ussia and Ja:pan.

marlted increase o£ Soviet l1liJJ.t.arJ;' st..rerlgth in the

lesson tor us here.

lar

rod bean

Fast.

n29

n1lhe

There is a

Japan felt that Rwls1a would. resist 19X/;xlmion to the

north, whUe it Was not possible

tor

the United Stkltes to prevent Japanese

expansion to the south, ~ or east.

It the United States in 1930" hnd buil:t

up a superior T:.a.Vi{ a.s Stanley Hornbeck had advoca:Led, .tu.ture events in the
Far East. ndght have been vastJ.:.y diUer·ent than they are.

crisis ta.ugbt the world that tl:~

a.ble to stop or control. :ruthless

Wre,S

The Hanchurim

no m..'lgic POWI' in existence which ,<1as

a.g~ess1on.

3ecret.:·.~ of S~'lte .. Hull, tel.1s us th~.t £rom the time of the Harco

Polo Bridge incident in 1931 uutU Ju.l7, 1941, the United Stutes bad pursued
a policy ot self-control and pittance.. natw1thst.'mci:tng the continual viola...
tion of American rights by the Ja.panese, and their eontinued aggression..1

which endanierad our ¢Ol1.rItry.

Newrtheless, the American Government had

sought to wOl'k out a. plan for continued fl"iQnd.ly rehti(Yns with Japa."rl, and to

--

...
29 ~ohn J. !{Ol~e" !.y. H. He. 57, 19;>1..19:;~, 168, citing F()l"e;m
.~lati~'1s 9.f ~ Un1t~ St-a:l\ies; ~nlOOlatic Papers" 1934. In five voJ.~"

!ol. III, Tho F~ Fast. Department at St;'l.to Publ1cat1on" 4011. Washington:
I.tOVCrtlmGllt: -1'..:'int:lng Orfice, 1950, PI'.. l:lco..'Vi.

42
gi...e t,.1)e

Japa~Be

every opport.unity to develop peaceful poliei•• .30

The change 1..1 &1ropean cowt100s after l4u.n1ch gave the Japa.nese

't.a.n:1 apport/unittes for tu.t.ure conquests. Now Japan was in a poSition to cut
of! supplies ca!'li.ng to Ch1.na from the United states and lta'ope, supplies sust,aj.nirlg

China aga1nst the enoroachmente of her ambitious. ne:1.;hbor.

China. had

been gettLTlg her arms and war supplies tb:rougb British HongKcng, and French

Ind.o-Ch:tna, and by way of th. Bu.ma. Road.

.A:1.mollt before 'the ink was dry

Mwlich, Japan laid. hold of Canton and brought an arli'IY
Cb.il'la, thUs preventing China froln getting

or

at

QC(NpaUon to Sout.h

suppa_ through

Hong Kong.

When Cs<echollovakia ws taken by 111t3...- in 1939, Japan j~ at

the chance to OCcupy the large C~ 1Bland 0£' I-Iainan, control.ling the Gul:f'

ot Tonkin. Them, in 1940, ahe ma.de o.n agreanent with Thailand (Siam) to pro-tect their common interests. and.

tor the exebs.nge of

in!~tion.

By Septa-

bar, 1940.. li'rance had fallen, so Japan occup1ed Indo-Cb1n&" 'thus sealing up

that source of supplies tor Ch.1n&.

rio

80~)ne:r

bad the United states passed

. the Lend-Lease Act, than Ja,..l».n stirred up trouble between Thailand and the
French torcea in Indo-China;

then, acting as mediator, she secur«1 a. better

hold on Thailand in Ma.rch, 1941, !rom. which Burma could be reaohed..

In a. cablegram to the State Dep!l1"tm.ent, September 12, 1940, Ambassador Grew told. hoW' Japan wa.s making tUte of her opportunity to pursue her
pollcy or aggression.

It reada in part:

)0 Oordell Hull, Fore!e Relatlons of the United 5tc~tesJ Jamn.
1931... '41. (Department ot state pubiICiition) J iOl.:-1,P~>=J2b."" C=titee
exhibit No. 29, cited by U.S. Government in ?,..:l:. Harbor .fl!ve~:!it\tion, 18.

43
\~la~er may be the intentions 0:£ the present Japanese GOI7ern....
mont, there can be no doubt that tho l'I~ a."1d other elements in the
coun~ see. L"1 the present world iItuaT.:IOna IOla• xi
to
f.~l iilt'O"e?Iect'tfi.err-cTreilns of expansionJ the tJerman Victories
have gone to Uielr' headS i:tke' "siroilg wiii&; until recently they have
believed implicitly in the defeat of Great Britain; they have argued th8 t the war will p.t'obably' (~f) in a quick Gentlall victory and
that it is well to cn.."lSolidate Japan's positiofl in greater Fast Asia
while Germany is still acqtdescont and bef'Ol", the eVOl'ltuaJ. hypothetical strengthening 0:£ ('~ naval POl1e1" :might rob Japan of' faxt'1Ut'lg control in the ','ll' :tr.a.stj , the;r have discounted effective o;ppos1tion on the part of the United States a.lthough carefully watcbingour attit>~. ~ abilltlof tlle saner hE).;1.ds in and out of the
Governm.ent to contiOl"tilese elei'intsbis been
18 ({oubtful:-. -;-.
Dipl.oma.ey may occasionally retard but ca:nnot e!£ectively stem
the tide. Foree or the display of force can alone prevent these
powers .:f't"cm attai.."ling their objectiwa. Japan today is Olle of the
predatory powers; she haS~ed .!!! !'i.eral 8:~ ethical sense ~
has becClllS 1":rankly and una
ad Y op~)ortunistt seekIii at Gvri' turn
to prof:.tt. by the weakness of others. Her policy of southward expan.sion is a. definite threat to American interests in the Pacifio and
is a thrust at the British Em.pil"e in the east~ )1

Oii"ortWi1!l

ana:

During the Congressional Investigation

vealed that a telegram from Toky'o

1941,

t,¢

ot Pearl Harbor" it vas re-

Berlin had been inta:t"Cepted on July 2,

by a United States Camnunicationa Division.

It ge.ve the i.."li.'onnation

tha.t the m111t<u:1.sts of Japan weN attempting to bring Chiang's government
under the oontrol of the Japunese by ap.,'Jlying pressure at various places in
t~:e

South. They planned to take over ooncossions by propaganda, and if that

failed, by fighting.

At the sane time, they planxled to continue

d1pl~tic

relations, and to ~ke eVer:! possible effort to prevent the United St.atos
!'rom entering the war. 32

31 Joseph C. Grew, comr1ittee exhibit lJo. 1, P. 9, cited in !uvea-

~i5at1on ~ ~earl

riarbor, 16.

- .•. ...

32 Cordell Hull .. CODIldttee record, pp. 11.08-1109, eitoo by U.S.

Government, Invest1&ati~n ~ !~! Har~t.,

15.

rr=

i

'"

In 19h1, Adm1ral Toyoda

Mr. !-lllt. suoka..

W'd.S

appointed Forait,"ll I{dr.tistel" to replace

Frequent expressions of the wish

ror

peace were :made by the

new r'lj.nister,

as woJ.l as by the Pr:1:me Hillister and Ambassa~or NorllUl"'a.

United States

r~ente.t1ves.

to

the

tle'V'M'theless, their actions belied their words

£(f1: mobilization was cOD.t1nued, not o:nly ill Japan, but i:ncreas1ng numbers of

the al"!f1..e4 forces m.tt"e

s~mt

to Manehuri;:c, Indo-China a.nd south Chi.na. 33

1941, our go~ent aamed that Japan was not making i'l.n:y change in her tor...
eie-m poliq. and that she would ramaill faithful to the agreements of. the Tn ...

f~tite

Pact. 34 This

W~:rt.ion

led .tWer100n diplomat.$ to doubt the sincel"-

Finding that after stWera,l months of di'plomatic discussions, Japan
w;.:,8

still intent on aggression" P1"e~id.ent Roosevelt, on July 26, 1941, froze

JapDnase assets in the United St.1c1tas.

The e!£oct of this order

W:.1.S

to bring

in€; order, hl'(r,e Japanese forces 'Were already conce::1trn.ted in HtmChuria, IndoChina. and south Chiu.oa.

1~~1 property in ChiM l aX'.d eve~l the !1211-erican

l'nlbaSSy and the U. S. S. Tutul1a at Chungking had. alre.ady boer:! dam.."lged with

bursts. 3>

,i

and -the loaders of other natic..ns tried to stop her in her r'-lthless campaigns,

In the next chapter, t.:r:e Roosevelt foreign poJJ.cy will be discUS300.

Nations had shown its

:unpote~1ce

by permitting Japan

to continue her ruthless .:a~ion.

rearming.

.As th.e prospects

£or the fa tetul l1o\U!'.

tor

to rat.:1.l.n tbncburta, and

All the J,'fUl.jor powers of the world were

lf01'"ld peace clintM'd J

America began to p.repare·

CHAl?Tl1t III

When Franklin Delano Roosevelt was i.1U'tuguratro or;, Hareh
eeonctnic 11£e of'

011..1"

:o.&.t10n was at a'low ebb.

4.. 1933, the

Duri.'16 1932.. over 1,400 banks

had failed, a..'ld in the last tvo l'TMks Wore Roooevolt took the oath ot ctlice., twenty-one SUttes and the District o£ Columbia w:ere either
their banks to run u:ndeI'specW orders.. or had c'.eclured a.

p~;rmitting

h-'mkir~

hoJj.day.

'l'he now President at once assumed the leadership of the Nation, urging con...
£ide~lce

and couri:.ige.

was :tear itself. and

He told tho people that t11.& only thing they had to toar
t~tt

\10m for the l..u:uD.plo.red.

moratorium

his most 1mportan.t

~go

This act lm,s the inauguration of the IJew

the directit')Xl of u pl,::mnoo. economy.
the landers of our nn.tion

't'lnS

to find

was plucod on the uithdrawal of cur...

effort to rest,ore prosperity to the Nation.

CUl'"lty and powr-ty.

at the momont

On the day after his inaugu;r.j. tiOl'l, a nationwide bank

was declared, and an

Toney £ran tho banks.

'k~sk

st.rug~led

De.:u,

and a.Tl

In its effect, it was a step in

For the next .four ye.:;.rs, Roosevelt and
with th3 problOttll of unemploymant.,

we-

l'lore tht:m ,;). $COl."e 01' legi!:l.:'1.tive acts Wm"a passed, giv-

ll1g the government control of, or supervision

ot

ec~~c

lifo.

l1uch

criti~

in favor oi tho new oxperimc;xts, and telt that the New De.,l would 1(;',ao. the
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country to eeonomic stability.
Roosevelt had

~

In!h!! ~1ie .9! qop.

friends a;r,d manyanem:les.

,

I,

~ch

we lenrn that the character of Roosevelt was a mixture of politieal in-

sight and enduring bigh principles.

even b"'l those who disliked hi.."'l.

His

was taken tor: granted,

He was agre.o'tt ora.tor, POBSe8sing a. b.t.'ter

understanding of foreign aUdrs than
he worked.

tru.t~

Uo one could dony his

a.n::r of the high authorities with

$\U."ellGaS

of vision.

whom

His death> l*pr11 12,

194$, na.t the .!1l<ment o£ triumph and irldi.!spensibUitl" in world politiCS, W£D
a O"eat los~ to hia generation. tt 1
The abovo portr~ cont;oaa;t.s ~tly with John T. P.l$lnta ~1s

ot Roosovel.t

in hie book,

:£h!. riooa~t~.

exert,ed eontinuO'W,S presSUrEl

to gain.

1110%'. ~

to

~bange

He telJJs us that the i'reld.dent

the st.rueture ot

gov~~"

tor ldmself. B7 one plan af+...er another.. be

les~ those or
President with $J"jOO,ooa,ooo

in order

inc~

2

th9

The

powers of the President .. and.

Congr0SS and the Courts.

1-& provided the

to use tor rel.ie!' and l"ecov-

fi%"',f.

The ptU."fJe strings, lMell hr:ul ton,.erly 'been held by Congress: were

his hands.

now in

In the wh¢le ten years prorl.ous to 1933, the governnerrt lk1d net

8X[JSmed suoh an enomooa sum. )

Senators and representatiws instead of g()ioi

1 Cr.amOOrs, 611.
2 John T. F:Qrnn.. The ~elt Myth, 1_ York, 1948, 289 •

...........

.............

,I!
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1IJg

to Congress for appropriations, now went to the President. They hn:",l to beM

to b;1s wishes, i f thq d$B1red to get money for their dist.r1cts.

Tho wieldi,.ng

of. this new power by the PrasicWnt 'Wd in its rQulta an att.nck on the structure of gOV8l"mlent, which endeavors to koep its three br'~hes independent of

eaCh otb.er.4 During the Roosovelt adminiatratiotl, over a hu;,dred bureaus were
org,;.n1zed, $uch as the }itA, the

oee,

t11$

mu.

a.nd the P't[A~

£~ bureaus were

never

giVell

power to function in a legit~te l1D.'Jt, by act of Congress. but he

their

pcMet"

directly :£'rom Roosevelt.!)

By mea.na of b:t.anlc-check dor>.atioos and

government rulinga) the poWers of the nation can be seized, and i! thiD plan

15 continued, our :f'ree go~ will be changed without a vote of the people

and

OUX'

Conetitution will be

d4s~. 6

In. a recent. book. Protes~ Thcnlas A. &oUey states that

Roosevelt r.pea.t~ deCeived the American peopl.e cl.uring the
period bat'oI'e Pearl Harbor• • • • He wus faced with a terrible
d.il.emrJa. If he ca.me out unequivocally for :1Jlt.erv$l1tion. he 'Would
be defeated 1.,"l 1940. 7
In a radio bro.'ldeast, JQ.ll'IlIU'Y 12, 19h1.. Senator Bt\:rton K. \l1heeler,
~at.ic

Senator trom 11ont.>.:na, critioized the Lond.-Leo.ve Bill at ~$ngth.

He said in part" that never before.. in tho hist.ory oi: the United St,at.es has

the chief executive o! the nation asked Congress to act contral"J" to i.."ltCl"'ru.l.t1
law.
.....

Never before II in the history of tllis nn.tion
ad

.=-

if

5
6

-

IbW.

-

Ibid.

h',~s

dupllcity been mrident

~---------------------.
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1n its dealing ld.th other nations.

given to ooe mn so gre..:.'\t

work of our Government.

Ii

At no other period has the 'United states

power, a power which could lL"liermine the fn,l'ne-

At no other time bas Congress been asked to surrender

its rightful poW\'lX'S to the Chief lkecutive• • • • wrbe· land-lease-give prognu:! is the Uew Deal's triplo A toreign poliCYJ it will plow under eve:r,
fourth Ji..mericun boy. • • • ApprcMU o:f lend...~ means 'W'nl', open and eomplete

warfare ...8
Accord.i.ng to Eliot JtIDfMs::f. Anler1qa t s

econom1c :reorGanization be...

tween the years 1939 and 194$ was 11ttle short of miraculous.
of living

A new st.and.a.rd

was given to the nation, labor, both 1'-1 the city and in the eount.ry'

a.ssumed. a new d1gnitT and importance. There was a treaendous
both the llv:tl1g ani worldng condtt1ons of the Negro.

~ovement

in

Complat.e mobilization

of industry pcmittcd the United stat.. to conquer the Ax1s 4tld bGcCRe the
leader in ·t,he stru.ggle against Soviet dom:i.Mtion.

edit for this stupend.ou.s acccmplisbnent.

lieh the

econ~

developed to initiate

Roosevelt

des~s

the

He 't-ook a Cha..flC6 on the speed with

.turt_ production, as !u'!)Qds for the

effort ~ greater. 9
Saae

h1stor1a.ns, viewing the New De&! trom the standpoi.'1t of the

present (19501 any it

and d.irccted economy

a,~:>ears

VIaS

to be a compromise.

offensive to the 3\rn.m.ca.n wq of life" with its in-

~om

cJ,ination !:or personal

A coroplet~ controlled

Expanded gover:tJl'1ent.!l.l. control

in bu.s1nesa.

ot

bllSi.'1.aSs was corwidered a weapon to fight the depression" but not as a rem«tr

t<:»: all national ills.

In labor legislation,

ROOSSVe1t adrr.in;i.stration aecart.pl1she4

m~

{uld

1.71 aocl.al, likewise" tho

benefit 111 a lev ye;.rs than Br1t-

The United St:1tas aQUiht a compront..ise betlfOO'n ~r1cted

ain did. in !'1i"t.y-.

compet.ition and regimented economy_ The recognition of the Soviet Union was
o<XlSidered 't;r;J some -.n'ite1:'s" to be the most int-'Ortant diplanat10 act of thel
Roosevelt regim.e d.ur1ng 1933.

to the

~iarld

was ready to

It is said that

~":1

LttYinov, Soviet delegate

Economic Conference in London (1933) st:~ted thatbis gove:ment
~

$1,000.000,000 'llJt)rt.b ot goode abr:"oaafl The American opinion

concern1ng tbe Russians

was

~

but cord1al.

During the Bolshev:1k Rev-

olution $440,000,000 llOl:'th of ~. property had been confiscated.
this. tbe Kere.nsky g~ent had borrowed

viets refu.sed

to bonor.. axt Since

the rise

Ru.esia and Jm.Gr1ca, RoO$welt dN:1.d.ed to
word

'):la..OOO,(X)O, a debt

Bea1d..

which the ~

ot JtJJ;an was a. threat to both

over~ past

ditterences a1l:1 aent

to Pres1dent Kal.1n1.n, that th$ United Statu WOUld welcale a aon..t re-

presentative ttl dUiWSS <;lJleGt1ons relAting to the two

came as

repr~sentat1ve

of the Sad.et.

COlL"1triU.

Af't,e:r eight dayf:.J of

Litri..noY

discussion, tomal.

d1plomat1c :relations 'ifEJl"e ~ betveen ius1a and tbe Un1ted Sta't;.$s.

Tho Soviet Union pledged. protection to Amen.oan citizens 1n Russia" and cancelled all

~

£or damages done during the S1berlan expedition.

It:P1"<J'11-
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tad states re.fuaed to lend the soviet a:ny more money, being deterred by the
Johnaon Aot of

1934"

which i'ol~hid$ loans to governments in default.

The sueeessf'..u. a.ttack of

Jalx~n

upon Haooll"..u:1.a in 19J1, rmd the

steady progress of Japanese control in North China durL~ 1933 to 1937, made

it clear to the

UnitedStc~too,

as well as to the oth.- gre,'lt powers, that Ja-

pan aimed at m.ald.ng the entire Chinese Republic a Japanese protac:torat-e.
'rheir plan, statod. AmOC,ssador Grew !rom Tokyo to Secretary' !till in DootDber,

1934,
is to obtain trade control ~nd~ntua.lly pre<icminant politic."ll influence in China. the Pr.illppines, the Straits Settlements, Siam, and t,he
tluteh F.ast I!kiiee, the Hartt:1.me Provinces and Vladivostok, one step at
a time, as in Korea and Uanehuria, pausl.n.g illtaIm:tttentl;r to consolidate and then ca."1tinuing as soon tJ.S the intervening obstaclu can be
ove%'Cor;19 b'J' diplom.aey or force • • • • • we would. be reprehensibly Scmlolmlt U' we wm·e to tr'wJt to the :;;oourity ot treat,. :restr-.dnts or inter- 1
nation;J.l COl1rl:ty to safeguard our interests or, indeed" our own property.
In 1n.formal discussions with one of llllleriea ts r-opresQuts:r"ives in To-

Jll!Xm" wh¢ tlas destined to bo tho leader of the Orie..l'ltD.l civiliz,ntlon
would in course of time be t.bs "'bose oi a grOllp comprising China, India,

the Netherlands East Indies, etc• • • • He proceeded to. say that tho
United st.oltes 11'111 lend th£! Americas both llorth and South. Qreat Bri...
tain is le.'1d1ng t;:.o Eurt:tpean countries, but Great Britain is degenera...
ting" while the rest of Ew.."q)e is decadent. Thllretore, it "Jill end by
the United statc;s leadinG the Occidental e1.vili~tionl while Japan lends

the Oriental civUiution. u II

l~ Joseph C.. Ga:-ew, }!'1C,. and!!!!:, United. ~t,<.ltes !ore~ Pollgz,
19J.:rJ..241, U.S. Government Pril:lt:mg Ollic., vlaailillgtoo, 1943, ~S'(,:300.
11

Cll.:1.mbers, 6OJ~.
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In

report to the Secretary ot S'ti:lt4,Wllliam E. Dcdd, Ambassador

:l

GermanY" said that th.e Dutch I'!1nister talked to him and told 'h.:im

t~t

the

1)Uteh authorities lnd becme concerned abou:t. a MCMi!llct known as na.n Asu:t1c
League

or Nations.-

Two gonernls

~.d

bean appointed to travel about in Ch:1na,

and to organize in &nohukuo, Hongoli;a, the Sl1a.llghai district. Indo-China and
Siam, groups whose Fll"pOM it is t.o·bring about a close c()ooordinatlon idth

Japa.n, and ultimately give Japan control of th. Far East. This activity has
bet'n rather intense since the .Amsrican rec.ognition of Russia.
the.t Ja:)ru'1 bas changed her plans 1."'l reg,'trd to Russia.
heX" at once .. she will delq, in Ol"d.er

gions n.a.med.

Instead of ehallq1ng

to establish a strOl"lgel" hold on the

1"'"

The Dutch ain1$teralso deserib«l a chi.1.:nging Japanese te.ri.ti'

policy destined

ed, but he

Dodd expWncd

WaS

to ease

thG re:!.l.ltions of Japan with all the countries concern,...

quite positive in

assert~

that the

~pean

countries &1-. the

Hague held the opinion the. t the Japanese ndlitnr,r olique intends toannmc thG
Philippines and the Dutch possessione.

The Ninister sincereJ.y hoped that the

United States would assist 1."1 bringing about beM. er economic and pr:>l1tieal
relat~ in the Far East.• 12
~jith

this infol."'nU.tt1o:n at hand, the United

er :meQJtUl'es 1n the

'ar last.

~;.\tate$

began to t-'lke count-

Through the Reconstruction Fintmce Corp.oratioo"

12 U.S. Govlt., Roreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic
Papers, Vol. III, The Far East, Washington, l~O, 2-3, citing a r~port of
Ambassador Dodd, in Germany to t.he Secretary of State, No. 401, Berlin, Jan.

6, 19.34.
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• loan of' &50,"'000,000 was made 'to the Chinos. Government in 14&1, 1934. The
United

S~1.tea

had already reeogn:Lze<i the Sorl.et Union, in llovember, 1933,

'fhich action was considered

_t

by Japan as a move by iiashington to oppose Tokyo t 8

_bitions in the Pacific. When Japan denounced the \iash1ngton naval agree...
of 1922, a race for naval su..urem.aC"J in the Pacific began.

Internation-

al relations .tu:rther deteriorated, when Japan withdrew from the London blaval.
eon£erenee (Decl91'8.ber, 1935 to March, 1936) because America. stood .f1rml,y a ..
pinst .tun naval parit,l with tho Unit«1 States &nd arita:1n. 13

In the opinion of Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, .American polio;y
was ersatz during the period tram the Mu.p.1eh criDis until tbe

SUllJ:1C"

of 1939.

It was the best the President could prov.:tde tor the count.ry, since the Ameli"...
ican publiC were insisting on isolation.

appeaseaent.

ByAprll, there was no chance 01

England and fra.nee vere trying to get allies aga.1nst Gem.a.l1Y.

Avter1ca was in a position to help.lu:rope.

it. repeal of the embargo on muni-

tions might have ste.yed Germa.ny. DurillI the spring o.f 1939, in taJ.ks to Sen-

ators and Congressmen, the President used to end. his eonvoraations with the
idea. that he regarded the l"$~ of the tlnbargo as the greatest step that
could be taken to guard

too

countryta interests, both to secure peace and to

protect us in case war shOuld come.

14

On February 11.. 19)9, St.-mley K. Hornbeck, adrlsOl" on Polit:teal Bel..

13 Chambers,

1940,

604.

14 Joseph Alsop

39-!~2.

and Robert KintnerI American Wlrl. te ~, lZev York,

.. ,

, __

ations" preptired a memorandum concerning an eool1ani.c offensive aga1:nstJIlpa.n,
which the Department of state

was p::k1ll.1'ling. The record states that untU

1900, the Japanese lfel'e considered as a.
t'oamparativoly a;rn.iu.ble, artistic, art-loving and peaceful people, who
needed to be taught and could be patroniac. ft But Japan'. character
was "not .Ihat it was thought be!ore 189$ to be, It and her "strength
is not what it has been thougl.rt.s1nee
to be." 15

190,

Since 1905, the world, through

fear of Japat)., has permitted her to ruthless-

lY steal territory trom her neighbors.
there are three

1t'Iqa by

16

which nations :maY' ofter resistance to such

injustice, first by opposing it as an

~

positicn, and thirdby' armed intervention.

act, second by econald..c op...

America. has 1001 tried economic)'

hence the onl.7 measure left to her is amed intervention. The
17
conclusion is t.hat mil1tar.r force will have to be used. sooner or lat..er.
opposit.ion;

Rauch contellds that Prel.d.dent. Roosevelt could. and c11d hope that'

the series of measures Which he adopted during pre-Pearl Ibrbor years might

have averted host1l±t1es.

He is exonerated from the cl:ltlrge of

or of baving violated in arq way

thl\)

v4nn1na

war

prom1$es of peaceful int.entionhe mde

ciurine the 1940 campaign.18

-

1$ Tansill.. Back~o~2,quoting a memorandum by Stanlq K.
Hornbeck, Ad.v1s:e:r on PoiI'tt
.. tiona, Febrwary 11.. 1939. 793 / 14671..
Confidential tile" }LS, Department of St.-,ite.
.

-Ibid.

16 Ibid.
11

-

den'llllCia.tion of our ex1st1ng oommercial tr.o.'lty fa.i~ed to be etractive.
blss<.l.dor Grell dUt.:~Cld with "'0h1s policy of eeonom1cpressure.

OIxi.nion that Jar.x:.n ba.d vast resources which she could use;

He was

f.m...

or the

that she h.'ld been

storil1g up raw :m£i.torial for mUit.."!.rY supplies, and tmt economic pl'"essure
might not be e!tect1ve. 19

S$cretur,v of state, Hull had no more opt:bdstic outlook than Or••

n.

told the :members of Congress t.ha t the oonflict to ems would affect

whole world.

It would be

aIle

th~

at-tack by "poWerful nations armed to t..ha teeth,

preaching the doctrine of l1','.r:-ed,

f'o:..~

a.l1d practicing a philOSI)Phy of bi.rl:>al"...

10m. It 20 He declarM tll;}. t
Hitler 1ntEmdato l'lUlke b:1mselt the colossus
pl,:\cfl'J6 her heel on Asia. If they su.oc~J
tnmsaet. cur bua1neslS wi ~~ the rest of tho world
and Berlin. W. know all this, and :yet we retain
which directly e?lcourages Hitler, l1Ul1,:.:es wat" more
threatens our own peace and safety. 21
Ja.l~n

of Europe. while
we ldllhaft to
through Tolqo
this _bargo,
likoly) ;mel

her in some plan 1.'!,gainst Japnuooe aggression in the Far East, in can of
in Europe.

~;a:r

She askfid that France and. Britain IllUl:rPly air and Da'\"al forces to

def_t JO;Pa.."l,l Whil& Cltin& would aupply the army.

Britain reiUs«i, sayi.ng

that she would. 11;;.;,ve to fight the war in Europe before she could do ~

19 Tans:tllj 502.
20 fi..lsop and Kintner, ,39-42.
21 ~.) 4,3.

in tho Far E:1st, and cr.xpresoed the hOPG thnt the pres..mce of the UnH.ed Sta

Fleot. in the Prr,cti'ic m.ght deter Japan £.rem attacldng EIr.1ta1n t s possessions
22
there.
\rJhile Ch.ino. wlas see~..ing aid againsh Japan. the latter was tr:r.tng

to find some plan to prasel."Ve the peace of Europe.

Japan fetared an accord

betwen Germ;;m::r and Russia., as that would. u.:.'1d.emine Jupaneee safety.
ing to

eot

Fail....

al.l:L::ls i'U ifurope, Japun. 'turn.OO tor help to the Unitod Stntes. 23

During an unofficial conversation w:i:lir~ the United St.lltes Ambassa-

dor, Hay 16, 1939fc by a Japanese who bad friends among the high officials of

the COUl"t of Japan, the .fOllowing Wonnat1on lfas conveyed to
Grewt

.Ambass~dor

pNSSure was being put upon Japan by ~ and Italy toward enter-

yet it could not ignore th.., fact that QRus~ia straddled Europe and
Asia, and. that wh$the,r Japa.'1 liked it or not, its policies and
actions tom a. bridge by which events 1."l the Far East and in
~

act and reaot on each other. tf 24-

On 1!Je.Y' 2), dipJ.omutic convC'sations weN resumed betwen the .Prime l>i1nister
of Japan. Baron ~, and the .amertean
man.

Cl:1iU'ge

Beron H1ranunw. expressed his horror CNer the

a secood world Wi!lr.

<,-~-"--

22 TansU1# 502.
2.3

Ibid
'

24

Ib:1p..,

tact that

there might be

He suggested an. alliance w1th the United StG.tea, which

liould have a I~od.~r:a. t,ing :tn.nuance in llu"ope. It 25

-..

d'.f£airs, ~ H. Dco-

507-508.

25 Ibi!i., 506

Doamm said that the principal d1.tt1culty in the way of mald.ng

such an alliance was Japan's aggrese10ns

1n Chim.

1i1.ranuma respoJ.'lded

b7

SIJ.11ng that Japan vas on.'J.T endeavoring to protect ita rights in North Ch1na.

It Secreta,ry Hull thought a settlement of t.lm Chin.:'l conflict was neeeesary
to the making of an a] J:lanoe, then Japan could not f~ one, as she bad hoped
to do, although she thought an ~Ja.renue all.1anee would bring about

peace in lh'rope.

26 Sec:retary HullcaYe a. cold

and diecourag1..ng a~ to

It would be bett...., b& thousht, for Japan to work

thiS proposal.

the Imropean nations With whan she had "special relations. n

ree.llY' want«! 'tIOrld. peace, it. was proper tor them to
in the FlU" Fast.

The foll.owing

J~,

s1n~ w1t..~

'It the Japan_.

put an end to hostilities

without waiting for a :oeply to

t~

conversation of H1ranuma and Ii1U, President Roosevelt gave nat'.Qe to the
JaJXt.neGe ths:t the treaty of

19l1 would tendnate on Janua1"1 26, 1940. Tanaill

is of the opinion that th1s note was not s1ncere"

reason for the

t~tion

of the treaty

OUr go-vemment ,.1.Ye the

IW IIChQi;·lge.a D'lr'lY need

to be made

toward better serving ·thepurposes tor which w.eb treaties are concluded."

'l'he real. reason tor 1ts tcd.Mtion was that
vance into Ohina, and.

kner1~

27

26~.,

27

~.,

507..508.

508.

refused to stop her ad-

.... protesting the sencl1ni of war ma.ter1als

to Ja,..ua.n. This action was the beginning ot
JaFan.

Ja~

iii.

strong economic otfensive on

58
al Econanic A.t'tai:ra, that Secretary Hull sent a note to the Japanese AmbaiJlla...
dOl', Horinouchi, te1l1ng him that the trade treaty would be tem1na.ted. 28

n-evicnw to

thi!\J tenrd.n-!ttion, se:veral events Mppen~ which made the relations

betwen Japan and the United St!1'tes lllOlte stra!ned.

dents

WilS

the bombing

or

The .first of these inci.-

Chu..~g.Amba.ssador Johnsm, ~ !~! ~

a.t£aires in Tokyo called on the M1ni~er' of Far~1 Ai'fa.irs on Jul:3' 10;, 1939,

jected on s,CC<llnt of the bontbing of Cht4~. .The Jap~ Hinist., ex~J1"essed di$tress that AMerican 11ves had been endangered.. bttt said be could

Inot promise that ths bombings would. ceaSe. Air attack was a necessity in that
Iregion.

On the same day, JuJ.y 10, 1939, Ilooseftlt dartanded trait the Japan• •

Pov'ormnent, a at&. tement in re.terenoe to the bmb1ngs and to the d..u1ger to

~icane. 29

Hull delivered

Roos~t's m~,

and st.ated that sOl1et.h1:ng

~ serious would haP::Jerl it the ba1~ continued,

In reepoM., the Japan..

ese 11mbaaeador expreased the hope that tl~e Ur4.ted. st,'lwe ~t WO'Uld keep
...;ts Mtionals am-;J" from the <::lQnger oone.. btlt Hull replied sharp~ that the

Pnitad States Govenmtent did bot ueoncsde the right of' any other outside eoun1Vl'Y to a monopoly oth:lghwaya or

. 28

U. 5. Dep tt...

f!!r.l

streets or other localities in China.30

fIarbor, 7.

29 Secreta.l')!' Hull to AMriC.Um !mbaStly :in Tokyo, Ju~ 10, 19)9.
93.94!1520U, ~.a, Department of State, cited bt.l Tamdll, 616.
)0 11ETmOrandum of C01'lVerafl tiro betveenSecretary Hu.ll and the Japan.
Ambassador, ~ 20 .. 1939. 79.3.94 I k.525.3.t }1S, Department of State,cited
i1y Tansill, 617,
SEt

That .,the D$partment of
t,baIl

Britain was, is shown

S~\te \faS

beitlg more aggressive to\'rard Japan

b'.1 the Tients:L1'l Affair. DuriJ:le World

~iar

I, China

Jj.quida:t'ed Austrian t:nd Gerr.um consessions in Tientsin, and in 1920, she con-.

fiscated the Russian consessions.

The Bri:t.ish had

46

million invested 1n

Tientsin and the French, a large amount, although less than the llt>1tish had.
Besides this J ,50 million

or Br.1.t1sh sUVel'

was in the Tiell'tsin bar.ks in the

name of the Chinese Uational1st Government.
be turned OVeJ: to the J~ase GO'te1'Tlr.lem.

Ja:pUll dan.andad that t.his silVt'U.'
\~en

the Chinese rei'J.Se<i, barri-

cades and wire enta..nglemt1h'1U W'G're erected around the British and French

COJl...

cesaions. 31
A...~er

the s:t.nld.ng of the United State. gunboat Pa."lay, and the b0mb-

ing of eivUia.n populations in China, the

.

IIIOral snbargo on airoraft going to Ja,.0an.

\i<ahington authorities :L"Tiposed a

32

The victories of Germany a..'1d

Japan presented difficult problems in foreign policy, and the United states
faced. econ(mlic losses in s<me ret;tions.

definite.

?.lblil:: op:i.n1on

iII'aS

contused

~_"ld

in-

The Washington author1Uec ~et!'d as to What policy wns beat tor

tho United. States as a whole.

The people at large opposed war and believed

in isolationism, yet Secretary Hull, in 193$, had made knolm to the:) cmmtry,

that isolationism had been given a trial, but it h:?,d tailed and had destroyed

22,000,000 bUlion doJ.J.s.n' worth

the United States Gcvemment on

3l Tansll.1., 500.

or

~

foreign trade.

After due consideration,

1, 1938, restricted the sale ot a.irpJ.anea

60

aeronautical equipment to countries whose pilots were using them to attack
he ci...r-1i.:lr:. POpulntio..'1. 33
li.S a retru.lt of the 'l'1entsin f>£fair, Sir

Rob(~:rt

Craigio, the British

,oo.s&1.dor to Japan, signed the Crtligi&-Arlta. Agreement on July 21" 1939.
By

the taxms of this

plan

tlu~t

£ar-re.s~ch1na

fOl"mula. Great Britain consented to the

Japanese forces be: allowed to keep order a:rl protect

he Chinese territory where Japan was cn.n'j1.ng an. militar,r

Britain permitted Japm to sUPp.z'eas em:::! aotions ·that would
success of these mUitOJ.'"iJ operationo.
ions, so followed

D. p~.th

~y

opor[~tiQ1w,

i..1'}.

and

int~r.1'ere llith

the

Brltrd.n wanted to protect her cances-

of .ir';:;J11Gasem.ent in signing thia

a~ont.

This

ction 'Was in reality a desGrtion of the Na tiol'ul Government of China.
eat Britain showed her vulnerability b'rJ givi:t'lg

t Tianteins but also wan under pressure by
this latter act, the United States
11U1 terlals

to China.

o-China, when pressure

lilaY

Jt\paJt

liaS bind~d

to

J~pa.n

not only hera

she closed tho

~

P.oad.

f'rom SEm.ding su,pp,Ues and.

Likewise, i'ranceelosed the route through French
'WruS

applied ,to her 'h-j' J.:l.pan.. This vas a f'urther

ndrnuce to the United States, who found it to

h~

interest to

cO~'lt1nut

aid

o Chim. 34
When l'liol'ld War II broke out, neit,he.r lil-arleG nor Britain
Y';Y C~.sSistanc0 '1;.0

the United States in the Far East.

33 U. 5.

Deptt.~

Poctrl Harbor, 7.

COIlldgiV0

A report trom the ~

61
.A1Jlerican goocUr,

cotton, wool, pulp, machinerT, 1ndust:r1al ~ipment, non-

ferrous metals, iron, steel

and chemicals.

35

In 1939, AJaba.asador Grow had warned President Roosevelt that sane-

t:1on8 on Japan might lead to wr.

It an embargo we're Pdt

rlpol1.

_"dean oil,

Japan mi8ht reciprocate bif taldng control ot the rich petroleum reeQUrces

ot the Netherlands

East Indies.

Grew wished to prevent war with Japan.

fansill believes that Rooaevelt had a doep..sefiLted dillike tor Japan, and
appeared umdll1nc to recognise I'J.U'f geature of Japan for an a.greement. Grew
did not like this attitude.

The Ja.;.")QMse Foreign Min1ster bad given him to

understand that Japan would. take __sures to facilitate American camaeree,

and that the1' vould not drive out Ame'rican interests in China.

When the Japanese darlanded the recognition of a new Central GtMmlment for Ch1:na, beaded by WIl1l Ch11:lg.we1. Sec:re~ Hull answered t

The Oove~t o! the United Sta.tes has ample reason for believing that the Gcwernment (of Chi.a.ng Xa.1.sbek) with capital now
at Ch1mgklng, baa the alleg1ance a.nd support of th.e great majority
of the Chinese people. The Gove.rnm.ent. of the United Stnt.es ot
cour•• cont1nuesto recognise that Government as the Govenrnent oJ:
China.

The British Ambassador to Tokyo, Sir iobert Craigie,
conciliation toward Japan' s nfi Central GOVernm«1t in China.

~fSed

a:e 11i::l.ted that

both Britain and Japan nre

striving for the same objective, l1<1J\'tely, a last:ing peace and ·t.he
pres~tionot' our institutions .from. exhraneous, lulMia:'aive
innuencos. This friendly ge~ure toward Japan was i'a:"orably

....
.3S

~,621.

)6 ~., 620.

62
r6iardect"trJ the tondon Times which spoke of the proposed eatablisbment oJ: the Wang regIme as nan otfer of peace to the Chinese
people_ fI 37

Britain." however, looked at Japanese aggression in

(4

ditterent

J.1ght# when Japan announced that she was

deeplT conce1'1'leCl over arq development acc~ the aggravation
of war in kope that. ma7 affect the .tatus S!!2 ot the t{etherlands

38

Indies.

,

Dr. loudon.. HlJtherlands Minister to Washitlgto.n, 1mmed.1ately inf'omt1ii '

Jap;1n that 1118 goverr.rm.ent would not tolerate ..rr:J "preventive protection" of

its eolon1al possaeslons.,'
SecretarT Hull was al$o 'Vf'I.I!Y pl!'<npt in lotting Ja.pan know that the
Unf.:ted states w<W.d not tolC"ate any intervention in the Du.tch &let lrldiea,
and the entire hc1t1c

treaty of 1908.

a.na~

He then radndGd

em ot the Four

J~pan

of the Roo~Takahira

Power Treaty of 1921.. 40

Apparently, the B:r:i:tish were ready to take action against Japan
after the Tientsin Affair" for Lord lothian of the British Foreign otflee,
inquired about

Angl~Am...ican

and &$ked S~etal.7

au:u

fleet movements in the Atlantic and FacUic ..

"whether Japan should be opposed or appeased~,"4J.

Lothian auggested a strOl'lfJ economic _bargo be placed. on Japan" and that.

31 London Times, Barch 29;, 1940" cited by'TanaUl, 621.,

38 Ibid/l:

--.

19 !bid

40 Ihi4.

-,

41 Ibid.

6.3
..,

battleships could be sent to' SU1gapore to dEftonstrute a

~ted

policy on the

p.1.:rt of Britai.'l and the Unitecl StatGs. 42 Hull thought we ought to let, the
aitu.:.ltion. Gtand as it

fO'r the pr$Sent, but whaIl

t'las

J<lpal1

suceeeded in pp.,r..

SW!.ding Brita1n to olose the Burma. Rood far thrse months.. thus cutting of£

war materials f100m Chil'l..1., Hull l'/l;ade it known tbat the United States wished
tile main. lines of trade a.."1d cc:21lmC"ce in ~ part of' the world to be kept

open. 43
At eo di1':tner p..arty, atte:~;doo by 11orgentl1s.u, Stin'.scn and Knox, Lord

LotllL'lu and the il;ust:r..ui.:m minis tor.. the plan of eutting off oil
fro."!l Japan \mS

discussed. Lord Lothian suggested destroying the oil wells

in the Moh East Indies,

rut

wben Sumner \JelJ.es heard at it, he said that

thisproeedure wO'.J,ld C&uas Japan
seGsians~

~pplies

to aM,aek Brit·ish and Du.teh colonial

pos-

HmleverJ the opinion of the tllt'ee Americ.:mrGpl"(,,scnt..a.tives pre-

VD.ilod. b4
Thue men 1"00.11;00. tJ}"9.t Jarlall w.as not
SaliS

other procedure must be followed.

to be coerced

'tT.f threats.

Fina1J.y" }lorgenthau drw up an order..

that placed alI ldnds of oil and scrap m.etals u."lder cont:'ol. The President

signed it,

am

....

s(!}nt 1:1:. to Uru1er-Secret,:ry Wellos £01' counter signatw:-e •

.)-1-2

TansilllJ 624

43 Herbert Faist Tlw ~ to .t~rf. I~bo:.... ~ £ond.nj.2! ~!!!;:
Between tIle United St..'ltea andJapaZl, PiInceton. 19>0, 89-9J..

.

h4 Tansill, 624.

~~------------------------~--------------I
~

A member of the Japanese

OOlOOS$Y

saw "lihe !lewsp.1.par accounts of the

tote.l embargo, and illJn~'1.tely made inquiries at vJi~ahington.
the

Ja~ese

represent.:'ltiv8 by say:i.ng the 0l:'dGr

8S

"'la11es cal."llOd

not aimed at a.ny partic-

ular country.. and that it was onlY' motor oil, lubricants and. heavy melting

was to be QUt aU. The d$pan,$8e G&ve!'mlent prot~ ~ th.~
long notes to \ielles. 46 Both British and Du.tch represmt'"...atlws counselled
iron whi.cn

prudence, but Grew" who had heretofor opposoo sanctions against Japcm" sud.denly reversed his policy" fQ'l' he bsliewd that the time had
strr-Alg

economic pressure, and that if' we want«! to

been won or lost. 47

to impose

Britain, "we must

$UPpol~

preserve the ::rt,atus guo in the PacU'ic, at least uutil the

OCll'l\e

l~

in F.Jurope b9.d

itA show of taro.) and tr.e reeo1ve to tWe it, waa nec-

essary to ~p JD.P!Ul :In her place. 1I
During 1940,

48

too United states

continued her poliey of a1d:ing Cl1.iwJ.,

by exertillg pressure on Japan. DiplomatiC presSUl"$ Was employOO, b'tJ of,faring

objections to JaPQ.n's $tUzure of Chinese
of Am.erlcans living 1.."1 China.

tem.to~"

.om to

Ja.panta

Econood,c px'easure was exerted. by 1oo.ning

China su.ms o£ 1l1oney tot.lUing $200,000,000 whioh cmabled be'

Iljllllu.faeturee and
1.

1

'If,

t(!

to

get needed materlal$ for both civilian and.

to

cont,in;ue her
mUi~J

1

-

46 Ilrl.d.

41

d1sr~d

Ibid., citing ,Pearl rJa.~! Attack, pt. 2.. 637.

4S ~." 625, citing Pearl Ha.rbor l~~¥~~, pt.2, 637.

use.

-

~---------------------------------.
65
l1eaides this, .America also sent munitions to be used e.p.inst Japm. 49
null reaJ.imed, aD early as the winter of 1940, that the Jap[;tnese

mUitar=r men

'Wm!$

pl.a.nning the conquest of the Pacific

and to the South S• •, and as tar west as
By the end

rut

or

1939, Japan had

4S

tar ea.st as I.nd1a.

I~.50

5S

milJiOll 'ba.r'nls of oil in reserve.

a.tter that date, it had been more' d1fftcult to procure.

bar:t'f.lls WC'e in reRl"Ve by SeptGnber. 19h1.

22,OOO,Ot"JO, but tho aviation gasol1ne

3Upp~

Fuel oil stocke

f.'lnl.y SO,OOO,OOO
"Wtt3:'e only

had 1ncreased from one to

ttJUr

ndllion ba.l:Tels.

Japan could no longer dru suppll_ of oU £rem the United.

States or India.

Japan £$ltthe.t

elle bad

ot

w1nn1rlg.

Dela.y" meant

the sooner she atta.cked, the better chanoo

a. diminishing oU SUPP1Y.~

1Tesi<:U!Jnt Boos.ft'el.t so1JCb,t to haw Congress amend t.he Neutrality

Act, so tba't w could provide Mta.i.'l and Fr&noe with a:t".mS against

~ny,

in the event that lmr ehou.1.d 'bnmk out, but the SG'Qate Committee, on July ll,

1939, voted to
cision as a
failure ct

~t.. decision

l1~tY'
~

to

untU January. 19bo. H\lll eonaidered this de-

DiAster,· Fle resortOO to a. m.ea.aure to ottset the

amend the Ilfeutral1ty Act.

He cmdod the

~il.ty

of Com-

merce and navigation betwetm the United st,tttes and Jar-un. 52

49

u.s.

~o

~.

Dep't., J'oor;1; Harbor, 8

51 Herbert leis,

-

52 Ibid.

!!!! ~ .!2 Penrl;

Harbor... New Jersey, 1950, 21.

66
;,

After Jap;m h.:1.d signed the Tl"iparliite Pact, September 27, 1940,

the UniiAld states began to

i.~e

strongereconanic sanctions on Japun.

The

Pact was made public, the three signatories a.vowi..1J.g their intention to bring
a.bout a now order· in librope and Asia.

attacked Russia.

This lett Japan tree to move into South Indo-Ch1na.

ma,de use ot bar opportunity, taki:og
Si~apore, and

A few days before this, Hitler had

f~

Prov1nce.

She

Here She could outflank

occupy the Malay peninsula. thus endangering strategic Singa-

pore, which was the key to As1a,

l~ia., and

Austftlru.d.a. 53 Roosevelt re-

taliatid by placing a total Embal-go on trOll and steel to Japan. This did

not a.t'fect Japan too ser:l.cusly', as she had buUt up a h.rge stock pile ot
lIlQtm:-ials tor her immediate ne«ls.

The J&P~.

Hi'l;.ler. Together

were

~

th&y' plan.,~ed.

54
at building a new "world. empire" aided by

to ma.ke the !&stern h~ 'their own and

they thought ·they would be able to control and wbjupte all other ll.'lt1ons. 55

Japan felt that Russia would resist
it w:us not poBsible tor the United state

the south, west or east.

It

~ion

to tb.f:t north, while

to prevent Japanese oxpansion

to

the United states, in 1930.. had bu.Ut up a su-

perior navy as stanlq Horn.beck had advooated, future events in the Far East
might haw been vastly dl£.farent,.

53 u.s.

Our policy toward Ch.1na

De~)tt... Pe"..rl ~~?l", 18.

Sh Tana1ll.. 625.

55 u.s. Deptt.

PO:ll"t; ~bor, 8.

W<iS

intlwmced

61
sreatly by JaPan's wishes. 56
Japan had 4,d.gned the Tripartit.e Pact as a de.tellS& measure, £or

l:I1tler 1 s trlulllphs might lead him to the Fa:r East, and to the Dateh East

Indies" which

-.$ tbe richest archipelago in the world.

The Pact conf1r.m.ed

a ~n "new ~ in P1il'ope.. whicb :meant a G$rma..l'). conquest of the continent of Europe.. in return tor a Ja.:pansse trnew ord.er" 1n the East,which

meant a.

Japanese conquest of' tb. Far

Ea$t,

{Uld

the qUlsion ot ocoidental

powerfr<u uQ1'.tar' East Asia.1f 57 The alUance also resolved that if one
party Wr8 attack«1 by a eOUttt.ry not alread;r participating in. the
tbe otber two ~ o:f the pact would calle to

cle .3 pointoo. a:traight at the United ~"tutes.

WU'.. ' that

the aid of the third., lU'ti-

".

I

It stated.:
II

Japan, Ge~ and. I~ ••

Ii l.iD1ertake to assist one another
and military means When one ot the
three Cont.ract.hlg PartJ.es is a. ttacked by a power at prOGent not

with all political,

econatdc

1nvolved in the European 1tiar' or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict. 50
Herbert Feis ha.s pointed out to Wi

trQ"a'J;''1'

bend and turn of the Road

to Pearl ~bor. ' He Gaj"'S tbat in 19)7, the ~n PWerG had t..~ last

chance to stop Japan short o£ a major 'War, but that this

CMl'lce

was lost

'When tfthe only' coZ'..current action taken was to do nothing. 59 He thinks tl1at

".!;ZI

•

The"lL~ted states ~ J~::an, ':£lie fl~~~lforei.E.
p~~ Libft1r:J" CwUidge.. 195'0, ei~ 171 Claude A. Buss in A.U.R. No ~

,--" , - 22 , Heischauer,

19S1-J.9~, 168.

57 Bemis, 864-865.
58 'l'an3Ul, 626.

68
stringent action "Which might have bAd the effect of bringing abOl.1t e. Japan...

ese atta.ck in 1940, lIl:len we ware in a greater state of um-eadin&ss, than in
1941, and woo Japan vou.ld haw had

III

bet-tar chance to 4Gfeat u.

S9

He

alSo tllin.ks that Grew and Docaa.n WQl"O too hope.fu.l about the l\ol'1Oye-Rooseval:t
meeting. 60 We are told that oil was eru(ti.a.l to Japa.'l a.t this time and that
the EIIlbargo on it was ill. real 'Wapon., in the hands of the l'ieste:'n Powers.

W.

art) not Wormed why Japan attemp'l:ted. $0 great a. conquest, nor what caused

the doep divisions in the Japanese go~t. 61
Japan had a secret oral
fran :Elel'lin,

%'$~

u~standin8

with stalma.r t representative

fer M,1"ael.t the right to dacdde whether a. cause tar

war eld.sted 1n w:rI' particu.lar case. There

1$ ev1donce

that Japan signed the

Tripartite Pa.ct to hinder the United States trarJ. entering 1.nto the war.

Ad-

miral N(ll'lUX'a received ir14tnctions tram the Japatm:Je Fot'"aignOtflC8, Octc;oor
8.

1941. etating that Japan had

signed the 'l'riparti te Pact in order to pre..

serve "amicable l"ohtion8 nth Ameriea.." 62
While President

~t

was ma.k:i.ng plans for n stronger economic

o:ffe:lSive aga.1nst Jap_. Ja....na..."l was tr;y.ing to e:f'.fect peace and __ ldlling to

saor1f'1ce her position in .~ to attain peace.

In l~~r, 1940, ~iatsuo

ka asked Bishop James E. Vla.l$h, Suparior General of tho Catholic Fore1.:.,an His-

$9

Feis,.!~ ft~ to Pearl I1ar~, 107.

66 lbid., 274.
61

lbid.

62 Tatl$ill, 62;>..626.

;,
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~
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-
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It t~ ~'Qtlld U$~ J".ar~'1
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Bemis is of the opinion. that the Secretary oJ: St.ate iu>.d made many

att(Op-ts to come to a pe.'i\ceful agreement w1:tl1 Ja:::an :1:n rega.ro to tho sattl...
mont or the Far Eastern

Q~ion.

Ue st.':l'tos

tr.at the l4hite House even hinted

at a n s~t$ ~ion:roe Doctrine tor Europe, As1a and the ~ca.."l::Jorld. ,,00

He goes on to explain:
Ii\; general Ja.1
')lUles.....American diplomatic settlement OOcallle extrane~
difficult mlen.. tTl" signing tho Triple AJJ.iane., Japan stepped :from
the baok;yard ot lweriean dipl(:)lIlacy to take a place in the trout

yard.

too. 61

By this act, Japan put herself

all its m:tght, the United
subme'r'~ed,

tnto the affairs ill the Atlantic,

S~1.tes

Wh~e

with

ltu struggling to keep Jiri.ta1n from being

and at the sa:m.e time endeavoring to unite the iUtU'llrica.s into a

solid block against the AX1s. 68
In How

£

Fresident Roosevelt

q~,
z~,nd

we read that Nomura. requested a meeting between

Prince Konoye as a lllea.ns of bri:n.ging about

pea.ce~

Roosevelt waUl at the In(';Q';1snt having a 11l0oting with ChUJ:'C-ldll at whichthCl !a-

by sending a. message stating tha.t certain principles should be ;.ere&d upon

oofore a. meeting could be arra:nged.
should DO adhered to by both rl;;1"t,1ons:

__

tions,
.

He said that the i'oll,')Wing four poin.ts
1) Territorial integrity for all na...

2) Non-inter£ert'Hlce in tbo affa,ire of other countries,

3)

Equality

._._66 New York Timeo, July 7, 1940, Sec"l, p. 1, cited by Bemis, A
ll!!torz!i! :tJl~, ~riitad Stut~., New York, 1950, 866.
. -

.D1plOlMtic

-

67 Ibid.

-

68 Ibid.

11

o£ com:n~ai opport;m1ty, 4) I'1a1ut.aioon.ce of the ata.tus quo in the Pacif'1c. 6
Six months prev10ua to the At.lantic Conference, the Amer1cm Ambu-

_or

at Tokyo, telegraphed

to the stat. Department sayillg that he hn.d re-

coiV$d information fran the Peruvian l&ister that in the eVel'l.t of trouble

between the Unitod States and Japan, that Japan 1nte:ld.ed to make a

~e

at.tack an Pearl Barbor, ua:1ng all the equipment that was a.vailable.
t.ho Poruvi.'1n l1inister, nor our Di7iaion or Naval

Intalllgen~e

Ne1thar

put any

cre-

dence in this report. 10
vJhile Japanese a.m."bassadora were tr.{1ng to effect a peace, JapQll

tinued h..- activity in the Far tast..

power by settling
~

it b~ldry'

dispute

By October~
b$tlf~

1940,

ahe M.d. shown her

Tha:l.la.lXl md Indo-China.

By a.-

several thousand square m.Ues ot territory to Tha11 a ad, Ja.pan weak...

ened Fre:lCh inn'ilene. in south-.stern Asia" a."1.d made Japral.$ position at
kale stronger.

~...

Tokyo M.."'tt sought a ten 1feU' neutrality pact with. R:wJsia,

which lUl.S aigned on April 13, 1941.
Gm:'l!la;n~",

c0n-

t_

signed the document..

ted states at the

It

Sabu:tu X'!ll'tUJU, Japa.nese Alu'bassadol' to

'WaS !lG

who

W48

taJk.tng: peace with the Uni...

of the Pearll!arbor attack. 71

.Rwuia thoug'h't. that the British and Prencb Would be conquered be-

fore lUllY montb$ had elapsed.

288.

She

then.tore foared that

69 Forrest Davis and Ehl_t I.i.ndley, ~ vlar

70

u.s.

Dep't", Pearl Harbor,

7~1.

~

.9!!!.

vould attack

11eW" York, 1942,

72
tl'.El Soviet G~e..YJ.t

e."lt$roo into the

little over a mol'l.th later.

G~

~aggressicn ~ct

with Japan. A

attacked thii Sov1et U!l1on, which usc de-

!onsivtl strategy and exsl"ted great effort to gain the help of thG United
states.

To show 1ts sincerity, it abollshed the Jlmleric.L"t

~t

Party,

and the Comrlr-mist Intenlaticnal, the Comintem, wh.ich latt.m"" organizatiozl
;;;"\',3.1in consid.er(iJ(i to be the Holy o£ lloll.. of 'l;,oo vork:tng 010.38. 72

to S::l.t'..gapore and Bur.m.9., she became a threa.t to thG Dutch &.at Indies and the

Philippines.

gram with

The I-Ttiident

Wl$S.SinC!l6S i

a;nd

the Secret..ar;y of state watched Japan's pro-

and sought to stop ller adv.anee,. fi..rst by Wtl....""ninga,

then by L"'Ctensiw lM.-w to ChUla. 73 Ub.en -1;.0 appease Japan, the Bu-~ Road
waD

closed i:rJ oxuer of

ing note. 74

During

a~t

t!".i.i}

Brit&1n, the Un1t4d

S~tes

utterod a dissent...

next few months, American oU, sero.p iron, gasoline

and in the end, petroleum were placed: under
but aga1.n.st all countrios.

We were

72 Wnljru:l C. BUl.11t,

~o,

res~

I!!! £:!._~

not against Japan alone,

'tJ"lem tor our

CUo~

O\m

noeds.

Br

I'tae¥, Nev York, 1946,

104.

7.3 Bemis.. 867 t quoting Fubllc PaP!!.... and f<l.<idresses S!! J.i).oa.nkli~
Delano Hoosevelt, 19LO, >95, says. "March 7,1'940, theErport: filiPort
Blmk authorized. a loan of $20,OOO,rx)Q to be repa.id Ui tin; on Se1?temher 25, 1940.. s. loan ot ~:25,ooo.ooo guaranteed by the Bank of China;
and. in addition a $.30,000,000 purchase of ttmgsten by the !-1etal Reserve

Corporation, a subs1d1ta.r.1 of the United states Reconstruction F':1.nance
Corporation. 11 :i'-Yl"t,her loon of $60,000,000 was MnOUIlCIfid U'ovember 30,
1940, in connect1on w1:th a plan o£ the 11etal Reserve Com~>any to purchase a stock ai' lIoiliamite, antimony. and tin from the national .Resources <kDmi$sion of Cb1na. n

74 Ibid. t 867. See at..1.toment made by Secretary U...tl1 to the Pross,
July 16, 1940. DoOUl'llOnts on American Foreign Relations, III (1940-1941), 269

73
JulY, 19h1, <ill

j!llel~icail

credits in the United StatG'5

,",can credits l:n like lrw,.'uler" in Jap..-ul.. On Ju.ly

Pac:i.£ic l.'*egion, Il

-r,he

des~)it..e

thG

adr~st:z.'o.ti0l1.75 The

"bitt\\~l"

24,

19l~1,

pll(.:1~S

ne::.di tlonth, August" 1941, an

Shollld

PN}s1da..'1t Roosevolt

.'\n'tW1e.am lend...J.. .e

Soon aJ:ter thiu, Ja-

attGmptoo. to :.lQjstl"oy t.he Du:.."'ma. licad bJ bom.btng it.• 76

Churchlll, Priu}t)

Jal?c;n

frozen, and. .t....-ner-

CI''itic:i.snl t:l2.t n.,;,d. been leveled agail1:irt

to mOV$ by' way of li:augooo" a.l'lU along thQ b'u:i:"ma. road.
IAa,nese

'Wer£

,~,:a~1ist~r

lu;nre been e:;.::r~ted..T7

of

E'l1guun,

SOlyo t!'!.:l t thll a.t taclz "rJIJ

Ther~ were man..,.v r~so,."1S 'Why J&~~ll ~"'n'l.1d

Sto:tes shcald b. att.aCkfKi by Jap&ll1,t Great Britain would

7(>

iliU;~ta1y

our aid.') Germa.V did not want the United Stfd"Q$ to enter the "Wur.

75 J03rlph C. G:rew, PGa.ce and
ton D.C., 1943, Document 220, ()99...70,3.
76 Bemis, 867.

~Ja,

come to
She

Govtt Pr..i..rr!;;ing Offico, >Is.shi.ng-

74
;,

bUt not

rJ...11.y

HO'~,

of the AmeriOt\n posHSsions.

Japan thought it too

g:rc.:1t a risk to attack the FI3r l!;ast, until she had cripploo. the Junerican

Y.J.eet

in l:'e.u-l lIarbor.7 9

In April. 1941, Natouoka received a message

trOl11

Churchill, in which the latter told bi."l'. that In;pa!l would hlCur s..nous da.ngel' by

1rIal". 80

enteri3:lg the

Church1ll

"WaS

happy" however" ..men Japan final...

Jy attacked Pearl I-Iarbar, not beeatUte of th!3 ~0 do~ there, bat

tor the

the Al.l1es. The fate of the thr_ membens of the AXis wua sealed by that
attack.

Britain and the Un1t0d $t..g,tu tf.igErt.lwr oould oonquer the world. 81

Through dipl<nac:y, Clm:rchill held the trier.d8h1p and gcod will
He 1m_ he wns depe."1deI'lt on h(;;1):' !o:r both men and 11l'Ulti.:tion.a.

ot ..1merica..

82

Tnnsill elahns thttt the So,riot Union W"..:.s responsible fox' both tho
wnr in

!1.:trOPCl~

and

:.tn the Far East,. 8) H. th..'Ll1ks tllatStalin instigated war

so th<1l:(; be would be able to

po,n

W&8

---..

.

ap~c1.d

Oa-II11lu...l'lian more easily .1r;d rapidl:Y. 81&,

a ba.rrier to Ccmmuniarn. in Asia.

79 Ib:i.d., 181.

80

lb~,

189...190.

eJ.

~,

601.

82

:ip¥.

83 'l'ansill, 456.

84

Ibid.,

458.

1"11$

Ja...

United. Statas should not waw

15
11.0 U~lO

0.1so

ros~;onsible

for ini"J..u.eac:Llfj; Chamberlain to oppose Hit101'' i..'1 Po-

J,nn.d" tIloreby brirlGine about

ed t,:.:e Ukruil!c u-l1d

If'll''

lfOuld h::l;'\7C

in

~)jrOf.i..)e. as

Hitler" if

llot

in:tiU".t'ered.

p::'ofOl"re.:l to fight. uith l:mssi!l over it,

;d.th 2.:bGlalld and l'ra.llco. 86 7anaill <iUDO blanco

~:I00drow

'di1son for

tl~

int~

h:Lve been e:r'01;~ted in :~p$" and 'the :m1st').kes of Vemaillos 'Would Invc been

.
87
avoided.

have had a complet,e vlatol"Y ill liUrolle, and it might

~lnvo

been a very stern

n/~

!:J.:lstcr tow.:.trd the conquel'ed.. G~,

be secure in :luau a

~vod.a;1'"?

sl.tuation?It~~ould

it have been mer$ sooure tha..'1 it is

89 1'at.lS1ll blamGS the Cllinesa for :resistd,ng Jup:.n in l-::a.stcrn . -\Sia,
.

a.nd the United St.ttt,GS for hel;p:i.:ng China..

85

~." ;J09.

En
en

-

flis re."Uion is til,d:; Jc.p',U'). i~.;:

lit

Ibid.
Julius 1-,1. PraM" Uniwrsity of' lltff'alo, rev:Letts Tnnsill's Back
~ ~ ~'klr. !.,li•.!!.j mIl, October, 1952, 15O-lSa.
-

-

Ibid.

;,

bUltml"k ag<:d.turt Camm.tn1mlt.
gain

contro~,

In 19141, it

1£ the Japanese did."l ft.

WD

It

not appanmt that Conummism would

~

be that Jal'J&n was expI'$ssing

a,l..a.I'm over Canmunim11 as an eXCiuse for pursuirlg her ~$ssiotlS in China.

There is no. rGal proof that Ja.pan W'O'Illd have beG aa'butied nth ~hing

less than the 1fhol.e of China, and a. China ct:lnpletely subject to her. 90

Pratt agrees with Tansill ,that the Pacific _s the nback door" to
the European. war, but he t4ll not agree that Roosevelt del.1berate:ly Bot.1ght,

war. He bel1e"1mll that our tenacious u.1stance on

the tJlad1iiional ~can

policy, in v1ew of the tact that Japan . . detendned to
Cbil'la

pr~

c~uor

and control

a. situation, wbich could not be ove.rcome Ave by W&1... When

war appeared il\ev1table, Ithow ... should lfWJl~ them
pos1t:i.cm of £1r1.ng the tim ahet withcmt illo'Wirlg

rIne Jap~

into the

too much d.amago to ours

selves" 1Ifa.8 a nonaal and :natural. Qultst1on. 91

In

4

lette:r to important and

~ .r.,P8l'leSO,

written at the

American ~ in 'l'okyo, s.~ 1, 1941, ~:r Grew spealcs of the
China aflair.

1937,

~

he sa,. thaii about twO' weeks af'tt!Ir

_I" had begun, in July,

Kd.-shek sent a me.Gageto Japan, otferl.ngto withdraw all Chi-

non troops i t Japan would do l1km..e, and declU'e an armistice until peace
could be negotlat«t.

The: JIl$ssAg& was sent through the British lhbassy and

delivered to l'fr. Hor1nouchi, Vice Foreign Hinister.
It appe.a.ra that the Japanese did. not

90

-

Ibid.

-

91 Ibid.

~

But nothing

Cmile

of it.

an armistice or pea"e. They had

77
bean .f1gl:l't1ng .for four years, atld Chiang Kal...shek

%"Iller of the Chinese.

He

W(':.l.$

still t1ght;1.,ng

WQ.8

~ave1y

still th~ legitimate

for his CO"W'lt,ry. 'YJ'ang

Cll:iJlg-wei htitd. to be protected b.r Japan"_ soldiers in order t'O pr$serve his

life. How could he be CC1.'lS1dered u tJ1& real ru.1.er o:t Ch1nal' ne
a. puppet.
t')OO.cd'ul

'"

WaS

simply

Japan'. difficulties with Cllina could. bave be$ll S!:llOOthed cut by
1'!1C!Nm8. 92

In T_~,~a.. Ambasaador Qrw 'bells of h1$ a.ttcpt.s to inf'om

the state
cable

~nt

of Japan t • att1t'!lf3,$ toward the United States• •~

aft.- cable to Seoretar.v of state, Hull, onJ.y to

that Hull bad 1'leVII1" read the MSsagH.

inept by the picture here dx'alm.

Our

S1K:tt.

disc~

~t

YOfiltrs lat..

is Bhown to be

The Japan... had hop«l to avoid a. conflict

with J..merica. Grft fOl"8atr two great traged1udUl'1ng his illetime, tbe spread

of'

~

ff~ise

over Europe, and the

at't4ck" on

P~1

Harbor.

Had

our diplcr.m.ts bf)en more exper.Lenced and eonc1ent1ous, Pearl Harbor might
have been avoided. 93
X>lr. F'ai&, 1n The Road

't!:9

Kearl I.1uroor, sbow

l~

the United states

into wu. When J<lpanese lft.u"sbipa and troop transports be-

was

being goaded

gan

to move south in December, 1941.

a.~l r~ll advised ~s1dant

P.ooatWelt to set up a geographioallkdt beyond Which Japan. could not tree-

92 Jooe:ph C. Grewt ~~ tl'an 10&:;0:
People, 11&w York, 1942, xvii... . :.1.. - -

93 Josepb C. (h<oew, Turbulent

!m.

N~

!

f~!ie

12 ~ Am.~x:1ea."l

York. 1952, II, 1273.

18
pass, and to tell Japan t.hat we wmU.d.

fight :it she overstepA:d these l1mits.

ThiS line might have become the Ooundry between

on Pearl lfa:rbor not occurr$d.

Dec_bel',

ftl"

19LJ., was

and peace, had the attack

'too l.:Ate a dat() to draw

such lines. We wonder :U' the line had been drawn. ten or even four YMl"8
earli..,

~

we could ba.ve made the Japanese uud....sta."ld that tt&q could

gail1 their end. without war, and thus by
have

al~

tile eo'UrSfll of

0'I.Ir stftightt~

declaration

h:1st<.'>l7. 94 From ~ ~ ~ ~~.! ~t we

learn how futile it is to at.t.empt. to

C~8.

nth aggresaton.. . FAl.ch con-

ceesion Dds by the Alliee at:S.ned the Japan• • to bolder advances. Cordell
Hull tr.mOO. down. pxooposala to deal

not receive public support

the facts sp.uc tor

~

~lves,

f~

with the Japanese,· 'because he did

lacked adequate tdlita17 power.. IJLr. his lets
1n order

to prove that *'far from goading Ja-

pan ute war, we gave tho JaI.l3.l1eSe twioe a8 !ll'U4h rope as thcr.r needed to .harJg
then.el'VU.,ft

The Hull nate, that k:Uled \he pe.aoe, did

for the .nc.rte was

too

late to have had

~

effect.

n~

kill it,

u~ Japanese com\rl.n.ed

.fleet, had alx'ead.y lett ItLtckappu Bay daye before the 1htll note reached Tolqo,

with _.led ~ to attack Pearlliarbor. R 9$
In !!!:! ±! p~l. we &1"8 Wormed that .A.drd.ral St.ui.( and hts ass&ciat.ea did not wish to ent. . the War.
cers.

..

Neither did the Japa.."teee 111.val offi-

Althollgh tho Japal:11iNJo leaders are

l"$~C1ted

au rea1s't.1ng war, the

94 Jerome B. Cohen, U sat. Rev• .Y:!. )).1), Oct. 21, 1950, rev1
!!!! ~oad !2. :t:ear;t 1~;Friii.Ceton, 19$0.

Herbert FeUst

95 Ibid.

79
reason why' they final.ly l1ttaeked u.s is left, unstated...

Nor does the book make

clemI' why Adtn:1:ral Yama.tloto opposed the Tripartite Pact, and the
United Stntea. 96

B:1

N~,

194:1..

the Japrmese Govel"nment bad come

1mI"

wi:th the

~i... ·

to the

::;ion to make one more offer to the Un1ted StatAs, and i f an agreGllent could
not he reached, to use force to get .what thq
prisf. attack

~

extensive

t~toryJ

as the foX'Ce8 could. be gotten r_dy.

d~

Thq pl.anned

Ii!. su:r~

and the atta.ek vas to' be made ",a soon

It America refused the JapaneH d.enand.8

Japan would attaok us at ;allpo1nts s:imultaneously.97
11001"0 QODSidere<i

~

the beet repree.ent.;1tive

in tliashing'ton in the past quart.er of a
Kuru~u

Kl.lJ"W'm~.ad

d1p~C4l1at1st.

a militarist...
Bel"'lln

to

It was tkmwra who :wanted

consul. and

and s. negoti.ate.r of ability.

lktnura., 'While

8ign

been an Ame...""ican

'~ign ~~

96

He did not regard him u

the Mpart1te ~. 99 He beli0Vll:1 that

act«i under orders tr(U the Japal1eso

James A. Field, Jr.,

~.lt.

KtU:"dSU had fi3.gxlfid

c~ry.

H~..

he had

~wer

or

tr,{ \lfalter Hillis.. !:lw York, 19

97 Frederick 1'ioO%"$, ~ Ja£-!;n·. ~~e~, !lew York, 1942, 251.

98

-lb:l.d.,

-

99 Ibid.

257... 264.

1.t

Since bie v1I1t to Berlin..

A.i!•.ll. 54, 1948...1949,

!! !..e:a'l, !1!! ¥t~ !~:t!!. ~ Jak'~'

Uomure. knew him

to JapG.ll. had sent I<'!lr'1lSU to

without belier.r.lng it to be the best plan far hiD

T.~

bad ha.d.

to usia;;' him to a.ttain a peacef:'.u settllrl'Amt o£ a.fi'airs with the

United States,.98

to 1>0 a

century.,

thatJai~

eo
;,

J[UrUSU • 8

'9'iew had altered ra.d1.caJ J7.

Belide8, he came 1d.th det1.n1te ~

trrJl1l b1a gO'lfenaent, (l1t;terent tban the instl'UOtiont, vh1ch .t0l'Jl8l'

Jap.~e

ott1ciala bore. 100
Moore _.

~.

tbe mi.ataken idea that the Japanaee would not dare

to make liar, and. the Un1tad States CloY«n'IIlent felt that Japan would.

'0 bold

Q

to attack us. The

Br1t~

thouih Japan bad g1ven. repated
Japan was 1'8at.iy fO'r
~

on

~..

not be

l1kewiae, 'WfIl"e of the __ m1tvi, even

~,.

101

war. Jtu:rt.l$U presented his governmmt"

tinaJ.

20, 1941. In wbatanee 1t stated.

The Japanese Gov'erlllent etf...t to remove it. anaer1 fo%*c8$ tr.
SoIlthern Indo-Cb.tna, tnms.t~ them. to the NC'lJ'th of that French
poeeesa1on, t.hereby 1'el1e"l1J.t'1g 'l'hD.:1l.aDd and the lJu.tch ilast I.rstU.es of
threat. In return. the Japanese asked.. in effect, that the American
G«..,.ent prompt,l7 ~ the cordon, r . . .e trade ftlat1.cne with Ja.pan «nd auppl:r: her ~1al.ly with oil. Tb:1s impl1ed that the Ja.pan.
eM Gov'~ WCIUld not ..... to the w1thdrawal of troops trOlll liQl"tb.
ern ~ or from ~. in Ohlrla, as the American Clorerment
ba:l been uld,nc in retum tr:1t' ~1nc the Cordon. 102

The Ja:panese propou.ls, i f accepted, would leave China a helpl.ea$
v.lc:rt1m o£ Japan.
be~ of

art. Amer1o& could not. accept such daman.ds. It would be a

urree Cblna" and a d.e8C"'tion of General Clwu.\tld. . .'. ~

mente B:r ceu1ng to help Cl:d.ang Xai-.$hek, lie WO\lld peftdt Japan to defeat
10J
bim.

100

-

Ibid.

101 Ibid..

--

102 Ibid..

103 Ibid.

61
That the state

~

r.gard«l KUl"'U$Uta proposals with gravity

oan be gathered fram the actions of Mr. Hull, and Pr&sident Roosevelt tollowing the pr~senta,tiQn of the Ja~ dan.ands.

Hull immediately called

a. eonfs-$nOe of :t"eJ.lrMentatiTN of the Britah, Austra.lian, Dutch and Chi1"~ Iloverments Wich met No~ 22, 19hJ..

de:ys, the

During the $tWOe«11ng few

~entati,"s alao cont.-:r«l with the

PrelJicla:t..104

By Novemb.- 26, the S'tstte l'lepartment delivered a tormall'$jeet1on

to the Japanese

in the tom of CQIL'lter-propOfJw.

~ ..

ticles stnted that uThe

~nt

One of the ar-

of Japan w.Ul withdraw all mU1tar,r,

n&-

val, air and polioeforees from Cbtne. and ~ Ir.clo-ChirJa••105 :professor
T4IUl1ll says that Franklin D. Hoosevelt "gave h18 ult1xaa.tum t.o J~I N('Jt'-

_bet 26, 1941, with a canplete understanding of ir116 fact that it was a
battle cry. ft

He is 1i.1<fIW'1se critical of

~e&n

e.ttort. to h1nde:r

J~pa.nese

aggression,. espeoia.lly tor the l"es.son that Jape.n was oPposing R'u#lB1a. lO6
Moore sa,.. tMtWinst.on ClmrclUU did not bel1Em!1 tmt Japan would.
I1ttGok :in 1941., ainee she had not done so the previous

ha.vo had a bet tcr

c~

at success.

been on the i l l out alel't at Pearl

year,

WIliIn she would

I4kewise, the Am«1 Forces W'O'Illd have

HaztborI it

they believed an attack tl'l.er&

to be 11Im1nmt. JJ:::.7

-

104 Ibid..

-

105 Ibid.

106 Fred Ha:rv'ey ~QR, "ttid-Century }A'~u,
n7.1 quot1ltg Charles Oallan ·T.auW.

101

~1oore,

257-264.

,a.!!.!.,

rio. %,

82
At Clltt1tenl'W.ll1, !1aryland.. on the morning of December

4,

the Hav.v

radio receiving st.::ltion caught a Japamse brOQdcast trom JAP in Tokyo, in
winch there was .inserted a false watne!" report, steaR wind rain. N United
statu communications officers were a.ble to interpret thia
minence of

WI;\%". It

m~ge

as Ifim-

This :1.ntomation alerted American .I'I..r.l'I&ed Forces radio sta-

tions to watch tor the "east w:i.nQ r&in" message.

As soon as they received.

it, the message was decoded. and handed. to Canmander Sdford, who forwarded it
without delay, to Rear Admiral Noyes J who telephoned it to the President' IS

mv::a.l aid. lOB Satf'~ Ll'ld Lieut_~lnt Cc.mmnnder Kramer, tried for tllX'ee days
to arouse Adm13:'al

St:~

to the realization that

:ing to start 'Wal" on Satu:m.ay" December

On Deember 2..

u... .

theJD.paneae were lito-

6, or SUl'ld.cty, December 7, 1941.109

'l'0kJt> ordered the Japanese to deFJtroy all copies of

c<Xies" san one copy of two apeci.f1ed codes, and all fUes and secret documants at the Washington &basey.

On the same

~

an important meeting was

held at the White House, at which only Roosevelt, Stimson, K.'1OX and 'Welles

were present. 110 The President discussed each phase
tion.

or

the Ja.panese situ.r.t-

Welles had already' eked the Japanese for w:hat purpose they had stmt

their forces into Indo-China, and had insisted upon a quick answw.

new York,

The r"'res-

108 George liorgen:srtern, P~l Harbor, The Sto!7 of the SeeretWar.
.
...
-- - -

1947. 206.

-

109 !b1d. Tbe t(tetimony 01 Captain Safford is given in detail.

8)

war

Council" bad met on NOV«Ilber 28, the President prea1d1ng.

lll

m.eeting adjourned, it was thought that the President would send a.

When

wa:m-

to Japln. But the Presidri delayed send1ng the message until DecBmber $,
t which time the Japanese Armed Forces were ah'eady' on their way to a.ttack

.112 Hull adv1sed tbe delay.

Fe1s has found no corrr1neing record, g1v:Lng

aBons 'IIh7 the ~ delayed.

Bull had been read.:1.ng and rereading the

essag.to Congrus, vh1ch bad been drafted at the Wiu' CouncU ~ing.

He,

too, dec1ded to va1t until some aot.1on by Japan would indicate that it Was
time to notify Congress.l13

Oount 01an1 of Italy wrote 1n his

d1ar:Y. December 3, 19h1., that

Boosevelt bad been successful in forcing the Japanese to attack the United
Stat08, sinee he (Roosevelt) vas prohibited

trom entering the war

directly.

llh

On the ome day, General. Mil., with the consent of <hmera.1I'1arshall, sent

word to the Ame1"1can

_~

.

.

at Tok;vo to destroy our code machine th....

ll5

Two daye later" Au.stralia. was preparing for war /I but teared a blockade in

the near· tllture. ll6 Ml". stimson d1d not like the tact that the Chicago Tri....
bune (DecemberI 1941)

-

revealed a. lMcret plan of the high author1t1es at

III Ibid.

U2 Feis, 33$.

-

11) Ib1d.

wshington, ~ raise an

sent to Europe in 1943.

of 10,000,000 men, $,000,000 of whc:Im were to be

army'

117

In the mea.ntilne a. mtm\ber of the AJ'm.ed Forces vall va:tnl.y trying to
¢n

his au.periore of grave

dang..-.

Blake Clal."k describes it thus:

Private Jeeeph 1.. Lockard was listening in on one of t.he detector
units w'h1cb the A:rm:;r had recently 1n.stalled ...... an instrument so mu-...
vel0\1811' sena1ti 1ft that it pi• • up the whir ot an airplane motor
more than a hundred mlles away. Oft1cUJ.l7, the detector was closed
at seven A.M. but 1n order to 1nstNct another a.old1c who was learn1ng bow to operate the unit, Pri:vate Lockard kept the i.nstru:ment tuned
in.
'
.
At exactly two .minutes past seven o'clock, Lockard. sensed that
the detector had picked up something. His hea.l't beat fast as be in...

"Planes.- lots of them ...- a hundred nnd thirty.two miles distant." The excited private """check$d the distance.
He re-ehecked t!le azimuth. Then he called the Artlr(f Information Cen-

terpx'eted t.he sign;:'llt
~.

.

'

"rlash ...- plan....- a hundred and thirty-two miles ing from an unusual. direction. f.f

u8

approach-

Unperoei.ved by the UD1ted Statea m.illtary men., a Ja.paneae ta$k tore
waa coming upon 11awaii. Over 't.he flagship Akagi flew the flag, whieh bad been

displayed on the 'battlesh1p Y.r1ka., when the Japanese attacked Port.. Arthur
in 190$.

119

At. Tul!NSh1ma S~t•• "the pl.anu

the carr1ers.

W8'l"e

leaving the deck:a of

Their er.rOlM, each crew bad been told, _s to dest.ro.y the

power oZ 'Mle United. State& to cheat Japan out. 0: its deserved place on the

~h." 120 In

tit

well-plAnned and sld.l.ltu.l.ly' executed. attack, )00 Japanese

117 :tb1d.
ll8 Feis,

)>.

ll9 ~., 34l.

120 U. S. Dep't.,

~8!lrl !I¥~

Attacfc, xi.

pltlnes i £rcn "six aircraft oarr.1.ers 'bombed the island of o.hu, atr1king the
l21
American Pacific Fleet at Pearl :H'arbor, liavaU.
BatON 9 o.clock 188

planea wre either lost
tioned.

Q1:'

so badly ~ that th~ could not be recondi-

lIlgbt ~ battleships.

vessela were destroyed.

pilots ,returned

tnr..

light c~i and tour other

Our cawalt1el amounted to

to tbe1r CUTiers w1th _1)

loss.,

in per.ODel, twnty-n:Lne pl..anee and 4ve midget

,,435 men.
1. . thaD

Tho Japanese
ODe

hubdr'ed

su.~inea. 122

Abcut an hour after the attack" Japanese ambassadors deli~ed to

the ~ t4 stat.) an

anetrrel"

tained no hint of Japan·. attack.
bring peace

c1.'t.S.c,

to the recent Ame:r1can DOte, but it con-

123 It stated; that Japan was try1ng to

to the world, and S"tabU,1\t7

to China and the 1al.Imds of the Pa-o

Hull tt\Ld the that the vb()le thing . . a lie and a d.ception.· Th.,.

did not ~, but lett the Wh1te House uneaoorted, enemie. of the United

Sto.tes.

l24
That the

b1ih naval oU1cr.l.als tailed to

lulu .eeu unaccountable.

to the United. States note

~t a ~ to Hono-o

On the Em!»'ling of Dee~

ot l'Iov~261

wa:J

6, the Japal'l$&$ Npq

intereeptect. l 2$ The Pree1dent

read the m~e to N~, then immediatelYe:c'Claimed; "This means

VtU""'"

But the Pretd.d.8nt did. not call a confel"«lCe of the .~ and Navr ottic1als;

w

U. S. Deptt., Pearl

122 Ibid., 65,
l23

lb:14.

124

Fe1a,

3bl.

l2$ Tans1ll, 652_

iIarbor,

xi,

86
as would"'have been expected.
ber

S. seaned unperturbed by

the nws. On Decem-

7.. a.t 9.00 A.M... Lieutenant Canraander Kramer brouglrt.

the laaJt part of

the Japan$S8 orclers· to Icaura, to Admiral Stark. Its meaning was so clear
that Stark cried out:

ftItt Qoc.U This meanswarl I must get

wonl to ltbnel

at once." 126 However" he did not notify him) 1natead he tried to get General Ka.rshall.. who could. not be· raaehed :i.snediatel.)r beca.use he was
back

rit:1ina.

~ ho:f'$

B1e absence ~ted an alert from raloldng POU"l Harbor 1n

time to save the American .fleet b'onl destruotion, and the lives of rJV'fJI!
three thOURnd __bent of the Navy and. Air" Corpa. 127

General Mar.hall reached his office at 11.2$ that m.crn1ng.
was

still. time to

~

HonolUlU

rad:S.9, but instead he sent the

b.r

~bl.. tel.ephone, by

me~e

BeA, and :f'.Uod

There

radio, or by

m

to ma:rk it ftprlmi.t1"

franaUl inq'llir••
tias the ~ under Presidential ordel'e to bl"eak m1l1ta'rT ~
tions ldth regnrd to ~ mil1tax7 infOl"tftation? 1lld. he t.b1nk
tbat the President t , pol1t1c41 objectivea ou.tweighed cona1df4"at1orls
of naticnal safetyl Wa. the preserve.t1on or the Brl.ttsh lIapl.re
worth the blood, r..f.eQ.t a..."'ld tears not onl7 of the men who would die
in the asOlV' of Pearl Harbor, b\rt. alsQ of the long roll of lw.roes,
who periab.ed in the epio etl($uuntertJ in th.e Pacific, .. • •• 128

President Rooseyel.t wa.s s1ttma in the CNal study of the
House" enjoying a quiet SundaY' attC'tlOOl.'lt when "Death stood 1n the

128

~

Whi~

doorwa;,.

87

...

Tbe Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor.
• "
-v.J.l
.... • •

tl

129

_ _
M __
_ _ __

-

129 Ibid.

Anlsrica ha.d suddenly' been tlU"ttst into

A concu.:rrent reso1utio.'1 cill:i.ng :tor an 1.nvutigatiOXl of the Pearl

Harbor disaster was sul:mittecl on Sept~ 6J 1945, by the Senate majority

leader, .Alben r'i. Barkley.

Section 2, o:t the resolution,. deserib0$ the pur-

j,'he oanmittee shall make e fUll ru:ld canpl.ete ~:igation of
t.he tacta :relating to tOO events and o:irc'l.'llUtanees leading up to or
followinl the attack made by the Japanese amed :torces upon Pearl
Harbor 1n tbe TelTitOl7' of H.awa1i on D~ 7, 1941, ed shall report to the SeI:w.te and the House of Rep:resentatiws not later than
Ja.nuar.r 3" 1946, t.he result. of its investigation together with such
l"(tcomme."l.datiorus as it may de_ advisal)le.. 1

The spirit and int«1tions supposed to animate the 1nqui17 were
described by Sana toi* Barkley 1n his address. He aaid tl:k'1t reports
of previous investigations uare cor.l.fusing and ca:d'l1.ct1ng, wh~n com.
pa;L"ed to one another, tild to some enent contain contndictions and
i:neonsistencies within the'mselves. 1f He 1"$~ to the ttlddesprcad
coni'uaion a:od suepieionkf tlU!.t ~$d "~ the American pt;I()ple
and amo~ the manDers o£ Congress. II 2
Senator Barkley said that the Congressional itlvestigr:t1cn
15hould !":i.x responsil):U1t.y nupon an llldividual, or a group of indi'Vidualst.l or upon III system under which they operata<! or co-operated
or £ailed to do either.. "and that it should d.eterm1n.e what correc-

tive action

-,-----

.,t tend to prevent a recurrence of tho disaster." ).

The inquiry, Barkley said, should be conducted without part1sanship or favorltiSlll toward any responsible o!'ficial, m1l:Ltary, :naval,
or civ:tlian, high or low, living or d_d. • • • Congr... itaeJ..t
should make its own thorough. impartial, and fear-leu inquiry into
the facts and c~es and conditions prevailing prier to and
at the t:t.e of' tIw Pearl Harbor attack, nom.atter how far back it
may be neceuary to go in ordc' to appraise the .:1tuation Wld.ch
existed. prior to and at the time o£ tho Pearl Harbor attack. 4

The resolution passed both Hou.ae. of
as8~

C~

on September 11.

By

$1x out of trm placos on the camm.1ttM to Democra.ts, and .b;r appoin

1ng Alben 1-1. lldkley, &mate majority lead", chairman. the ednt1n1stration

demoutnted the partisan nat'l1l"O of the: project.

P.res1dGl'lt Ha,1'l7 S. Tru.-

mnnts executive order thus daied minority ecm.dt1:.eGmen the powr to
inc the

g~nt

files·.

But neither Senator

~,

nor

S~tor

~

Drew...

stex' were to be deterr$d by these at tempts to hinder justice !rom t..ald.ng
it. course. When the cca;d;t;.tee
three

di~t

tina~

made ita report on Jul3 20, 1946,

opil-J.oos w.re $Ilbn;1tted. 5

Throughout the period dur:lng wldoh the 1nveatigat1ons were b;Jing

made,

~U8 and

persistent ef'forte lfet'$ made to silence minority man...

'bertl. U they wre honest in describing :?,resident Rooeevelt'. methods and

moUvee, they would. be declared del'enders of HitlQ> and Taja.
ticised All'lorlean of't1e1ala. they wuJd be

cClun:b~J

~pres«lt«i

If the"J cri-

a.s bla.rning their

01lll

forsturt:tng the war. 6

4

~'JI c1t:ing 90PW"e8~1ona1; Recol~, p. 8lt'\O, sept. 6.

$ 1iorgGruStwn, x6

-

Ibid.

1945

..,

In the weeks a.nd months following' Pearl Harbor, Presid.c\m't. Roosevelt and the high au.thorities at Washington, attempted to

~

the

cause of the catastX'ophe. The de.te:at at Hawaii was, at the ou:tset.. blamed
on Japa.fl. The Japanese bad not otlly .tirGd the first shot, bu;t the;( bad k&pt
on dropping b..7il'bs UlltU our battleships and aircra.tt. were d«nol1shed., and
over two -chOWland men 0: our Armed Forces lay dead.

Japan

_8

fingGlr

When

not wholly at tault, Roosevelt a."ld the high

of guUt at Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

them for not being watchM,

it . . found

~

that.

POI.ate4 tha

Socr~

Knox blamed

for not 51gh'ting the .n~ 1n t1me. 1 "!'he

President, although he baA' call-eel no witnesses, found Kimmel a.nd Short guilty, and diad saed them

~ their

Commands. 8 Roos.-velt then appo1nt.ed a COIl-

tnUs100 headed by Justice Roberts, to investigate the matt... The ccm1!d.asion
£0\tXJd K1mmel and Bho;rt IUilt," of dol'ellcticn of duty.
they would. be wbject

to eou:rt martial at some future date.

cumatan.ces, bot.b men had. to keep .Ueac.. the
hung 't:WfIJl thed.r beads

Tlw,y

t~t

~told

UndC"

that

the cir-

of un.juIt punishment

for the next f'ou.:r ~. Sf

The Roberts r~, which was given to Roosevelt

em. Jam.tary 24,

1942, made ma.ny errore in important matten. It 18 ve:r;r much to be ~ted

that the Roberta Report was' made sc hw:".rte<il;y, and that it wu so 1ua.ceumte
and incaaplete.

The Roberts Camnission knew' about the 1ntercepi;«l messages

1 J;bitl., 311.

-

S Ibid.

-'

9 Ibid.
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aM. the eraclmd code J but it did not inqu1re about. the ll1essa.ges J or find out
1£ Kimmel. and Short had beon Wormed about tlleSf4 lO
a.<ivUling Short not to NSign.

If

Gtmer41 &:rshltll, after

took naps in secret to pt r1d of him.tr 11

Admiral Stark hoped that Kitnmel would resign also.

Feeling that

th~

high-

er otf'1c1als want«! it, both men resigrud, but thq knew they- h;"d been
treated unfairl;:r.

Kimmel felt t.bathe 'Wa.s .singled out as t.h1J scapegoat tor

the tragedy of P.u:-l Harbor.,

free1dent Rooeevelt, and b1s war cab:l.ntllt and

councU concealed their own taiJ.ureto into1'l1l Kimmel and Short. Thus
Pearl Harbor commo.ndera were deprivec1 o.f thei4*

of the public, who thought they

Weft

to

b~

~

posta. Dissraced in the

tor 'earl Harbor,

81SS

they could

do nothing in their own defense.. 'because the threat of court..martial :b.ung
over t.hc. 12 Tn. President and the Wa.r Ca.binat advised. poa~t. ot a
tr:1.al.. in ~r to prevent certa.1n m:1l1tary secreta £rom being

F1na.l.q. in

work.

there vas a strong demand for an inve&tigation

To l:'Tes1dMt, __:Lng that Congress was deter.m1ned. te

of Pearl Harbor..

make a thorough

19l.t4.

known. 13

~tionj

Secre1:.ar7

~

decided to haft the adm.i.nistration control the

a.nd Secret.al7

an M:m:;r Board. Kimmel

_$

St~n arranged

daelared not gu.Uty.

for a 1lavy Court, and

1'11.. report.

~

in po.rt.:

H&sed UI>otl tho facts et!ftabllsbed, thecf'AU't 18 ·of the opinion that no of...

fE'..nses Mve been com.r.d.tted., nor se:dous blame 'inour.recl on the part of an::!

-

~

10 ~~.I
11

47.
Ib¥., 1.6.

12 lb1d.,
13 opmi.,

t'k•
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person or perSons in the naval seniee. U 14
Kimmel. testified that it Was more than two ,.ears: alter 'the Roberts

Conmd.asion bad aiven its

l'Gport

before he

(~) 'W'&$ al.lowed

to l<J.'lGw what

accusation the Camdssion had brought a.ga:i.nst him. The UaYy Court vas the
onJ.y one in 'Which the rights of an American CiUsen 1le1"e grant.$d

though E1mmel had :requested

&

or

the tlaval Court appeared 1n the

!1rst t.ime that he had 'been judge«
er~

.

of jud,pent.. tt

Al-

report, of 1WJ trial, the Secretary of the Navy

refused to grant his request. Six m.on.ths late'; on August 28,
.t1.n.d1ngs

ldm.15

ttnot

~s,

1945.

the

and l1mmelleaft1ed tar the

guUty of any dereliction of duty

«

16

. The report o£ the kI/fq' BeaN. was no mare pl.-sing to the .A.dm1ld.titra';
tion than thai; of the If#.v;y Court.,

'fhe

ArrIt:I

~II

named

~

Pres:1dentt. cabinet, and of the b!gh oaasand gullt)"., These were

ot

~

~tal"Y'

State, ltull, Cbtef." of .St&tf" Barsball, and Chief of War Plana Gerow, in

a,d...

ditiM to G~ $lua1'..' President Trunlan and s.creta.ry Stimaontried to

'board. Stirmlon said that the 'orit.io1sm of Hull was ..~

overrule the

~

called for'"

and that that of ~hall was unfair, and t'unjustified."

"Tl"UlIlan endeavored to court m.art1al the ~ people.

•

MTbe countl7,.... he Aid, "was not ready for preparednus •

14

~., )12.

1,

-_.

Ibid.

16 Ibid.
11 Ibid'

17

. ".
"

of
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I think the country 1s as much to blame as a.n;r 1nd.ividual in th1a .final situation. that developed :1n Pearl Harbor.... 18 Adia:Ln.l Ki:og, C~er-1n-ch1et
of the Fleet, and Secreta17 of the NaV'1'.. 'ot'l'eet.al, d1dn t t think it would

look: just :right Wore the public to free I1mmel of all guilt, eo he said
that the A4m1ra.l would not be allowed, in Mure, to oCcnlpT &nT pos1tian 1n

the

NaYy

"'Wh1ch r~ the

exerca. of ~ ju.dpent." 19

rul.1ng might not appear too preJu.diceO., they
Stark as well.

20

ga". the same order' to A4m1ra.l

Judge Advocate Qener'4l Cramer IlI&de. e£tOll'te

inVo$t1gation. and he

~'ted

That their

that the work be

put

to ha:ve turther

into the han.ds of a "se-

lected· 1nd1v1dual.2l Colonel Clausen waa given the task.

Two day's after

his report was wtrdtted, ar~ brought up the verdict or unot guUty." 22
The general question which tho Joint

~ttee

took upon itself to

Did all the c1'9'i1, m1l1tal7, and naftl auth.orities of the Un1ted
states charged with l"espone1b1l1t7 tor the conduct of d!plcaatic
negotiations with the· Japanese Ooverment and. tor preparec!nesa
and det. . . at Pearllhl"b4# eomp¢Ct:q, eff1cient17 and with pr0per: rosaX'd tor the tl"WJt 1eposed in th«n .fultUl the duties of
their reapeetive atticaa under the Constitution and lan o! the
Untted Statea1 23

18

~.,

3ll.

19 Ibid.) )12.
20

IbW..

-

2l Ibtd.
22

-

Ibid.
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..,

'rhe subsidiar"J and st)eo1.£1e questions were:
1. Did the h.igh e1vU, mil:itary, and naval autb.o%'ities 1n
vlalllhington secure in advw...'1ce of 10 o'clock a.~ (&•. s. t.) December 1. 1941, ird'ol'tlation :res-;;>eeting J&pan.oae ~ and 1ntentiona sufficient to oo.'1vince thm beyond all reaaonable doubt
tr-.at war with Japan __8 imediatelJr ~?
2. If SO~ did they gift to Goneral Walter C. Short and
A~ Husband I.. Kimmel, the c~ at Pearl llarbor, clear
and de£inite orders, immediately prior to the Japanese attack,
~ing them to be fu11;Jr alert tel!' detenae ~ such an

a.ttack'! '
). Was Hawaii

a4equate~ ~ for its defense ~
a Japanese attack 4"l accordance with 'the known eUC'UfIl$tancd?

4.

D1dthe commanders at Ptm.r1 Harbor take the aPPl'opriate

measure. required by the orders iseu.ed to t.1U!1tl from. Waahington,
by the duties of their respective offices, and by th$ infonta...
tion in their possession a.."1d the resourcee at their disposal,
to me.i."rttat.q the security o£ the poaaes:sions of the United State.
as tar as that %"$sporud.hility was invested i..'1 them? 2k

t:lons gift!'" to the conndttee..
history

back t.:l.tty yean

~

to the truth, by

Such at q:u.~tio.n would requ.1.re the study' or

at~

le.adil'lg up to December

01"

However we can get some clues

our d_l.ings with Japan, and the negot.iations

7J 1941. 2S

After all thEa

tost~

vas presmted, the Jo1nt Camd.tteo fOfl."ld

tho r .ecord o£ Pe:.'1.l"l Harbor in.canplete.
Knox were dead.. Hany

I!I.O.re.

Hop~

Fra.nkl1n D. RoosGVelt and Secret.u:y

an intimate and official aJJsistant of the

President died ahortl¥ after the 1nTenigat1on began.

m

health kept Sec-

X"crtary of State, Cordell Hull, and Secretary of \rId', Stimson frorn. giving

2S

-Ibid.

intornw.ti~ which would
Th.

have been

C~ss1ona.l

Report unsatisfactory.
and i..'1.complete.

valuable~ 26

Investigating Camdttee found the Roberts

It was made hastily, and. vas

pr~

to be inadequate

It d,id not inv68tiga to the int..aepted "witlda a.-agu"

sent early in Deeem.beJr, 1941, prior to the a.ttack on Pearl He:rbor.

Neither

did it find out who accepted the . .sages and to whom they were sent. 27
The fact that Wull1ngton failed to tran:mr1t the tltdnde messageslt
to the canmandws at lla;wall bee. . an important piece of avldence during

the Congressional. Investigation ot Pearl

H~.

It General Short and Ad-

mi:ral Ki:rrnel had not received the vital int.elligence tranamitted 'by'tile
ftwinds

mes6age", tbey could not have been elq)ected to act upon it. Hr.

Justice Roberts test.ified that he would not hav. read it (the winds message)

aV" if' it had been shown to him.. '.Uhe Iriwstigat1ng Camda810n sa.ys.
rt should be noted, however, that Justice Robe%'ta bad su.tfi...
cient legal e~porience to knoW tM proper method of eollecti.~
and preeerri.ng evidence wh1\lh 1.."1. this case involved the highest
interests o£ tbe Nation.. The .fa-cts were then .fresh in the :minds
of key witnesses in WdhingtM. They oould not then halve been
ignorant ot their whereabouts at 1mporta..'1.t ti.tnes or have forgot...
ten the details of events a.nd operat1ons:,. No tUes would have
been "lost" and no W<)l'r.lation would hav~ beM distorted by the
passage of tim;e. 'Ihe laUuxe to observe t.hue obvious necessities is al.'11ost as tr~gic to the cause ot truth as the attack on
Pearl. Harbor itseU was for the nation.•
Theae difficulties were su:,")plemented lry even greater ones
stemm.1ni trom. P..residential restraints Of the Conn1tte. and from
the pa.rlisAn character of the Comnittee itself. 28

26

2Y
28

-

Ibid., 497.

-

Ibid..

-

Ib1d.

on August 28, 1945, curtailing their POWEll' to gaL'1-

tun access to official

It is true that the Pres-

documents .fran which they could learn the facts.

ident reJ.axed the order of August 28.. by a nw one leao stringent J on October 23, 19h5~ but 1ndiv1dual menbers oJ: the Comldtt•• were not permitt.ed to
search

the records.

The majorii:ly party mEll'1Oer& continued to hold control

over papers, records and other intomation. 29 Sane of the mjority nembers
of tbe Committee tried to have the r.atr1ctions l'E.I11lCVOO, however, when by

til

tmjority vote ot the Comnl1ttee. the minori.ty muibers were forbidden accoeUJ
to

go~nt

t:Ues and other

""~~

the ~ty inferred. tt>.at there was

a d.elib....ate attozn.pt being mtlde by the majority to r..id.e the truth. 30
'l'hese rostr1ctiou were opposed to tho usual pr;;J.ct.ice as evidenced

assisted in t.he inwotigo:t.ion of the Teapot Dome

member o£ the eornmittoe.
ho.d ever betm

ment.

hind~d

Se~l;

being e. minority

m~

ot tbe ccmrJ1ttee

He test.ified that no one

£rom searching the flles in

1A1'o.y'

dermrtmEmt

or

govern-

During the Coolidge admi.."li&tration, Attorney Genoral Daugherty Was

a.sked to res~ because he roi\tsed '&0 give the f"llM fran his depurlme.'1t. J1

President

~ lla.S

weU v$rsed in'the rights o! oomm1ttee mem-

bers, ha"'T.lng been bead of the Truman Commit-tee {late- the Mead Comm1tt.>.
During the tour years of its e::.d.stenoe, no memher of the eomm1ttee, whether

29 ~'t 498.
30 Ibie" 497.
3l Ib1?

97
eve:"

refused access to any Wol'tla.tion th...1.t

a :member thought relevant or useful.

At thE! time the Cartrdttee waa £omoo..

o! the I3&jor1ty or minoritY' was

t.ho methods which had proved ver::r successful. in the ~1 Committee were

b.:mned to the Senate inveat1g::diors

or

Pearl llarbor. 32 linen st:L'11Son declined

to appear before the Com:1ittee, he offered the excuse ot ill-health.
not answr the 116 questiona submitted

b.Y Sertator Ferguson, on

R,~ch6J

He did
1946,

but he did suhnit written a.nwers to 61 subnitted to him l-~ter IT,r the same

Senator. .33
Secret<:ll'j!' Hull. teet1tied. before the C(l1llllittee three timeEt, neverthe_
less tho Republican meniben at' the Committee were not illO'b"Od to c1'oss-wramine him.

They had no ~ oJ: sectu'ing L~Ol"l!lation £1'011 him, When the questions

sent to hiln remained un&nswared,34
.Ambe.••ador

Grew' B diarJ

had ~ given

to persons who were prepar..

i..'1,g it i:ar canmereial publication. but it Vias d«ded examination by the .CoJn.,.

mittee.

Excerpts of the diaries tiere printed in the record, and the rest

or

the documents were withheld. American law denn,nds that t,he court have &Coes.
to the wholG document, incatJes where a part ot the docUJll$1'!t is used by a per-

son in his own

d~£ense• .35

H1ss Orace Tully,

~sident

Rooawelt t 8

8ecret~

was allowed to suect the offioial letters of the la"to PNS.1dent., pertaining
to Pearl Harbor..
....... .,

The ConmittM and the eount~J had be satistied th.:lt her se-

98
l4Ction was correct, but it was hardly a satis£a.ctor.r one tor those wt-..o were
responsible for learning the tr'J.th and producing the evidence. 36
The delays in bIlUd1ng up defenses, such as air fields and radar

installations at Halfa.1i,

'!Im.S

an irlportant question bc.t'ore the Committee, but

,they were not permitted to question Colonel Theodore Wym..'U1, Jr. 37

Navy and War authorities' strongly advised a modus vivendi for tll:l."'e

rJlonths beginning in November" 1941, in order to give our armed forces t1.'11e!

to prepare for war. Secretary Stimson

and Secrtrt.ttr"Jr Knox examined tho docu-

ment a.nd told Secrektry Hull that this procedure would be a 8&le one.)8
Nwertheless, shortly after this, the modus vivendi was suddenly dropped

:!'rom the 4genda, and til.... wa$ substituted the Hull message which was
followed shortly by the attack on Peurl Harbor • .39 Genenl George Harshull
testii'1ed that

Ja~

:might have doc1ded not to attack

115,

had we succooded

in delaying ber attack tl.."lti1 !1oScov had defeated the Gel'ml'.m8 in Deeember,

1941.

40
Because the Camm1ttee was unable to get all the facts

the Pearl Harbor attack, it worked under a handicap;

however, it

reg~g

SUCC$eded

in collecting a vast amount of :lnformation in a short time, enough to point

36

~.,

31

-

501.

Ibid.

~.,

501-502.

39

~.,

$02.

40

-Ibid.

38
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out those who "were responsible tor the destruction of Pearl Harbor.

A study

of the material collected makes this clear. 41
The following conclusions lter. drawn .from thG evidence whioh was
collected by the

~tt.. :

In the months 'before Pearl fkaobor attack. there was a grow1.ng ten.sion with Japan, and aft.er !~ovember 26, war seemed imminent.

19h1,· the

t~_t of

felt that one

or

war had

bocOl~ so

B;r November

7,

strong that RoosC!lVelt and his cabinet

three courses Would have to be pursued:

either .Amenca's

leaders would maneuver the Japanese into firing the first shot, or the President could ordco an attack upon

Ja!-'\~Ul.

or he could ask Congress to decide

between war and peace. 42 But the Pru1dent of' tbe United Sih'ltes did none
of these things.

He waited for Japan to tire the first shot. 43

The Washington high aut.horities, eapec:1.&lly' the War· Council. and
the vlar Cabinet, had a very good chance to send identical and precise instl'UCtions to the canmtmders at Ravall, 'btlt they did nothing.

cil lll.Drlbered 1'1ve I'll_bars.

nam.~..

The WAr C0un-

the Secretaries of Btl.\. te, War and Navy,

and the Chief. of stat! and of naval Operations, whUe the War C.billet was
CompoBee1 of these same men, ioge:ther with the President, and lanetl.tltes the

commanding general of the Air Force, Otmera.l Arnold.. l44 It .seems atrange

41
42

"IfWI., 502.
~.

-

43 Ibid.

-

44 Ibid., $l3.

100
thn.t the nax.;u nWar Council and "lvar Ca.binet" were give to Roosevelt a.nd

his colleagues during peace ti."Ile,

it indicates that the leaders w... think-

ing in terms of war rather than olpeaee.

In thiD ca.se they should have

notified those in cblrge of our defenses at Hawaii, ani given th_ orders
to reconnoiter. 4,

The "War Cabinet" and the tt\'Jar COUl'lCUft discuased their

policies togethf)J" so that all might have the necessary in£ol'r!l&tion to make
proper decisions i..1'I. -.eh one'" own sph.... They met weekly' or more frequent
ly, and it was the President'. work to coordinate the civil a.nd militar,y
branChes.

46

}f..a.ny intercepted messages were decoded by the A.rmy s1gtm1

C~

or l:r<J the Uavy Office of Communication4ll,. and sent directly to the 'It~il.r Co\m..
cU" and the flWar Ca.binet. 1t47
It waa the President'. du:t.y

to see that his cabi.n&t and council

transmitted important information to the COlll!:landers of Hawaii and elsewhere.
The two groups, HWar Cabinet" and Will' Councllrl could, without difficulty or

inconvenienoe, uve seut neCesBal"'J and. exact 1nItruction$ to the Hawaiian
COlllluu¥lers concerning the danger of a sudden attack.

NeTertholess this

148.S

not done. These groups knew: that the Japanese were going to attaok very
soon, especially after l~ovember 26 ~ 1941.

They bad l_rned this through

decoded secret messageD V'hich had been intercepted. 48

- .

45

~.,

46

-Ibid.

47 Ibid.

-

48 Ibid.

514.
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The high offioials in

~fashington,

1.nclud1n.g the President, expect-

ed a Japanese attack '*perhaps ne,tt Hondaytl that is 'the l'londay follO'Wing Nov-

ember 25.. 1941.

The intercepted Japanese messages go.ve them this advance

inf'o:rm.ation, and the !rk.r Cabinet knew that Novmoor29, was the time-limit
fixed b:; Japan tor a ~lomatic agreement with the United Stattosl'

the decoded messages read:

nThe fate of our Empire hangs by the alender

we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this

thread of a £e1l1 da.ysJ

die. It

One of

Japa..."'1 considerOCl. our diplom.a.tic note of

Novemb~..r

26, 1941, a. "humil_

iating proposal" as revealed by an intercepted me.ssage. 49

On September

24, 19la... the Japanese consul at Hawidi received

d...

tailed inatntotions fpom the Japanese OoV8nmt.ent in regard to the vay he
was to roport, about United states T&88e18 in and around. Pearl Harbor. 50 The

Japanese Government wanted to know where the craft were located, hOW'm:;my

were in eacb place.. and wha. t kind of vessels.

For more exact pla.cflIcumt ..

the harbor was divided into five areas, A, B, C,

n,

and E.

51

On SeptEmiber

29, 1941, the Japanese conaul in }lawaii, in .answer to the "bomb plot" message, sent a system of s,ymbols which could be used to show the position of
52

United States VEissels.

Tbia dispatcb was decoded and translated in

~falb..

ington on October 10, 1941.. _Several other messages were sent from Japan

49

~.,

515.

50 IbSd., 517.

51

52

-Ibid..
Ibid., S18.
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roquesting the positicn, number and movements of ahips in Pearl Harbor.
These nessagea were intercepted and decoded.

All indic.utionn pointed to .an

t')

attack on Pe:.!l"l Harbor./

On November 1$,

1941, the Japanese corJSul in Honolulu was asked to

give his Itahips in harbor report" about twice a week.

During the fortnight

fran November 15 to 29, four I!1t\Seages asking for the location of ships in
Pea.rl Harbor were sent to the Japanese coruml, vho forwarded the inf'or.nation
to'1'okyo on Uovember 18, telling the number of ships, where loca'l;,ed, desi£-

na.:M.ng the subareas of Pearl HarborI and reporting the movements of destroy...
ers. 54 These messages were inttlrcepWd, sent to Washington by the Cemuni...
cations depar-tment before Doeanber 6, 1941, and were decoded and translated

there. 55
Japan had never sought 1nt()l."Bl.ation about location of vessels in

any other ~ tha.'"1 Pearl Harbor, a.lthough she had endeavored at different

ti:mes to learn the position of the United States Fleet.

The ttbomb plot"

:rtl&s$age and the requests for inf'orma:tion about Pe:u-l Harbor indicated tl'.at

Jupc~ was going to attack there. 56
Lieutenant Canmander Kr.am.er of the Navlal IntelJ.igtmee in '¥lashing-

ton sent to the President,' the Secretary of the Nav.:t, the Chief of Na.val
Opera.tions, Admiral Stark, the Director of Naval Communications" the Dir&etor

5.3

54

-Ibid.

-

Ibid.
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01

~~u. ~t~,t.be DUteotor

of

w.~l"

PlAna, end the

~tor

l~

of

xntell.:1geno. the ~l ~ ttbtnb plot" ~,tGd 1l_-ae.57 ~ men
~tMd

the .~ plot,» ~ tb~, ~ of it ..

attack on :y;b1P8 1n
J~~~
~

to

get

about tho

s:1mP__ wanted

~l. HaJt~,

all th1a

~1cul~ WOl'tb.t~n.

1a wuch

pL!W for an. aU'

fMy t1:tOUSht. it we aW'~ of t1me for the

~•• act1v1~. t.be:f

~ kOflg

4\

_,it

1lil.

U t~ h&d ~~ .~

abould baft

~

d:htc~

or .~ fltM".

t.hat U Japm

iQOh ~

woiWi not haft ~ nec...,..SS ~, th$ ~ to ~ ~
Tolqtt"... Uwa~ sent back ~ 1ndloat1nc that tbe tt'bc:.llib plot" ~ d.wel--

op:1ng

~.

and. 'tlOUld 'bo pat. Sate

~1«l t~

th.... >9 The

~

of tM

kUOI4t4ge about. Ii~~ta 1tl the ~ lid th&'t the fllhips ~ 'be
i:£;

~, 1# ~ . . &t~

~~.

tbe

_~

~~.

Pt:k:ar1

l~f.i@ ~.,

by

or

tv dDrGOt. l.'lft8:1on...

of thU3 JapaM"

I~ .~

~,''i;I_

and.

f~ .....

~

tbfl

baye becm. saved, .. at leaatJ lAS;g

~. voul4 b&_ bien . . . .61
1dld:ral

~1 VilLa

l4:tb ltt s.t_t,-. Oenwal
tQ'4" tile

nMt wb1J.o

to iJl$ tl$Ot . .

:n

~aic

.t1. . :

~J ~~

and ~

,~1fl.

~•

th~ t~ ~'\~

of

of tb. tl.atr AM

t.r~ ft;~Y.f.l

C~~

bu:., •.

$ ~.~ble

"to, h:ia b&d", Th..~ m.,. WQ.attcn ~1~ danger

~ ~,t

59

at

519.

mft ~ ttivoa.

th$ ~ldcmt, h1s

¥u

104
Cabinet a.."ld.

nus

~¥'ar Cou..'lCU had received vital Wormo.tion:J the tfbonlb plot"

messages, long before the P~.rl Harbor attack. These messages intercepted
by' t.he

the

ArsJr:r Signal Corp. and the Navy Office of N.'1V'<l1 Ccmmun1cationa concern

neet and. the protection of the lla'Val base at P.awall. Admiral K1mmel and

General Stort did not have acoess to this Wormation.

obligation

or the

It was therefore the

:President and his colleagues to see that thes. men re-

ceived th.1$ vital in£ormation which directly concerned the

neet

and the na-

val baa.,62 The 'Washlngtona1,l.thorlties were guUty of neglecting an :1mpcrt...

ant c1ut:r toward Kimmel and Short. 6)
'£he "Pilot Dlt'Ssage" .from J_pan to her mabasGadors in \iashil'\gton an-

nounced the o~ of t,he Japanes. reply to the United St~!te8 note of November 26.

to the

It

va.. to be in fourteen part.

s.cr~ or

J

the last of wh1ch was to be htmded

State on December 7, 191a.. 64 Long before December 1, a

great mass of information bad been collected and deliwred

to thetofaar.J.ngton

aut.ho:rit:1es. They should have been abl. to judp the intentions ot the Japanue from this intormation, and the commanclera at Hawaii should have been
inf'cm.ed, oot the ~on high authorities d.1d not Worn th_, although
the information was very neceaAJ'y' for the defense

-

62 Ibid.
63 ll:aii.4.

64 Ibid., 520.

65

-

Ib1d..

ot Pearl Harbor. 65

10$
The!' men at Washington responsible for preparedness, received mes-

sagea showi.."lg 1:.110 United States waa fac1.ng great. da..'l;er. These men were the

President I the Secretaries ot state, 'War and lJavy, 4nd the 0b1et of SWf
and Chief at liaval Operations.
~1s

The ''maaic .. " that

of Japanese code messages

WI

not

a

SeDt

t11e reports from the

to GemIral Short

(:Jr

to

Admiral Kimlnel, and much general intoma:ti1on fr::r>l othezo sources was also
withheld. 66
If a

I'm. of

the history of Japan be made, it becomes evident

that Japan haa on more than one oceasion used the strategy of su.rpriae.

Tho

Unit.ed. states should have 'l.»tm ready tor a sneak attack, because the high

authontiu at li&4hi.ngtQn hid plenty of information concerning the 1~';'In'd.nene.
at war.

seeret~ Bull, at a meeting with these authorltie6 on tlovember 2$,

and again on I~OTember 26, elq)rused the opinion that the Japa.nese would make

a surprise attack, perhaps at several points at once.

Ambas.dor Grew also

felt that the Japanose would atti':l.ck suddenly a..."1d. without Warning.67
President Roosevelt vas in i l l probabUity ex:pectL"lg

Japtln_e :CONes. Therefore, he and h10
keeping this knowledge

a..'l

attack by

·war Council were not warranted

in

trata the comr!ta.nders at llawall. A lllesage from Amba,s;..

adoI' \'lin.ant in London at 10,40 A.Ii. December 6, 1941 (Wa.shington t1m.e)

in-

famed Booaevelt that two large Japanese forces were sa.1l.i.ng toward the Kn.
PeninsulA.

Still the President

-

66 Ibid.

67
68

~.,

521.

tO~'fk

no steps to alert Hawaii. 66

Athiral Kilmilel received a message on November
that the J.apanese might make

the Philippines or Guam.

Q.

24, 1941,

stating

surprise attack in any direction including

He was told to inform the senior 0.£'£1cer8, but

that utmost secrecy was necessary" so as not to arouse the Japanese.

The

next message announced th4t negot1a.t1ons with Japan were ended, and to ex...
pect an aggressive move aga:ioot the Philippines, Thai or !ra, a"ld that the

number of the Japanese forces was l.arge.69 The high authoI'it1ea in Washingtoo failed to estimate the danger in regard to Japanese plans, and to notify Hawaiian camnanders of perils they might meet.

authorities were negl1,gent.

In this respect the high

They did not act promptly in ew,luIating Worm-

ation they bad received, nar did they send aI>propriate directions. 70

Five months prior to thiS, in a memorandum dated May 26, 1941,
A<biral Kimmel requeatedtb.at he be turn1shed with information, as soon as

it would become avail...able, bearing on Japanese movements Which m.1aht affect
the base at Ii:wa11.

11 Ue said tha.t his was a d.i.fficult position. Located

far from Washington, he is not Wormed as to

ment.

~

pollet•• ot govern-

Hence, he cannot determine 'What course of action is best, and

times does not know what taree he will be pe:nnitted to use.

.~

The uncertdnty

created by lack of necossal'"y Wo:t'l'!lAtion intorferes with the proper execu....
tion of naviiil operations. 12 Adm1ral Stark and G«neral :HarsluU.l also sent a

-Ibid..

69 Ibid.
70

-

71 Ibid., 90.

lD7
memorandum tb the President. in Wb.1cb they informed him. that Japan' s fieet

was superior to that of the United Stat.. and that our Amed Forces would

not be able to und.ertake an offensive without withdra:w1ng all naval vessels
f':ran. the European theatre.

Sea-ides this, a great quant1t7 01' merchant ton-.

lk'lge would be required 1Ihich would have to be withdrawn from the Atlantic,

leaving Britain without the necessary aid in her fight against Ciermany'. The
Pearl Harbor cmma.nders thought that by the middle of December, 191a.., enough
air and subnarine strength could be aceumuJ.ated to deter the Japanese a-

gainst a"l'r'-J action south or west of the Philippine8. 73
An

at.tack on Pearl Harbor

va.. a necessary part or Jm.pan3Se strat....

gic plazmina;, and. thertt is evidence that thtt President was considering that

probability" Roosevelt bad stationed the neet at Pearl HarborI to det.er
the Japanese 1.'roa ma.ld.rlg an attack du.ring the diplonatic conferences I and

to make a show of power ~ Which might make the Japanese yield to to the wish

of the United Statu.

14

AdJUru

PJ.c~onj

then Camnander in Chief of the

Unit&d States Fleet.. advised against atatiol"ling the neet there, and was

"1'

moved. because of protest on that lsoue. lt 7$ Admiral WUli..-uu D. ~, fcmn
Chie.f e£ Naval Open.tiona . . of the aame opinion as Adm1ral aicha:tderon, in

th1a rega.rd.. The fleet would be effective only it 1t moved to strike Japan..

ese forces, which m1gb.t be too near .Alaerice.n, D!.ttch. or Brl:t1sh terr1toX7.

-

13 Ibid.

-

74 lbid..
15 Ib1d.,

522.
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United states n"t at their left, and to destroy it, 1£ possible, otherwise
tlley

could not hope to be successful in theirconquut of . .t At.d.a. 16
P.rime H1n1ster Churchill forSd that the United states Fleet would

be attacked tor he reasoned that JaPl n would not attack the Malay Pen1nsu.la,
Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies w:Lth the A.mer1~m

n.et at

its rear. 77

Colonel otis Sadtler testified before the ItJ:JrtS' Pearl lJarbor BrJud

that

GI.

Japanese message had. been caught b.Y the Un1ted State, senice men

wbich t.cld that
with

L"1

important muaqe was coming, which· would announce war

a certa1n countl7'. A talse we&thel'" report would give the menage. !he

A:I:rt1y' Pearl Harbor board intercepted this second meeusag~ which gave the in-

format.ion Ueaat wind rain" Wb1ch meant that Je.pmi Would. go to war w1th the
United Stat_, but that it would preserve peace witb Russia. 76 This original message baa die&ppeared .fron the IiaV7 filos.

It was taken £rom the .fUes

and. sent with other papers to the Rebert. COIIdssion.

varioua places.

~

haft all disappeared.

Copiu of it were in

79

The Joint COl'lgr.sional CClltUm1ttee, alter conducting :tm;reet1gations

for

OV'f!f1t

~ler.

two ll1C.I'1ths, rendered.

the concluaicns with

II

Feport

~d

of the :majority party. The tollow1.ng

to ruparudb1l1t:tes:

1. The lhp1re of Japan attacked Pearl Harbor without being

76 ppA.
77

~.

78
79

fiaA., 526.
!bid.

-

1'1'\.. ,.............-

to perform tids act of a.ggression.

The treacherousness ot the atta.ek is

shown by the tact tho.t Japanese ambassadors were kept at 'II'!asbingtOl'l, con...
farring with the govomnent officials and pretending to seek peaca, while

actuaJ.ly' their ndllta:ry tore" were alftady moving across the Pacific to
attack Pearl Uu-bor. 80
2.

Japan is responsible to'/!' the at tack on Pearl Harbor,.

The Ja-

panna used astrikL'tlg terce of great power and executed their attaok f'r<a
a great distanoe. They were much more poWertul. tMn our

3.

suspeo-

The foreign nlations of the United States ldth Japan were

such that there

ot

c~ers

was no just reason for than to attack us. Tho Secretal'1'

Strate bad make known

to

the War 4..'I'ld Ua:r.r Departments the orlticu con...

ditions that 'N'er'e developing, and that diplomat1e relatiens had ceased..
it

wa.$

therefore time

tor the milit..u'y' to

tcL~e

centrol.

4. No ev!cIenee was found 'to prove that the President and. his
secretaries coerced or tl'icked Je.p;m into war,.

5.

The Prendal1t and the high uu.thorities at

~'1z:.8h1nston tri~ in

evsry way possible, to avart w.r with Japan.
6.. The

~

and Navy taUed to avert the disaster at Pearl liar-

bar, because they did not establish reeonaissance partios to watch the mevemen't$ o.f the Japanese.

If they had had a lorce reconnt.>1terl.ag, they would

have discovered the hostUe torces a.pproaching and could bave fought them

110
off, and thu& 8&V"ed Pearl Harbor.

7. That the
eV~Jono.

J~,r..aru:t6e

struck at Pearl lL:.rbor was a surprise to

Yet the Washington high authorities knew that there was danger

of an attaelt by air.

The Hawa:Uan ot£icers knew of the imminence of

\:1'.3.%'.

6. Tho Command.$rs a.t Pearl Barbo,%' tilled;
a) To perform their duty;
nence of war)
coordinated

they had other WOl"'ml'ltiOIlJ

the~
b)

they had been warned of the imdthe A'rm.J! a.."1d liavy should have

war dc.fens$ p).at>.a. 81

'1'0 alert their men, atter receiving _mingo .fran the

\Jashington high authortt1. bet~ Novan.ber

21 and December 7, 1941.

e) To exchange all war 1ntormat1on, and to plan their defence

aircraft.
e) To,•• that the Jl.rmy and tktV'J had their equi'pment ready.
r) To use the forces and supplies under their control to

repel the Japanese raiders.

g)

To properly interpret the message. sent to the.

9. The mistaku made by' the

e~ers

at Hawaii were mistakes of

j lldif4'&nt concerning tn.e information they possessed.
10.

The ~/ar Pla.ns Division of the ~Snr Department, £aUed. to in-

:tom the Hawaiian CotnMand, tha. t they bad not alerted their department out-

ficientl¥.
---....,.e"""l-~.

III

Depa.rtment failed,

a) To consider oarei'u.l.ly tM illteroepted messages £rt::lm Tol\:Y'o
to Honolulu

or Sept«nber 24,

tiOVE¥llbw 1$, and NovGIlib.. 20, (the bcrnb plot

plan) • The, rJ4waUtm COL1!namera should have been Wormed of these 111tercept.ed. messages, as they directly c~ the Pearl Harbor base~

b)

To be properly on the alert 'to take the "one o'clock mea...

sase." Ifth1s message had bean con"ectly interpreted, the oOl'l1l.l1iaJki would.

mVG been able to alart all the outposts or the Pacific as General 11arsball
tried. to do as .$Oon as he raceV'0d the in.f'omat1ol1. 82
12, The Comt:'ittee is

ments

dj"d

ot

the opinion that the

Arm::!

t4"ld Navy Depart.-

not receive sutticient infonnat.ion to put than on the alert £Of'

war.
Bn.sed on the CCIlUldtteets investigation, the :following recamnenda...

tiona were presented to the Senate,
l~

Unity o£ cOll'WUld should be e.;t;'lbl1ahed immediately at all

United Stat. military &ltd naval otatiOl'l3.
2.
togethQl>~

Arrq and :N~rv.t intellig~nce agencies should work

Of.f1cers who

haV6

ver:r clooely

an apti:tud.e tor this work should be caretullT

chosen and kept 1.."1 the position for a long time in order that they may know
~1r field thoroughly and become competent in 1nterprethlg Wo:t'm.a ticn re-

ceived. Those p.ppo1nted sbould be eleg1hle for promotions, just a.s tlllY' other

-

82 Ibid.

112
person 1n tlu.. s~..
p*S.c....t:UntD a8 well

Etficient intolllge."lc:e service is :important in

as in war.

3. The COllmittee wished the activities of Theodore

Wym;::"''l,

Jr.,

distriot qineGr in the Hawaiian Depart.m&mt, invest.ip.t:ed. 83

SeQ.1.tora Ferguson and BrustG' of t110 minority would not accept
the

~jor1t;y

report, calling it "illogical and unsupported by the preponder

ance of evi.det.lce." 64 They ga.ve a separa.te report.

It st;;;.ted that the

Pruiden:t of the United states .tailed to secure cooperation among the War
Cabinet 111 deterr.d.ning what course to follow.

The President should have

insisted that clear and eract directions be sent to Kimmel and Short at

Hawaii. The Constitution andaws of the United st.<ltes grant the preIJident
65
power to en1'orce oooperation.•
The CcImuu'lder-in-chief of the a.rmed :torcea

a: the United

States appo1."ts the chief officers iL'ld tinal responsibility

rests on him. There.tora K1Jmne1 and Short could not be bw!ed.. The President·a decision to .:litiait tM Japaneae attack made it a more urgent duty for

him to Worm the lI,aw~ CQ'l1m&nd.ers, and order than to !'.1lly alert their

fore.. for defense against a JapaWHle attack. 86 President Roosevelt and
the h1gh autbontie. tailed to do their dut,y. They neglected to inform
Admiral Kimmel. and General Short of the im.m1nence of war ~ and tM7 faUed.

to give them the inf'onnution obta::L"ed. by "l'lla.gic." A few men were attempt..

8)

~.,

251-253.

84 Horgenstern, 318.
aSIbi~.,

318.. 325.
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r-

ing to pre~re for war by the cont'erence method.

They were trying to do the

work 1ih1oh should have been aasiSned to the leaders ot the am.ed forces.
neglect to make the proper preparations for
the President and his War Cabinet.

WoU'

Was the

gl'FJa test

Sane powerful individun.ls

To

failure ot

~

making

decillions 1nd.ependently of the reat of the Cabinet, and even of Congreaa. 87

PlrHident Truman t til claim that 'the eountl"7 a8 a whole was to blame
as much as an:r single individual. cannot. be ac:cepted because the &"1lerican peo-

ple had not been informed of the imminence of warII or of the messages learned
through

th~ comm.un1catiou department. 88
The minQ:rity coounitteo of the Congressional Investigatit'lg Committee

believed that the tragedy at Pearl Harbor was clue to the failure of the h1gh
o.tficialJl in our govarnm.ent.

Using the rodence that had been

they dr.. up twnty-one conclusions stating who was respon.1Jible

llu'bor tragEidy.

coll~ed,

tor the Pearl

Tbs twentieth conclusion stateas

In the final irul'tanee of crucial 81gnificance for: alerting Ameri~
can outpost commanders, on Saturday night, December 6, and SW:Jday m0rning, December 7J the President of the United Stat't'!8 failed to take
that quick and irurtant executive action which was required by the
occasion and 'btJ the responsibility tor watch£u.l.ness and guardianship
rightly uaooi.at«l in Jaw and pra.ctice with his high ottice fran the
establisbment o£ the Republic to our own t:1mes. 89
It is the .fixed policy of the government of the United. St..'1tes to
preserve our country and its pos••ssions tram attack.

This polley ill a. per-

lnanent one which has been reaffirmed by Congress many times" When war loaned

87 Ibid. , 325

99 U:,413.

..

large in Europe

t#

Asia.

The execut.ion of that fixed pelie,. is the dut l ot

the President, r~ he 1s O<xn.mander""in-<:hi.ef of the armed forces.

vho is bound \0 decide what 1s beat

It is he

tor the country. The reapanalbillty o£

n:uudJlg plans far its detenae rests with him.

It is true, that he is ably

assisted by competent advisers, bJrt. in tbe end, it is the Pr_ident who
makes the !ina.l decision. 90
Hav.t.ng made an analys1a of the respotl$ibility

tor tbe war between

the United States and Ja.pan, by sta.ting the opinion:a of the mere r.pu~1.ble

hiGtorians on the subject, the aut.hQr of this thuis finda that writers do

not agree.

Sme put the responsibility

tar the Pea.rl

Harbor diaaetet' on

president Roose"l'elt, a.nd his War Cabinet, WhUeothers bJane the vhr Lords

.

It 18 the ....5.tet!e opinion, that both the United States and Ja::).:,\n

boa a. share of the CUllt. The Japanese, 'b:Y" their open acts of ag!'P'flssion
and irJuatice, performed :1n complete violation of treaties and :L."1tel"na.tion...

al agreements are responsible.
bJ.A.l1'le also.

They foreaw th.'1t

Wa.shir-Gton officials ~qr their sh,u'c o.f t:!1e

war

i.11nS

inevit,:,tble, yet they failed. to Mamo

their responsibilities, when the country"

14$,$

in grave &..~etr.

!t is true,

tilAt they tried to delay the war by a thX'ee-.fo~d pressure, .first diplct'l.l2.tic
then econOMic, and £irkilly by act1vely aiding Brlta:tn and China IT.1 sanding

supplies, a.."1.d. mu.."lit1ons in ).,:trge quantities, and at the sane time, ~~inderlng

Jap1;l.:1 by u total embargo on dsentio.1

w:::;r

mterinls.

In this wc.::; tM United

90 Cl1arlcs A. w,%'d, Amcrj,can Fm;:e~ Pol' ~ in iJ.lil U1ld.ni, 19.32.lSUl, l~ew Haven, 1947, 567.
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States hoped to delay the Jap:.tnese long enough to enable the country to p:re-

pare tor war.

In the J.1.nal months, when Roosevelt and his War Cabinet knew

of the hlrl.nence or war ~ they .failed to t~ke the steps aeeded tor the sat..

tyof our navy and ail'" force. The h.igh authorities .at
SiOM

Waa~ made dec1..

which ehould have been made b.r oftiC«t's trained in n&v.aJ., air ,and mil-

it<.4Jr affairs.

In the crucial hours, wbe.nlimagic lt L"lfQl"'ro.ed the War Cabinet

0:£ the c~ty of attack, they failed to alert Admira.llthtnel and General
Short~

the two

infonnation,

lll~l

~

who could have prevented disaster had tha;r received the

the high authorities, to which they were ent1tlAJd.

In future" we 1!l'tvst secure our country". satcat'tJ,
w110 ldll

'b7 el.edtina men,

accept the high :respcnsibilities entrua.td to than b't.r the people

ot the Un!ted St.at.esI and who will be lllindtu.l of their dr.1ty and will sarve
A!l1Gtica 'flith ~ion.able loyal.ty.

h

ed.,

tV1J.liam E Dodd, Ju. &nd Marttha Dodd~
Ambassador Dodd t IJI ~l\l'
New Y(1.I;"k, 1941. r,~. Dodd was appointed ambassador to ~'"by lTest·
Roosevelt in 19)). Char1_ A. Beard wrote a pre.face to this book in which he
says. "As a dossier of evidence bearing on policies, methods, and labors, l-Ir.
Dodd ha$ left th1s journal covering atta1rs !rom the beginning to the end of

hi. RdS$ion. But it is mOl.'e than that. To use a mfltaphor, it cast. a flood
of li&ht into the dark passages of the time now past in wh1eh Adolf' Hitler va
solidifying and ~ hb dal1nion in~, from Ju4r, 1933, to the
clon of 1931. • to • the training and apel"ience in historical study a.bd
writing vh1ch Hr. Dodd brought to bear upon his j<mrn:J.l are cleo.rly rewaled.
in it and d1st:ingu1sh it from whole libra.r1es of diplaBatic memoirs eompUed
by professional gos.s1ps~ (P. xv-xvi )
116
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Grmr,

Joseph C.
Ten Years In Japan.. N'ew York, 19W4." i . a contemporary record
drawn trom his dIiiies, ini:rprrft~ and of.f1cial papers, In writing this boek
the author "sought to prcmote not only tIlt-. drive tor the uncond1tional surr0nd.er of Ja.pan, but also the reconstruction of peace at the end of hostilities. Toward the ultimate end, one of the purposes of the boQk, in the words
ot Ainbassador Gr. . _s to tell the .Americans that ·there a.re man:.r Japanese
today" who did not want val'J who realised the stupid!ty of at U\cldng the
United Stat.N, Great Britain, .lUld the other United Nations, who did everything in their power to restrain the miJ.ital"y extrem:1sta from their headl.ol1s
and suicidal aggrusionaJ'. cited by Kenneth Colgrove, !.!!. !." LI, 1945-1946,
316. JOSeph. C. Grew, Report from ~~~o. New York, 1942, was written !fto &ssist the war eft ort inthe'11n!tEii sta .es by impressing the American people,
with the tom.1dable chal."acter, the brutality.. and the fanatical determination
of the Japanese mUi:tary machine. ff (P'o1"Ward x.) Joseph C. Grew, Turbalent
Era"llIew York, 1952, tells same ot the reasOO$ why Pearl Harbor was attaCked.
Heglect al'.l.d ~unconscientioume$$' of our state Department officials are shown
by' the auth,~ to be partly responsible for the "surprise 1..t.t4Ck~tt Cordell
Hull, ~ H._irs ~ Cordell Hull, 2 vol., New York, 1948, oonta.1n8 extensive
quotations Nam mtiiO.fii2i at ~tions which Hull bad with ~senta.tives
of 'otltv eeVel':l1m.eIlts. He gives the main pointe of the conversations ratber
'-han t!~u elCaot wol"'de. Tile book is not desirable tor research, on this account
but iteontaw interesting h1storJ.cal material. Arthur H. Vandenberg,
~ ~l!!!. Pap... ot ~eM.toJ" 'and~, Boston, 1952, is an absorbing book.
It 18 a political biography, be!iii a ten-year narrative of Vandenbere;.. and a
portio~~ of the American people or his time. In Januar,r, 19$0, he wrote to a
constituentt"To me 'Bipartisan foreign policyt mea.ns a mutual effort, under
our ind,1$pensible two-Party STSt., to u..."l1te our o.ff1cial voice at the water's
edp, 40 that. America. spooks wiiih ma.x1mum authority against those who would
.
div1de &nd conquer us and the fre.e world. It d¢es 1\Ot involve the r_otest
~er 0:£' free debate in dete~ our position. tf (p.552) His son and
editor statesf "It was hiD dedication to b1part1&~noh1p that dadnated the
last years of hU li:t'e, and brought into sharp locus a gerle.ral.l;r unrecognised
spiritual side of his nature.· (P. xix)

.h-.,

C POtICm

Charles A. Beard, American Foreif! Poll! in the I~kirnb ~9!t1940
respwibUr
Chose-the thesis " . F
the United states was to blame for World War II. He said that the country
wanted the President and the State Departm.exit to. pursue a policy ot isolation
during the yoars 1933 to 1940. The world would have remained at peaCe, if
the high authorities at Washington had been permitted to pursue a. ditterent
policy. The isolationists would not allow a. preparedness program, and so
lnl.lSt ~ the blame for a.lloldng aggression in lhrope and Asia, which tinal.ly'
New Haven, 1947, is a study in

e's. ;

rNulted in "the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Beard saYl that in order
to test the truth concernina the people'. responsibility tor t~ poliCY'.
W$ should det~ who innuenoed tbe people toward isolationism, peace and
neutralit;y d1lll'1ng tbe rear. 1933 to 1940. Did .Roosevelt and Hull contim1ou.sJJr oppose the iaolation1sts<{ When and where and. in what speeches and
radio broa.d.casts was this done? Bes.rd s;qa that Roose"Nl.t adhered to an
isolation1at policy fr~ 1933 to 1937. In his quarant1.nespfKJCh in October,
of that ~. he broke away frem uolatior.d- t a!Jd. in its phce put the id_
o! collective security. (p. 117, 1$6 and 184) Gharles A. Be;:J.rd, President
Roosevelt and the ~ or the 1;lar" 1941: A Stu~ in !e2earancea iii{ Ii;;!

it!&, WiW'1G:viii';l9lilr.""ThIs 'volume is a seqUel· to AiirIT l~~~uer
hi ~a' ~-~940. It is based upon the documentat~on pro
iii ' he

Joint ~.. on {,he :ti!.ve:stigation 01 Pearl Harbor Attaok. "Th& ar;ument
of this book .ia epitom.:ized ;Ln the wOl"da taken ham its concluding chapter" It
declares e.c. tlr1:ttin, who reviewed the book :in !.!.!.. , Janua.ry, 19h9, 382...
386. He quotes Beard.'. titQ%'dAn "U the preoedenta set by President Roosevelt in conducting foreign. aftdns, as reported in the record.$ of the Con...
gressioDal Committee on Pearl Harbor, am other 4ocuments, are to stand un...
iPJpeaf.:bed ,~nd be accepted hmoeforth as valid in law and morals, then •••

the Pras1den.t ot the United. States ••• may, e.tter publie:b" announcing one

foreign policy" eecret17 ptWsue the opposite and so conduct foreign and mil1t::.17 affairs as to maneuver a delignated fore1p power into firing the first
ahot in an attack on the United States and thus avoid the neo. .:Lty of oalling on ~ess in advance to ~e its constitu.tional power to deliberate upon a d.eclaration or WI:U"." (p. ,82...$83) Qr:U.'fin continues: u~
who knew the o~ of the late distinguished historian on foreign pollcy
expecter:' this book to be hoBtUe to the Roosevelt administration, but ma.:D7
would baTe welcotned /,t. treatltent in a vein as relatively sober a.e that of

Beardts earlier volume, ~er1cart lore!e ~oUm:- 1:: 2

wb1ch a.,o1o.-.1

unwarraniid

Mak~..

fPi-19!iO,

$'tII'eep:1ng con.olUiiIons
by the record.. .
3 ;regret·t&ble ~toH that hi. last work should have ~ so largely an tt.XUlp1e
of p&rtilJ&Mh1p on a subject 80 deepl)"a part of the _otional ~e!l.Ce

ot the author. as tbe events Which preceded the recent world war.fI(Charlet!
C. 0r1f'f1n, A.B.;!., vol. W, JanuaX"y', 1949, 382-)86. Herbert. Feis, .D!!
Road to pea;"I f.1ai:bo%' t The ~ of the War Bet.lIeen the United states and
.TaPin;-PirDCetOll" I9$0. '""'""fn'"'"'th!'SviiUiie; 1eI1 'il!iS showus fINer] tWIst and
turn 01 the road which 1«1 t.b.. Unit.ed stat_ into 'W'&r with JaPlUl 1n 1941.
liThe decade since this road was traveled. has laid bare most of its secrets.
Hr. Fela had. access to the State Depa.rtment archives, the stimson, Morgentbau, and Clrew diari.es, and seleotions fran the Roosevelt papers, and had
the opportunity to talk at ~h with ~ of the Ame1"1cans involved in the
negotiations which preceded the outbreak of the war w:1. til Japan. on the Japanese aid., he had the :records of th. International MUita.ry 'l'ribuivU at Tokyo, t.b& records of the 8~ tribunals at Nuremberg, and the ~ reveal.1ngl1do and Saionji.....Harnda diaries, as well a.s other documents and studies. rt
(mWin c. Re18obau.. makes thea. comments 1.\1. his review of The Road to Pearl
Harbor, A-li.!., LVI, October, 1950 to July, 19$1, 617...618.)- -

t

..,
~i1Jli'k'1'l

tion, New York,

L. Langer and S. Everellt Gl_son .. ·.~

~ge

12 Isola"fl.

1950, is a study of Ameri.can foreign policy d'lU"ing the years·

19)7 to 1940. Ianger aM Gleaaon wel'$ 1nvJ.ted. by the councU or Foreign
.Relations to undertake the talk of writ'1n8 a h1st~ of .American foreign policy of the period prior to the Seoom. World War, and contim1:1ng through 1940.
The project was financed b'rJ a substantial fund. fran the Rockerleller Foundation. The book naturCi1l..1.1' supports Rooaevelt and. -lihe h1gb. a.uthorl.ties in
.
Washington, .!.nee the authors have had p~l. flontact and couns~l f'roa
these men. Charles Austin Beard' c.riticdzed the Roekerf(llllw Fomdati= ..,-..
ing that it did not ltwant jou.:rr.t.alista C1r &n7 other persona to ~e too
elosel:1 and critiCue the offieial propaganda and of't1c1al statements nth..
t1ve to our haLlic. a1nus and activit1ea, during World War II • • • • Instead
of pr(:mot1ngthe liberty of reseU'Ch and writing tha:t winnow f&ew ~ t1.c-tioms, su.ba1d1Md histories of th.ie 1dnd pr9part)d to strve a purpose fixedin advance,' a:re more Ul~ely to perpetuat$ errors than eliminate then • • • ,
otticialareh1veB m.ust be open to all e1t1sens on equal tenu, with special
priv1l1g•• tor none," \1a1t.-lti.ll1s, Tb,u Ie Pearl: The Un1ted States and
l2k:l~ Hew York, 1947 _ The a.uthor
;;t "theTeai pre<ied.liii Peari
i~,'""jI""'ving an aCCQunt of the Japanese preparations for var,and our own
pn,p.u-ations. fIe tells of i¥he meetings of ambassadors of too two countries,
in an ef'torttd seek a solution ot their diffioulties. 'Mr. M1ll1s draws on .
the government )."ecords, purticuJ.arly the Pearl Harbor investigation for his
Wormation~ He sides with the RoOlltCiWelt adm1nistrat1on, taking the stand...
po1nt that war wa.$- unP."otdable, that thwe was no other
even though u. s.
polic1es brought VBl" tc our countrj. This I. ' •.'\1"1 1... important IlS it tell.:J
oJ: t,h. Q1.r1~oI1S vJ: l>listakee 'Wh~ch le4 tc'1Jii &.~'Of' Pearl llarbor II It
leads up to tn. of the ereatest ~11ta%":r feats ot bisirory, the v1~ that
lost the TAr tor the Axia power.~ (James A. F1.eld, Jr. reviewed the above
book 1ntlle !.H-!!., LIV, Oct., 1948 to May, 1949, 17;;"'17,.) Basll Bauch,
rt.OO~t frOm ~IUn:1~to Pearl Harbor, A ,sai:nthe Creation of a r2!:~
PolIcy, I. 'rorIi,
hucii -~la!U thnt .
- '0•. Roosevelt"We.s ~
ternatiooallst, and he Gndeavors to prove it 1n this book. A.tter the eurre.4der ot theWestfa"n Power. a.t Hlm1ch,_ Roosevelt turned from preoccupation
with ~$i;.ie -pt'obl.ls to the task of cl'uulg:tng: American foreign poliey fran

:treats'

"'Pti.n,

.if,

r -:-

"1,aola.t.ionJ.sm." to "hiterna..ticnal1sm"lfaqeanp11sb1ng tld.$ bit tv bit as b1s
apeechu and acts edu.cated the American ·people.
Charl_ C. Qrit.t1n, reviewing this book in !-!!.,ll" LVI, Oct., 19;)0$
110, says tha.t~cb adm1:t.a Roosev$lt'. involvement of the Unit«! States .
a t11m1ted undeclared wart in the Atlantic Ocean, during tho autumn of 19141.

He argues stl"~ that the Prea1dent did not seek an. all out conflict there
now of lend-leaSe to Britain '
He cannot, h01i8'lel", conti.nu.es Rauch,conceal the tact th.a t these steps wre'
accompa.n1ed by a great deal of presid.ent.ial verbal lege:rdaua1n in order to
grasp one hom of the J.end.,.l.ease dilemma (all-cut support tor Britain ahort
of war),)and at the 8:lme time grasp the other horn (lend-lease was a ~"c"" .
and took only min1mum ~t.o bolster the

measure~

"

'

!:

... ""

,r
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Ori.tfin continues! "In dealing with the Japanese problem, Rauch
.forcefully' • • • and suecess.tUl.lT dem.olishes the Beardf10rgenstern thesis,
though he does not expl.a1n why the imposition of embargoea~ so long res1stEd by the adldn1strat1on, as likely to bring war, unleu lindtecl to nonessentials was resorted to in the summer of 1941, without .full recognition.
of ita aJ..moat 1neri:table consequences.
Idwin o. ne:t.schaueZ', The
United State. a.nd Japan, Cambridge, 1950.. is reviewed by Claude A. Biiie in
X.E.!., LVn, OCt"o5el', 19~ 1;(> July, 1952, 169..112. He teJ.la U8 that hurtorIeal writing at ita best is .fourJd in this book:. 14r. Reitschauer speaks b:'om
experience. He studies the problems of Japan, a.s well as our own, a.nd points
out the eoonan1c aspects of each. He. say'8 that we do not knOW' the Japsn.ese
culture well enough to understand the Japanese cilal"actel"S hence 80me th1ngs,
which seem to be contradictions in Japanese character, a:re not really so a.t
all, "The awak~ of Japan preceded that of other countries of Asia. The
st~le between democracy and totall ta.r.tanism was not .a passing phase of
Japan&ae histOl'7." (p.20l) It ha.s continued until this t~ under Japanese
occupation. Our objeotivesare to "rea.djU8t the bala.nce so that in the f't1ture.. peaceful and democratic forces within Ja.pa.nese societr will graduaJ.,4r
win ou.t ever t.he mili~u:1.st and authoritarian forces." (237) Mr. Reisehauer
draW$ this sage conclusion I "upon the .tat. or Japan b.anga t.he tate of the
world. Japan is merely one elemont, in tbe world order as a wole.. By helping Japan to beome a £:reG c1emoerat:J.c nation, we are helping to create a democratic, peace-10'V'ing world. 1f id.1Iard R. stettini:u.8" ao.,.~t . . the .a.u...
~l the Yalta Contarenee, Oa.rdcm01ty, New 10*, 190. A~to~
t
ua.J"""1':res1den~ noosiiiilt eould bave uJ.. no other agreements than he d1d
e at Yalt.a. St~t1n1U$ does not say whether the President'a action Wd
right or wrong. The President MUft'8d that weshoulcl build the peace on a
tim unity between our count.ry-, ltusia and az.e.at Britain. 1'td.s:1dea influenced a.nd pre-d.etC"mined tQ agreaent that was made at Ialta. Charlos Oa.llan Tansill, Back Door to w.r .. The Mot:tevelt
Pol1gz. 19n-19~. Writing in a.g.!." oct:;l9'$'2',~No. 1, 23.. JiiD:us il.Pratt,lliirver ty of
. falo sarIn nrto the work of World War II trm.iord.sts t such d the late
Ch.~lea A. .Beard, George liorgenetem, ~1il1iam R. ~lln, Frederic R. San, and &:rry Elmer Barnes, Professor Tans1ll now adds a much more weighty
eumented V01Ull1e. In addition to the p:rintedsources, he has made abu.ndant
uae· of :num.erou.s collections of peraonal papers and a walth of mat~l frOl"t
;<

••

r..ore!p

state Department arch:Lves.

l'l."he basic thesis of the book can be stated in a few sentences. The
!Viet Union, in ord. . to promote it. own program was the 1nst1gatorof war
. both the Far East and Eu:rope • • • • Japan was the natural ba.:r:r1er to the
praad of C~ in Asia; ~ in h-ope. The United States wae
, ilty of a f0. tal error in opposing Ja;t:anJ the a..ocracies eim:llm.rly erred
• backing PolAnd against H1tlti". Roosevelt bear. the ma:in guilt, for he
ot ~ 'ma.netlY'ered' Japan into w.a.r in the Pacific, thus enten.-:Ig the Iiu"owar through the 'back door'; he had already tneedled t Cb.amberlain into
1""""'~''6

a t1rm stand against Hitler in Poland, thereby pla.ying a key role in

,
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precipi"k:.t1ng"'var in!brope. Had Hitler been permitted paae~ to have
his way in Pola.nd, he would have turned east tor he t1t'OU1d have pref'erred
conflict with Ru.ssia ·over the U'.k:raine' to war with ~. and France over
Poland. ff w:1Jliam 1,. N.utIlaM~the Peaoe. ~....1945: Tho D~lcma9Z
of the Wartime Confwencea 1 .
n,~. lietmla.ncr-ucribea r
course
or iIiganatIons &itween
the United Statu and Buuia d.url.n.i the
interval between August" 1941, (The litJ.a.ntic Conterence), and F.'br.u:ay 1945
(Ya.lta). His ~ 18 objective and shtnm good ju.dgment. ae 83.1'8 that
tIle peacemakers ha vesuceeed.ed no better tlwl those who tried to plan a last...
ing peace at the end ot World War I. (See revies by Leland M.Goodrich in
J\.1!.j•• LVI, Oct. 19~, to July, 19$1, p. 168.)

2tain,

W1nston CburebUl, The ~ ~I Eft ~co~ World War Vol.
ill, Boston" 1950, bas been
W fr.tcm Sloe.on Iii
oct..,
1949 to July 1950, 876...818. nesa.ytl that ChurChUl carries the stor".r o£
ilorld -War n from tbe beginning of 19h1, to the Japanese attack on ~
and Brit1ab possessions, at 'the end of that~. American poUcY. is diS:" ~
cussed and ~ tributes are paid to lTaaident Roosevelt and bis .4:ris......
CburchUl tells us that the ,l)ri.tish int.ervened in Greece in order
to deJ.;.4Y the Geman o!'fensive against Ruas1a, and to 1nt':!~t~ with the plans
for the Russian campaign. (p.29) The first air-borne attack by the ~ADIJ
was l'!i\:lde against Crete. (1'. 284) This used up v.aluable men that might have
been placed to greater a.dvantage somewhere else. t'The forces or Goring ex..
pended there 1llisht eaaiq have Siverl him ~8, Ira.q.Syria,t a.nd even perhaps Pertda. ff (302) Buaia, altboughrep_tedly v.arned by Britain, thought
G~ 1IOulJ;.i .not attack bero .!or a long tbte. The be$t ~l"Y of the work
in the opinion of .Pre8ton Sl.san 1a vilat Churchill said in an address to
Parliament in 19411 ":!"At us not forget that the ~ has difficulties of
his own•.•• and that the struggles of history have been von by superior will
power wresting Y10t0r;y in the teeth of odde or upon the nanowut ot mrg1ns.ff
(P. 1.$$). Samuel B. MOl"iIonJ ~ th!'~. Battier, ~. J.~212
~.19ldt.:I Bos1ion, 19h9. The~ Oct. 19>0 to July, 1951;-m
.. ' .'. 30,
carrliI'ti" review of Moruon'a book ii Gordon W. Prange. 'l"he Bismarcka 'Barrier wus a eomb1na.tlon land"..so.a..air roa.dbloek ot ~ong Japalle$8 bases ,centered. around. the powerful and pivotal t~8 of Rabaul at the northern tip
of H_ B.r:1ta1n Islam.. 1tThe h1si;.olY.of the eighteen months of bitter land,
sea, and a1r fighting which he so expertlg describe' presented. no great fleets
maving into treme:OO.ous and epooll-mcld.ng battle such as l¥1idwa,- or I.eyt.e. Gul£•
• .. .. Morison was forced to deal with a series of relatively' small and isola...
ted actions. tf George· B.&msOl'l, The W
..terIn World and
A B~ in the
~t.erQ.ct1on of liu'o~ and Asiafu euI£ures~ YOrk, 1 . 3. 'Saiien,
~ent lUstorIin 'ol apan, has ma.de a stU7:& elf t.he affect o£ the ~J_tern world
~ Jl!l~n before 1900.
Japan adopted ~ie:stern culture more quiCkly than did

rmWed
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other eountiies~ She formed a. strong centralized state, a national eonscript army, a system of uni.venml education, and a. centrallzed. ba.nld.ng
structure. Sanson saY'S1 "To OV~$st1:mate the part pl.ay'ed b-/'Western
influe:lCe is to misunderstend mOdern Japanese history, and 1n consequence
to £om an unbaJ.aneed. 1£ not :mistaken Ti_ of the relation between East
This book points out the wq Japan has eontinuousq
and \iest." (p, 22)
resisted the introduction o£ Western idoaG. In All probabU1ty, it wlll
tal:e ~~S to develop a democratic wa:y of lUe in Japan. George B. Sanson,
JAR!!! in World Bi8t~. New York, 1951. This book contains two serlea of
leetUl"'u aellvered ~npan to the Japanese by its author, ~ B. StanSOlh The specialist in Japanese h1story' w:U1 read this smo.ll volume w1th
pro.fit and interest. Chltoshi'L'Ulap... W-an Since ~ New York, 1949,
The author ducribes Jap('m' s emergence .. ail feliaa:!:fiiit:;thr\!7Uih the ef'£oria
~ her leadera, who followed a ver"3' definite p1a.n. He pictures the riae
and fall of Japan as a world pOlf$r and ends nth the JapM.eH being trained.
by the United Staws. Ianaga do_ not ecmment or attempt to justifY Japan'
foreign policy', bttt lets the nader draw his own oonelU$iOlls, Ue aayat
"Japan was lFaciua.1l:' working heraell toward the .tta.~t c£ heg.ony in
East .A.sia~ 11 (P. 369), !;Itt hQ alDo write~n ftl)ual diplMaoy' .. • .. gave nee
to inconsistencies, contxadict1ons. .. .. • TM right hand did not always
know what the lett. h",nd _s doing." ( 8ee rEPtiew by' Harc>ld S. Quigley,
!i" LV, AprU, 195o, Nc~ ),

a.!!.

E..

POLITICAL MID rootroMIC mSfacr

Aaron DnniGl, ecL., A:mer.lca in Crisis. 7~ 0n1c1al ~cd.ee
in American tJist.g£l, New York,' !9~. ""In tIiIi volUme $~! reeens"
treat«t: Ii'Q&ii the Banks Closed" b7 Walton H. HamUton, Paul B. Sea;.rs"
uToo Black BlislardsltJ M(lIl"ris Janowitz, "Black Legions on the Ha:tchfn
Norman fIolm.es Pearaon, "The lfa~ov1et Pact and. the End of a Dram", In
theae essays the a.u.thO%"$ mve told ot the issues at s~'\ke and the ef£'ecte
of the crises on the peal>l. of our United States. They huve bequ.~
r_ponded with cOUl~age aoobave shown a willingness t.Q work topther when
public need demanded it. Eliot Janew...,.,! Chron1c:t.~ of Jf'.ccmt&ic ltobi,JiZ;!Uon in World \Sr. +.L ChrorJ1cles or Am.eriCa ~., 'vO!. ~J, Viii miven,
~. is ~ewed by Paul 'Fanter :in A.H. B.. , LVII, No_l, AprU, 1952, 758.
Those ue Hr. 'arm.'s words. ttAm~rei'l. ·oooncmie mobU1aation between
1939 and 191.6 C()DBt!tuted a veritable miracle ae Eliot 'ia.newa.y believ~1
vh1ch raised the st.tuxlard of living of the nation, gave labor. both urban
and rural - & new SenDe of dignity, and importance, and tremendously im.proved t.he position of the l~egro, while a1,mu.ltaneously pem1tt1ng the Unit~ .sta~e5 to vanquish the Axis and usume 0. position of lead...-ab1p in the
poat-war struggle against Soviet tOtalita.rtaniSlll. ft Henry L. st1msbn,
!)"elude to Invasion, An Account Baaed u~ Official Reports, Washington,

are
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1944. sth180n tells U8 ol the success of the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor, and hoW that a.ttack assured .tu.rt.her sueeoasses ~'1 the Philippines.
ff~1ith the balance or naval power in the PacWc llOif in their favor, the
Japanese were relatively tree to send mass reinforcemom..s to their in'Iasion
troops in

the

PhUipp1nea, lIhUe the PJ"Oblem of strengthening our out.numbared

t~ was under the circumstances, an insoluble
and .Amer1~ torces hopelessly out-numbered, were .torcGd

gurison

ODe. Fb1lipp1ne
to witbd.raw to the
Batun pen1nsula" (a mountainous r~on north of 1Jle ent.raAce to l-1anila Bay)".
for a l.:uJt ditQh stand." {p.4} N1cholAs 11u.n'q Bl&tlC', .Ap1er:i;oa F.aces the
~, Beaton, 1932. The author bel.ients that we tnUst bift sme Bii.! O't""a.
planned econcay.. He saY'S' "What I ask for, gentl_en~ is a plan, a plan of
int.ernational cooperation to solve the WOblcs that have b«:~ internation,..
a.l - not to sit and wait -- not to $tand and WP..1t - not m.erely to abuse the
people with a plan: but to present a. bet~ plan and to tutU)' for our time
and for the time that shall come alter UG that all tbe sacri.ticen that have
been made tor three hundred ~ all over this world to build institutions
of llbc't;r,ot ~da.u, of pollticaland economic ~ubity, to build them
into g<>VC'l:lm.rt.a and social ~. - that all that has net been wasted.
We have not ~ on a tal.$e track, bu.t we B~q na.ve been incouequent in
a.ppreo1at.ing and in meet.1ng the gravest lId.tuation with which ou.r system of
l1bc'ty has ever been faced. Let. the W01".ld w..'ike up. Let it dema.ndot its
JllEDl in public office that t'Mt7 e1thfJr take constructive lCtaflor make way tor
thm3e 'Who can .....am w1lll 11 George Morgenstern, Pearl Har~, !!1! StS!,Z.2!
til! ~ee war. Now York, ;?41. Cbar~s .4... :I3eal"d says: "!he catastrophe at
p~
or on Dec~ 7, 1941, it. s~ance and .1ta issue. is now and
un.do1.itJt,~ wUl long oont~e to b. an ~bl. cent.. vi jntell~ual
and moral 1nterest. Having ~tin1Hd the :more than ten thousand pages of
~ tes~ and oft1c1al papers bearing on this disaster be~or. I read
the prQot sheets c£ ]orr, l'iora«C"~t~'a boalt. I can .Y' Q1t of sane knowledge
of the. sub3Mt t.l:1at btl volume 18 a powertul work based on primary and ;1r..
reducible facta 1n the caM, ca.re.tu.l.ly gat.l.i.ered and buttressed by ~c. t e1...
4

tat10na of the sources. For his own interenees and. conclusi~l he gives
~tarr contexts," Wbat tho h\ar Cabinet and the War Councu d1d in their
frequent mMt:t.ng, befoh Pearl Harbor 18 desCZ'iJ)&j in }lorgenaternts book.
rrhe &eCl"et plans of the Japanese govemnent al"e disclosed by the intereepted
code wtdch the CQmmmicationa ~t dtlooded shortly before the attack.
United states Depart.wmt of State, )?Wa and liur, United. Stat·ea Fore!f:n
?olicY. ~1...1941. Wa.s~t.~, 1942. . ~ok'Pl'eients·"<l· :record of 1'o11;.1e;3
~ aQts
~ the til' J.ts<" states sought to pl:"'Omote conditions o£ peace
and vo;'ld order.
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PACInC

OCEAN

.L-__________---.-.---.--,--------------~"
I.)earl Harbor J shOW'.i.ng bert.hings of the Pacific Floet whan the
Japanese att.acked on Dee_her 1. 194J.. Wl&t'$b1ps indicated in black
were sum" those in black and white dama,ged but aJ.'loat.
This map vas cop1ed b"om George Morgensters

!l:! B!2!l 9! t!l!

~ Wa;r

New York, 1947, with the perm:Lssion of the Devin-Adair c~:uv.
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l'iAP OF OAHU ISLAND
RAWAIIJ.N lSLANnS

u

,
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. tr .

DiamGrict

l~~.·~

The island of Oahu" Territory of Hawaii, shOlf'lng objectives of
the Japanese attack or Decaaber 7, 1941, which brought the United
S't.:1.tu into iiorld. War II. This drawing was taken fran Pearl Ha.rbor,
The story of the Secret lia2:", by George Morgenstern, with ptrm1ssion
of The Devin ... Adair Canpany, New York, 1947.
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This world map is on Denoyer's Semi.elliptical Projection. ~he
elements of scale •.area and shape are adjusted 5C? ilS 10 combine

useful and mslructlvefeatures m the greatest poSSible degree.

Equatorial

~h~~~~i~:n~~~~r~£~~,!~~~:at~~~~=

presentalion to the globe-the onty true world map.
This r:nap presents a unified picture ofthew:orld. There are no

~~~I~~ke~~~e~~V1~: ~'=~~hr:S~~8~:tl~e~~

countriesandlocalilies.
The.SCilleis true on the central meridl3n, the equaror, and in
. AreasaooshapesaretJueonand

map provides approximate equal area
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The most important single
ography is the fact that the
earth is arotating sphere.
Semi-Elliptical projection
used for this map;--shape of the earth, due
the increasing curvature of the
to the proportions of
meridian lines as you
way from the center of the map.
Land masses near the
the map have to a surprising degree
the appearance you
s you rotate a globe and view the
curved-away areas in oe:!1S1)eC:U"e

map is chiefly valuable for showing world re
that neither land nor water areas be penal
the other. In this map the same scale is USel
water areas. This has been insured by beg1nn:
,
network of meridians and parallels on which tJ
plotted. All area on the earth's surface is accounted'
scale. The scale is 400 miles to an inch, all that can be ac~
on a 64 inch map, since the 25,000 mile equator then need,
of 62 1/2 inches.
,HiiUUrL<llli

Note how the map vividly contrasts the much narrowe:
Ocean with the huge expanse of the Pacific. Check it on'
If a world map fails to show this, and relations between A
Siberia, and between Labrador and northern Europe, it f:
in showing important relations a world map should brin!

Clearness in this way has been heightened by omitting e'
deemed non-essential in a simple political map of I
Relative importance is shown by the size, style and b
type. Continents are in a bold type of great dominance and
Country names are in capital letters. Cities are name
letters. Names of oceans, rivers and lakes are in itali,

Unity in the Map Proje
Since the equator is a full circumference of the eartlh,lll
tance from pole to pole is approximately half as long
uses an equator line twice the length of its central meri
proportions of the map are essentially correct. In anJ
type of projection the meridians that are further from:
must bend toward the pole, unless the map is "interrupte(
clefts, sometimes done so as to make all continents I
up-and-down position. That sacrifices unity in the map,:
relations obscure; for example, Siberia may be pulie(
from Alaska, altho it is actually very close. Unity is an
virtue in a world map.

Land Masses I

Polar insets in the lower corners of the map add measurably to its
usefulness. These are on the equatorial scale of the main map and
show these polar areas in their true size. Truly a world map for
education in this air age.
roller and board, dustproof . . . $17.00

Denoyer-Geppert offers a variety of world maps, in sOUl
the Americas are centered throwing the Atlantic and pad
into sharp contrast. In other maps, as in the one on tIh
the projection is centered on the prime meridian, keepiJ
masses undivided. This arrangement is preferred by mOl
for use in the lower grades. The continents are th
identified and learned. The old world may be considerec
in the right half ofthe map, while the new world appears
The political units making up each of the great land D
clearly colored and distinctly named.

Mtg.-15 In new octagon steel case ... $20.00

Mtg.-1D Folded, with eyelets.

wo:r~ld~m:a~p~~Iti~Inp~1;e

network of meridians and
These are the in<lis;perlsa
of reference that you
li:ry good school globe, and that
the map maker
idabout transferring the surface of the
sphere to a
dtThis network does not merely identify
ection;
Ih,ery means of plotting a world map, locating
f~eir true position and the relation of one place to
~o of this network we can really understand and
Isap, thru comparison with the globe itself.

~b

Straight Parallels
Parallels represented by straight (east-west) _
arcs or curves are a distinct advantage oi this'
relations, such as relative distance north or south
are easily observed and explained. When parallels are
a point farther than another from the equator on the
represented on the world map by a point nearer the
the Denoyer Semi - Elliptical projection, with its
parallels, comparisons of latitude are at their simplest.

[ian lines are 150 apart, so that intervals between these
Ir'esent one twenty-fourth of the earth's Circumference,
~r of time.
~l

ia

g

globe and on any map is determined by the mers, and should be so taught. North is toward the
along meridian lines. East and west are along parallels.
'dther reason it is vitally important that a world map have
,network. Children should practice reading direction
)~ projection of this map, check it on a globe, and also
'.tion in the polar insets at the bottom of the map. In this
lCm gain a real understanding of direction in maps they
,e led upon to use.

, at map of the world can combine all desirable features
'ile,but the Denoyer Semi-Elliptical projection achieves
r mpromise for school use. It gives us equal area for the
tlrtant part of the earth - 60 0 N. to 60 0 S. Note that
dbears a fairly correct ratio of size to South America;
I with a globe and also with the polar inset in lower left
lIap. At the south pole, Antarctic is exaggerated and to
lis a polar inset is provided, as is done also for the north
I, A measure of polar exaggeration in the map relieves
s somewhat around the sides of the projection, and
e best compromise between equal area on the one hand
nality (true land shapes) on the other.

Map S9a

_s map the "language" is consistent with all other D-G
naps of continents and similar areas. Political entities
sI areally in pleasing, distance-carrying shades of red,
Il!n, orange, etc. The oceans are in a clear, light blue,
I: of meridians and parallels in a dark blue. All names
fp, legible black. Standard D-G city symbols are used
ocities as to size. Post-war political boundaries are
ned in distinct red lines.
,is of Map S9a WORLD (handmounted on mUSlin):

A synopsis of the principal features of the map is contained in the
legend, insuring a maximum of use by both student and teacher. An
explanation of various abbreviations used on the map is included.
Distinct city symbols are graded according to size.
Mtg.-l0 Plain wood rods, top and bottom ... $12.25

Mtg.-14 On
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Australia
New Guinea Terr.
8. Bismarck Arch.
Belgium
Ruanda Urundi
France
Fr .. Cameroons
Fr. Togoland,
New Zealand
W'estern Samoa

Area
Sq. Miles
93,000

Population
690,613

19,536

3,390,205

166,489
21,893

2,819,981
918,638

1,133

59,306

~

mn

Great Britain
Br. Cameroons
Tanganyika
Br. Togoland
Nauru (admin. by Australia)

Area
Sq. Miles

United States
Pacific Is.: Caroline,
Marshall, & Mariana Is.
(minus Guam)

Ed. by Norman J. Padelford, Ph.D.,LL.D., Prof. of Internat'l Relations
© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts

34,081
360,000
13,041
8

Population
857,675
5,250,000
341,254
3,383

846

48,000

~

lIZ]
......

Palestine
Former Br. Mandate.
Israel now State.
Italian Colonies
Br. occupied.
Eritrea
Ital. Somali land
Libya

Area
Sq. Miles
10,429

Populo
1,912,

15,754
194,000
679,358

1,500,
1,021,
1,000,

317,725
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